ADVAITA VEDANTA AND JUNGIAN PSYCHOLOGY: EXPLORATIONS TOWARDS FURTHER RECONCILIATION IN EAST-WEST DIALOGUES ON THE PSYCHE

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ABSTRACT

Advaita Vedanta and Jungian Psychology:
Explorations towards Further Reconciliation in East-West Dialogues on the Psyche

by

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The two primary objectives of this dissertation were (a) an exploration of the difficulty Jung had with Eastern claims of higher states of consciousness, and (b) an exploration of the opinion among some Advaita Vedanta schools that enlightenment cannot be achieved through intrapsychic means alone.

According to Advaita Vedanta, Jung's understanding of the ego as the only center of consciousness (self-awareness) and his difficulty in imagining other centers of consciousness in the psyche are understandable given the inherent tendency in the psyche to super-impose (*adhyasa)* the subject of all consciousness (the *Brahman*) on objects of consciousness such as the ego (the *ahamkara*). An analysis of Advaita Vedanta epistemology does not support Jung's criticism that Eastern epistemology lacks a basis in critical philosophy. Numerous accounts of personal experiences from the East as well as the West that meet Jung's criteria provide adequate empirical evidence for higher states of consciousness. More recent quantum physics theories challenge Jung's view that there is a limit to which the unconscious can be made conscious and support Advaita Vedanta's theory of the conscious nature of the substratum of the universe. Jung's primarily philosophical objection to higher states of consciousness appears to soften when faced with evidence of life after death, re-incarnation, and ego resolution in dreams.

Advaita Vedanta demonstrates a superior understanding of the nature and locus of consciousness in the psyche. Jung's superior understanding of relationships and

communications among levels of the psyche as archetypally driven offers Advaita Vedanta insight on how mediate knowledge for enlightenment could be attainted through intrapsychic means alone. Eastern theories of dreams lack the understanding that dreams could communicate compensatory knowledge from the self to the ego. Limited dream material is presented as evidence that mediate knowledge for enlightenment can be acquired intrapsychically through dreams.

The Jungian self is closer to Advaita Vedanta's *Isvara* than it is to the *Brahman*. Advaita Vedanta complements Jungian psychology with another level of self (the *Brahman)* and another goal for human consciousness in *moksa* or enlightenment. Jungian psychology offers Advaita Vedanta the means for acquiring psychological as well as spiritual prerequisites for enlightenment.

DEDICATION

Dedicated to my father Ponvalam Muthu, my mother Kannammal,

my grandmothers Muthulakshmi Ammal and Nallammal,

my grandfathers Nachimuthu Gounder and Ponnammbala Gounder,

my granduncle Palaniswami Gounder, my grandaunt Ammani Ammal,

my maternal uncle N. Jegadeesan, and all my ancestors.

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There are many to thank for help and support in the writing of this dissertation, too many to count. Two I have to mention. To Swami Dayananda Saraswati, my Advaita Vedanta teacher to whom I was led by a voice dream, I bow in respect and in gratitude for higher knowledge by which every other knowledge is known. I was so moved when he changed the topic of the last lecture of my first retreat with him to *Brahma Vidya* to accommodate my specific request for it. I imagined that Arjuna might have felt similarly when Krishna gave him the higher knowledge. And of Dr. Richard Auger, PhD, my Jungian analyst of 14 years, I can only say that it must either be my good karma or his bad karma that he has been all that he has been to me over the years, a debt I can never

repay in this life. He has been for me analyst, father, guide, wise elder, companion, friend, and occasional punching bag. When I am not discounting him defensively, I wonder why I am so fortunate as to have had such a great human being in my life for such a long time, someone for whom I do so little.

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Note: The dissertation ahheres to the stylistic and editorial standards of the sixth edition of *The Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association* (American Psychological Association, 2010).

Chapter 1

Introduction

Dissertation Overview

Jung and Sankara

Jung developed analytical psychology in the West in the 20th century as a psychological model that focused on the potential for growth in the consciousness of an individual psyche, in part in response to what he believed to be a spiritual crisis in the Western psyche that had lost its meaning in moribund images of an external God (Clarke, 1992, pp. 57, 77). Sankara developed Advaita Vedanta on the basis of the ancient *Vedas*, the sacred texts of Hinduism, between the 6th and 9th centuries CE, in part in response to what he believed to be a spiritual crisis in the Indian psyche brought about by the fragmentation of Hinduism into sects that focused on rituals and devotion, in a disconnection from the eternal truth of the universal spirit in the *Upanishads*, the end portions of the four Vedas also called the Vedanta (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, pp. 17-18). Advaita Vedanta, a philosophy of monistic idealism, is a model of consciousness of the psyche of the world as well as a model of consciousness of an individual psyche in that it asserts the equivalence of the two in the most-quoted *Vedanta* statement "Tat tvam asi" or "That thou art" (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, p. 537). Jungian psychology and Advaita Vedanta, developed in entirely different times and in different social, cultural, and religious contexts as models of the individual human psyche, offer different possibilities for the growth and development of consciousness in the human psyche.

Dissertation objectives

This dissertation is a hermeneutical and phenomenological endeavor aimed at further bridge building between these two models to explore the possibility of a more comprehensive model of the human psyche, ideally with greater possibility for the growth of an individual psyche than offered by either model. In pursuit of the above objective, the dissertation will examine specifically where the two models complement each other and therefore offer possibilities for building on each other or overcoming deficiencies in each other. The dissertation will also examine specifically where the two traditions have appeared historically to differ irreconcilably from each other to examine such conceptual differences again through a dialogue informed by (a) deeper understanding from prolonged study of and personal immersion in both models in my own individuation process; (b) more recent theoretical developments in quantum physics; and (c) relevant empirical evidence of higher states of consciousness from Eastern as well as Western spiritual and psychological traditions.

The actual history of dialogue between the West and East has unfolded over a longer period than generally believed (Schwab, 1950/1984, p. 117; Radhakrishnan, 1939) and has had a greater impetus in the West in certain periods such as enlightenment and romanticism reflecting the prevailing conditions and needs in the West (Clarke, 1994, p. 28). At times, this dialogue has been quite broad in scope, acknowledging very general differences between the East and West and the associated pitfalls of over-generalization and stereotyping, and has been criticized for possible ulterior motives, including domination of the other cultures (Said, 1978). At times, this dialogue has been narrower in scope, taking the form of a comparison of two specific systems (eg. Anand, 1980;

Jordens, 1985a; Spiegelman and Miyuki, 1985; Spiegelman and Vasavada, 1987; Thornton, 1965; Whitfield, 1992). The dissertation, even though it belongs to the latter category of dialogue, has as its focus very general issues that still remain in the debate between Jungian and Eastern thought in particular and Western and Eastern thought in general on the topic of the nature of human consciousness, its origin and its limits.

Personal motivation

There is also considerable personal motivation in the writing of this dissertation. I grew up in India for the first 26 years of my life and have lived in the United States for nearly as long. I have sought personal growth through Jungian psychology and its derivatives for 16 years and through a formal study of Advaita Vedanta with an Indian teacher for the past 8 years, to whom I was led by a dream while writing a paper on Jung and Eastern thought for a class on Jungian psychology at the Pacifica Graduate Institute. The conflicts that arose in my psyche in embracing these two systems and my attempts to reconcile what appeared initially to be irreconcilable differences between the two have been a fertile ground (at times a psychic minefield!) for the development of this dissertation. Specifically, the Jungian position that rejected Eastern claims of higher states of consciousness that transcended the ego in the human psyche and the position in Advaita Vedanta (at the school I have been studying it) that the knowledge of the ultimate knowledge of oneself cannot be arrived at intrapsychically by an individual for epistemological reasons both played equally important roles in heightening my personal conflict and motivation to write this dissertation.

Overview of Jungian Psychology and Advaita Vedanta

Jungian psychology

In Jung's model, the ego is defined as the only center of consciousness in the psyche (Jung 1951/1969, p. 3). The psyche of a human being is divided into the conscious and the unconscious, with the unconscious further divided into a personal unconscious and a collective unconscious (Jacobi, 1973, pp. 5-9). The self, the center as well as the circumference of the psyche and an entity super-ordinate to the ego (Jacobi, 1973, pp. 126-131), is unconscious and therefore needs the conscious ego to evolve (Adler & Jaffe, 1973a, p. 65). The individuation of the human being or growth in the individual psyche comes from the conscious ego successively encountering and assimilating the contents of its unconscious, first the personal and then the collective, with the ego increasingly surrendering its authority to the self over time (Jacobi, 1973, pp. 104-107). The individuation process is a dynamic one in which both the ego and the self evolve over time with the help of each other. The impulse towards wholeness is universal, and its symbols appear to be indistinguishable from the phenomenology of religious experience in the human psyche (Jung, 1926/1964, p. 339).

Jung's methodology

Jung's philosophical outlook was much influenced by Western phenomenology on the one hand and the empiricism of Western science on the other (Jung, 1933/1961, pp. 134-138). Even though Jung argued for the reality of the psyche and strongly disagreed with science that the psyche was a mere epiphenomenon of matter, he appears not to have broken completely free of the modern Western scientific notion of

consciousness that it arose ultimately from matter in part or whole and is in a continuous state of evolution in which human beings play a central role, despite coming close to breaking ranks with this world view more than once in his lifetime as in his writings on synchronicity and the psychoid archetype (Clarke, 1992, p. 198).

Advaita Vedanta

In Sankara's Advaita Vedanta model, an immutable, eternal, infinite, all-pervasive, self-existent, and self-aware pure consciousness called the *Brahman* is posited as the transcendent as well as immanent basis of all existence and consciousness, including human, in the plurality of the relative or dual universe (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, pp. 566, 602); dual or relative because it is dependent on the nondual or absolute reality of the oneness of the *Brahman* which does not depend on anything else for its existence and consciousness through the mystery of creation called *maya* (p. 572). The *Brahman* is the sole source of existence and consciousness for the universe (*Isvara*) (p. 555) as well as the sole source of existence and consciousness for the individual (*jiva*) (pp. 475-485). All individuals have the inherent capacity to achieve the highest awareness of themselves as the *Brahman* (pp. 513-514). Such achievement, called *moksa* or enlightenment, offers the individual or *jiva* freedom from the endless cycle of birth, death, and rebirth (pp. 644, 646). Such possibility is hidden from view in the individual's consciousness through *avidya* or ignorance due to *maya* (p. 507). Images of Gods and religions are but symbols formed by the human psyche in an attempt to grasp the wholeness of its nondual nature as the *Brahman* and are ultimately transcended in *moksa* (p. 649). The impulse towards wholeness is inherent in the individual in the sense of

limitation that is unavoidable in the limited consciousness of the subject in the subject-object duality of the universe (Dayananda, 2002, pp. 1-6).

Advaita Vedanta methodology

Although some Advaita Vedantins such as Sankara claim that these eternal truths in the Vedas are based on the personal experiences of enlightened yogis and are subjectively verifiable by others either on their own or through the Vedic *pramanas* or methodologies (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, pp. 513-514), others such as Badarayana (the author of the *Brahma Sutras* and the founder of the Vedanta tradition) claim that individuals are epistemologically inherently incapable of arriving at these truths on their own, constrained by the structure of their psyche, and therefore they require the help of the external *pramanas* or methodologies in the Vedas to become enlightened (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, p. 435). The latter group holds the Vedas as revelations from God to man.

Jung's criticism of Eastern claims of higher states of consciousness

Jung rejected Eastern claims of states of higher consciousness in which the ego consciousness is transcended, the experience of the tension of opposites is overcome, and the duality of subjects and objects is dissolved (Jung, 1953/1969, pp. 484-485; 1954/1969b, p. 505). Jung rejected these Eastern claims on the basis that they had no scientific and empirical basis (Coward, 1985, p.61; Jung, 1929/1967, p. 54) and that they lacked the rigor of logic and reasoning of a sound critical thought and philosophy (Jung, 1929/1967, pp. 50, 54; 1944/1969, p. 580; Adler & Jaffe, 1973b, p. 438). Characterizing

the higher states of consciousness claimed by the East as states of trance or unconsciousness (Jung, 1939/1959, p. 288) or as participation mystique (Jung, 1954/1969b, p. 504), Jung stated that such states claimed by yogis probably arose from Eastern intuition over-reaching itself (Jung, 1954/1969b, p. 505) without the safeguard of a critical philosophy on the one hand and a scientific and empirical world view on the other. Jung also offered as one reason for his objection to Westerners practicing Eastern methods his rejection of higher states of consciousness claimed by the East (Borelli, 1985a, pp. 79-92).

Criticism of Jung's views on Eastern claims of higher states of consciousness

Apart from the controversy stemming from Jung's view that Eastern methods are unsuitable for Westerners, Jung's rejection of Eastern claims of higher states of consciousness and his reasons for rejecting them and the ensuing criticisms have been one of most active and controversial areas in the literature on Jung and Eastern thought. Jung has been criticized for misunderstanding the nature of the higher states of consciousness (Sen, 1943 & 1952; Jacobs, 1961; Krishna, 1975; Ajaya, 1983; Coward, 1985; Reynolds, 1989; Wilbur, 1990) as trance states (Guenther, 1975; Bishop, 1984), or states in which the ego is dissolved (Parker, 1967; Avens, 1980; Miyuki, in Spiegelman & Miyuki, 1985; Whitfield, 1992) with some attributing Jung's misunderstanding to the inadequacy of his psychological model (Welwood, 1989; Jones, 1989) with which he tried to reduce to psychological understanding what are essentially spiritual states (Jacobs, 1961; Ajaya, 1983; Coward, 1985; Reynolds, 1989; Wilbur, 1990; Aziz, 1990; Leon, 1998).

Jung has been criticized for rejecting Eastern claims of an empirical basis for these states (Jordens, 1985a) or for overlooking the empirical evidence for such states from the personal experiences of individuals in the East as well as West throughout history (Schultz, 1934; Moacanin, 1986). He has also been criticized for overlooking the tradition of critical thought and philosophy in the East (Clarke, 1994). His rejection of higher states of consciousness claimed by the East has been attributed to lack of personal experience (Jordens, 1985a); a practitioner perspective (Reynolds, 1989; von Moltke, 2000); inability to imagine the possibility of consciousness outside the context of subject-object duality (Watts, 1973; Welwood, 1979); Western scientific bias (Jacobs, 1961); and a fundamental East-West philosophical difference regarding the perfectibility of human nature (Coward, 2002). Jung's empiricism has also been understood as one level of experience in Advaita Vedanta (Thornton, 1965).

Using Jung's theories of the psychoid archetype and synchronicity or his own statements that indicate a changing position with respect to his views on higher states of consciousness, karma, and re-incarnation, some (Jordens, 1985a & 1985b; Seeman, 2001) have inferred willingness on Jung's part to re-examine his earlier outright rejection of higher states of consciousness claimed by the East and his reasons for rejecting them but conclude that he did not go as far as to embrace them more fully in his lifetime.

Research Objectives

There are two primary and overall research objectives, each of which is broken down further into several secondary and specific objectives.

1. Primary and overall objective:

Can a dialogue between the specific Eastern tradition of Advaita Vedanta and Jungian psychology shed further light on any misunderstanding that Jung might have had of Eastern thought especially in relation to the nature of higher states of consciousness and the possibility for attaining them in the human psyche?

Secondary and specific objectives:

a. Theoretical perspective: Jung criticized Eastern claims of higher states of consciousness on philosophical grounds laid by Kant. Accordingly, he argued that the self cannot be known directly. He defined the ego as the only conscious function in the psyche. And he understood consciousness as always implying a subject-object context. From the perspective of Vedanta, it has been observed that Jungian thought is dualistic and that it is pertinent to one order or level of reality in Vedanta (Thornton, 1965). And according to Advaita Vedanta, a mysterious force called maya makes it extremely difficult for the human psyche to grasp its infinite nature (Radhakrishnan, 1929/1994b, p. 507). To what extent and in what specific ways can an in-depth study of Advaita Vedanta's multilevel model of the psyche with dual and nondual levels of consciousness help explain and reconcile Jung's difficulties with, rejection of, and misunderstanding of Eastern thought, especially in relation to higher states of consciousness beyond the ego?

b. Epistemological perspective: One reason Jung offered for rejecting Eastern claims of higher states of consciousness is that Eastern epistemology lacked the logical rigor of Western post-Kantian critical philosophy. Indian philosopher Radhakrishnan (1923/1994a) disagrees: "It is untrue that philosophy in India never became self-conscious or critical. Even in its early stages rational reflection tended to correct religious belief" (p. 27). Does an in-depth analysis of Advaita Vedanta epistemology offer insight

on this difference of opinion on whether Eastern philosophy and epistemology have a critical basis? What is the basis of Jung's conclusions in this regard?

c. Empirical perspective: One of Jung's criticisms of Eastern claims of higher states of consciousness was that they were not based on empirical evidence. What empirical evidence is there in the East as well as the West for the attainment of higher states of consciousness? What are their characteristics? To what extent do they meet Jung's criteria for empirical evidence?

d. Scientific perspective: Jung rejected Eastern claims of higher states of consciousness as scientifically untenable. However, in his formulation of the concept of synchronicity and reformulation of the psychoid archetype on the basis of emerging scientific findings in quantum physics, Jung speculated on a common third out of which the duality of psyche and matter arose and appeared to be moving in the direction of Advaita Vedanta's understanding of the nature of psyche as the fundamental substratum of the universe. Do findings in quantum physics since Jung bring the Jungian and Advaita Vedanta models closer?

2. Primary and overall objective:

Can a dialogue between the specific Eastern tradition of Advaita Vedanta and Jungian psychology help resolve the differences of opinion among Advaita Vedanta schools on whether human beings have the inherent capacity to achieve enlightenment through solely intrapsychic means without an external source of knowledge such as the Vedas? Can such a dialogue also lead to the formulation of a more comprehensive model of the psyche with greater means and ends for psychic growth?

Secondary and specific objectives:

a. What is the nature of the epistemological argument in some schools of Advaita Vedanta against the possibility of enlightenment through solely intrapsychic means?

b. Can Jungian psychology, especially with its well-developed understanding of the archetypal structure of the psyche and of the intrapsychic axis of communication between the ego and the self, help in understanding and if possible resolving the above differences of opinion among the Advaita Vedanta schools?

c. What understanding is there in the East of the possibility of intrapsychic communication between the self and the ego of archetypal realities, especially through dreams, which are considered to be an important conduit of such communications in Jungian psychology?

d. Is there any empirical evidence for intrapsychic ego-self communication that is on par with the core mediate knowledge around enlightenment in Advaita Vedanta?

e. In what ways do Jungian psychology and Advaita Vedanta complement each other? Is it possible to arrive at an overarching model of the psyche by integrating the two models that offer greater possibilities, goals as well means, for human psychic achievement? Given the findings of the dissertation, what revisions or changes have to be made in the fundamental assumptions of the two systems to make them compatible?

Methodology

The dissertation will engage Advaita Vedanta and Jungian psychology in a mutual hermeneutic dialogue in the pursuit of its research objectives. The hermeneutic dialogue will also involve the scientific paradigm of quantum physics on the one hand and the phenomenology of the experience of higher states of consciousness from the East as well as West on the other to lend two additional perspectives to the inquiry. The hermeneutic inquiry will attempt to take special note of the relevant historical, social, cultural, religious, political, racial, philosophical, epistemological, literary, artistic, scientific, and technological contexts of the two models as much as possible, with special emphasis on the philosophical and epistemological contexts for reasons presented later.

The word *hermeneutics*, derived from the Greek word for interpreter, relates to the Greek god Hermes and has the basic meaning of the process of making the meaning clear. Gadamer who offered a philosophical account of the conditions that characterized human understanding suggests that hermeneutics is a dialogue and that a real understanding required a "thorough immersion in the subject itself" (Palmer, 1969, p. 199). Gadamer, a pupil of Heidegger, understood that all thinking was historically embedded and presupposed a tradition in which a thinker was immersed; and that adequate understanding required not only a careful evaluation of the context of the thought being studied but also the context of the person studying it; and that it also involved a "hermeneutical circle, "a continuing dialectical exchange . . . by reiterative interplay of meaning between part and whole, between text and context, between interpreter and interpreted" (Clarke, 1994, p. 43). According to Reason and Rowan

(1981), "all understanding is hermeneutical, taking place, and to a very large extent, determined by our finite existence in time, history, and culture" (p. 132).

That a great deal of attention needs to be paid to the relative contexts of these systems of thought to minimize misunderstanding follows naturally and logically from the fact that the dissertation compares two systems of thought that evolved in very different cultures and times in an attempt at reconciliation across time, space, and culture, with differing philosophies and epistemologies. The reasons for the special emphasis in the dissertation on understanding the philosophical and epistemological contexts of the two models are to be found in the literature on Jungian psychology and Eastern thought. As we saw earlier, Jung's view that the East lacked a sound critical philosophy has been criticized as inaccurate. We also saw that Jung's criticism of lack of empiricism in Eastern claims of higher states of consciousness has also been challenged. Jordens (1985a) points to Jung's lack of grasp of a differing style of scholarship among Eastern thinkers such as Patanjali who belonged to a tradition that considered natural the transition from experience and reasoning to metaphysical statements, suggesting that such statements therefore are not to be construed as lacking either reason or empiricism (p. 164).

Jung's negative view of the mixture of psychology, philosophy, ontology, metaphysics, spirituality, and religion in the East contrasts with a more integral Eastern view that holds the ontological analysis of the fundamental nature of one's being as the central science around which all else need to revolve and finds it odd that it has often been the other way around in the West, with religion and science dominating the dialogue in relation to all other disciplines in different periods in its history (Radhakrishnan,

1923/1994b, pp. 22-24). In contrast with the criticism that Eastern metaphysics at times lacked logic, Banerjee (1988) holds that a metaphysical system must be creative and grounded in one's deeper quest for identity and finds totally lacking or missing in Western philosophy a "pre-logical" insight into reality. And according to Radhakrishnan (1923/1994b), Sankara holds the view that the ultimate understanding of one's nature is beyond all logic of the dual empirical world of subjects and objects (pp. 512-513).

The study of philosophical and epistemological perspectives that underpinned Jung's thinking is important to understanding Jung's interactions with the East and Eastern thought. For example, according to Clarke (1994, p. 198), Jung's views on human consciousness and epistemology, despite his case for the reality of the psyche, appear to have been tethered deep down to some extent in the prevailing scientific notions of consciousness as evolving and material in nature (in part or whole) and that perspective might have contributed to his difficulty in being open to certain Eastern concepts such as pure consciousness or awareness as the fundamental ontological reality of being, even though Jung appeared to move beyond both psyche and matter towards a third underlying possibility in his writings on synchronicity and psychoid archetypes.

Chapter Outlines

Chapter 2

The second chapter, presented in 13 sections, contains a detailed outline in its introduction. In addition to an extensive review of the relevant literature, the chapter consists of sections covering (a) general issues in inter-cultural dialogue; (b) an overview

of East-West dialogue; (c) basic concepts in Jungian psychology; and (d) basic concepts in Advaita Vedanta.

Chapter 3

The chapter contains four sections. In section 1, Jung's rejection of higher states of consciousness beyond the ego is explored from the point of view of Advaita Vedanta. Jung criticized the East for lacking critical philosophy a la Kant and for conflating psychology, philosophy, and religion. In section 2, Advaita Vedanta's epistemology and its basic assumptions are explored and compared with Jung's, especially in relation to the concept of the self. Whereas Jung's self is unconscious, the Advaita Vedanta self is conscious or self-aware. The objective of this analysis is to understand whether Jung's criticisms reflected adequate understanding of Eastern epistemology and its basic assumptions. In section 3, the empirical evidence for higher states of consciousness from the East as well the West is studied. The objective is to determine the general characteristics of descriptions of higher states of consciousness and their adequacy as empirical evidence with respect to Jung's criteria. In his later writings on synchronicity, Jung appears to expand the boundaries of the psyche, attempting to provide an analogy if not scientific basis for it in early developments in quantum physics. Section 4 presents a perspective that findings in modern quantum physics support Advaita Vedanta's claim of nondual consciousness as a basic characteristic of all reality and explores whether Jung himself might have been evolving in the direction of Eastern notions of the psyche.

Chapter 4

The chapter is organized in five sections. In section 1, Wilbur's four-quadrant integral model is used as a conceptual framework to assess the strengths, weaknesses, and potential complementarities in Jungian and Advaita Vedanta models. In section 2, the superior aspects of Jung's understanding of the structure of the psyche, his understanding of relationships and communications among its many levels and his theory of archetypes, is discussed. In section 3, the differences of opinion among Advaita Vedanta schools on the ability of an individual to obtain the necessary mediate knowledge for enlightenment through intrapsychic means alone is presented and explored. In section 4, the Jungian theory of archetypes is brought in to understand and reconcile the differences of opinion among Advaita Vedanta schools and establish the possibility of obtaining the necessary mediate knowledge for enlightenment through intrapsychic means alone. In section 5, some dream material is presented and explored as possible evidence of mediate knowledge for enlightenment that is on par with the core teachings in Advaita Vedanta. And in section 6, the complementary role that the Jungian model can play in helping those on the Advaita Vedanta path with acquiring the basic psychological and spiritual qualifications for enlightenment is discussed.

Chapter 5

Chapter 5 consists of five sections. Section 1 presents the major research questions and the summary of major findings, by chapter. Section 2 presents the specific incremental contributions of this dissertation to the area of research. Section 3 explores the potential contribution of the dissertation to the theory and practice of clinical

psychology. Section 4 reflects on the limitations of this dissertation and section 5 points to possibilities for future research and study in the area of scholarship.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

Introduction

The rather lengthy review of the literature is presented in several sections. The first section reviews select literature on intercultural dialogue in general and East-West dialogue in particular. The possibility, extent, means, benefits, and risks of intercultural dialogue as well as the history of East-West dialogue, its major themes and controversies, are covered in this section. The second section presents the basic concepts of Jungian psychology. The third section presents a chronological history of Jung's interactions with the Eastern traditions. The fourth section presents a detailed analysis of the influences of different Eastern traditions on Jung's thinking. The fifth section presents the major objections that Jung raised in relation to Eastern thought. The sixth section presents quick summaries of Jung on Eastern thought and of the dialogue that has ensued since on Jung and Eastern thought. The seventh section presents in greater detail the criticisms that have been leveled at Jung on his writings on the East. The eighth section presents positive assessments of Jung's contributions to the West as well as East stemming from his interactions with the East. The ninth section presents the major categories of research that Jung's writings on the East have spawned in the field of psychology. The tenth section presents the basic concepts of Advaita Vedanta and the eleventh the literature on Advaita Vedanta and Jungian psychology. The twelfth and final section offers an assessment of the possibilities for research in the interface between Jungian psychology and Eastern thought as revealed by the survey of the literature.

The length of the literature review chapter is justified in part in terms of the inclusion of the basic concepts of the models of Jungian psychology and Advaita Vedanta, the dialogue between the two forming the body of the dissertation. The length is also justified in terms of the inclusion of the first section on intercultural dialogue in general and East-West dialogue in particular for the reasons presented below.

This dissertation has as a background personal long-term immersion on my part in two systems of thought that stand alone as distinct and narrow traditions within their respective cultures. They owe their existence to two extraordinary men, Sankara of India and Carl Jung of Switzerland, who each in his own way interpreted or reinterpreted the extant understanding of the psyche to rejuvenate their respective cultures. One reason for including section on intercultural dialogue and East-West dialogue is to bring at the outset a broader perspective to the dissertation that compares two narrow traditions within their cultures, even though the scope of the inquiry by these two traditions, a comprehensive mapping of the human psyche, is by no means narrow.

Another reason for including the section on intercultural dialogue and East-West dialogue is to better understand the intercultural context in which the dialogue has evolved, a context that in itself has evolved over time. A hermeneutical endeavor to understand and to contribute to an intercultural dialogue requires an understanding of not only the internal contexts of the two cultures involved in dialogue but also an understanding of the attitudes with which they have engaged each other over time.

The understanding of the array of characteristic or collective attitudes that the East and West brought to their encounters over time was personally very important. It helped me to become aware of the impact of such attitudes on those engaging in the

dialogue, including myself, and to set them aside as much as possible to engage the topic on a deeper and more substantive level without being unduly distracted by them. The attitude of racial or cultural superiority that the West is often accused of bringing to the dialogue and the Eastern attitude that its superior understanding of the psyche precludes any significant contribution to it by the West can be seen as examples of such characteristic attitudes with the potential to polarize one side against the other by triggering defensive reactions counterproductive to mutual understanding.

I am an Easterner who lived in India for the first 26 years of my life and who has lived in the West for nearly as long, immersed on the one hand in the study of Advaita Vedanta with an Indian teacher now for 8 years and immersed in the study and practice of Jungian psychology, including a personal Jungian analysis now in its 13th year, on the other hand. Such attitudes on both sides triggered much emotional difficulty and many defensive reactions on personal as well as collective levels of my psyche as soon as I started to engage the topic in earnest. Therefore, it became extremely important for me to become conscious of such collective attitudes on both sides as well as their potential impact in terms of counter-productive and polarizing reactions so that I could look beyond them not only to engage the topic on a deeper and more substantive level but also to convince myself that the endeavor was indeed worthwhile in the first place. The inclusion of more discussion and personal conclusion in the first section on intercultural dialogue and East-West dialogue than in other sections of the literature review that follow is a reflection of this personal struggle with such collective attitudes on both sides and my attempts to come to terms with them. As a consequence, the first section of this chapter adheres less to the format of a traditional literature review. Also, for the same

reasons, the review of the literature on intercultural dialogue and East-West dialogue in the first section is not exhaustive but selective to serve the purpose of unearthing the major themes and the collective attitudes involved.

In the literature on Jung and Eastern thought, I found the contributions of Clarke (1992; 1994; 1997) to be the most comprehensive, researched, reasoned, and balanced. Clarke also brings to his work on Jung and Eastern thought the unique vantage point of a historian of ideas interested in the history of larger East-West dialogue over time. Clarke's *In Search of Jung* (1992) is a comprehensive analysis of Jungian thought in the context of the history of ideas in the West. Clarke's *Jung and Eastern Thought: A Dialogue with the Orient* (1994) is a comprehensive analysis of Jung and Eastern thought in the context of a longer history of East-West dialogue over time. And Clarke's *Oriental Enlightenment* (1997) is a comprehensive analysis of the history of the larger East-West dialogue itself. I would like to acknowledge my deep heartfelt gratitude to Clarke, on whose work I have relied substantially for the literature review on Jung and Eastern thought, and for inspiring in me what I hope is a more reasoned and balanced attitude towards the topic. I would also like to acknowledge my gratitude to Coward (1985), whose scholarly contribution to the dialogue on Jung and Eastern thought is next only to Clarke's.

Intercultural Dialogue and East-West Dialogue

Means of dialogue

Migration of people or ideas across cultures and new civilizations forming out of old ones through migration contribute to intercultural dialogues in an obvious manner.

The possibility of such dialogue on a more subtle level through morphogenetic fields (Sheldrake, 1981) and archetypal structures (Jung, 1954/1959) has also been theorized, with some evidence.

Benefits of dialogue

Understanding of self and other. All dialogues offer a potential to enhance understanding on both sides, not only in understanding the point of view of the other but also in helping to clarify one's own point of view (Coward,1990, p. 148; Eliade, 1960, pp. 10-11; Spiegelman & Miyuki, 1985, p. 172). In his own words, Coward (1990) states that such dialogues are important

> not just in the building of a bridgehead between the two traditions, important as that is in itself, but the benefit is also one of a deeper self-understanding achieved by examining one's own thinking in relation to the thought of the other. More simply put, it is through others that we come to know ourselves. (p. 148)

Correction of imbalances in self and other. The opportunities for critically appraising oneself, complementing/balancing/broadening one's perspective, and recovering what has been lost in one's perspective using the perspective provided by another culture, have been cited as benefits of intercultural dialogue by many writers. Schweitzer (1936, p. 17) sees the opportunity for discovering complementarities, Radhakrishnan (1939, p. 252) the opportunity for self-renewal, and Abegg (1949/1952, pp. 336-337) the opportunity for discovery and rediscovery of things lost in one's own tradition in the tradition of the other.

Controversies in intercultural dialogue

Cultural enclavism. With respect to the extent to which intercultural dialogue might be fruitful and even possible, there are alternative views. The view characterized as *cultural enclavism* by Clarke (1994, p. 14) holds that cultures are encapsulated entities that grow out of their unique historical, cultural, ethnic, linguistic, religious, and conceptual frameworks that the possibility and benefit from intercultural dialogue and understanding is quite limited. The idea of cultures as mutually incommensurable conceptual frameworks is examined in Bernstein (1983), Davidson (1984), Feyerabend (1978), and Popper (in Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970, pp. 51-58) in general, and with respect to East-West dialogue, in particular by Bernstein (in Deutsch, 1991, p. 85). Bernstein in (Deutsch, 1991, p. 92) and Rorty in (Deutsch, 1991, p. 4), are critical of the notion that cultures are encapsulated entities having little in common with limited possibility and benefit from dialogue with other cultures. MacIntyre (1988) discusses the commensurability of different linguistic traditions (chapters 1 and 2). Halbfass (1988, p. 165) argues that the difficulties presented as possibly insurmountable in intercultural dialogue often exist just as much in dialogue between subgroups within the same culture and that the possibility for misunderstanding exists just as much across divisions within cultures as between them. Clarke (1994, p. 46) writes that there is enough evidence in the history of mankind of exchanges between cultures throughout the ages. The following observation from B. K. Matilal (quoted in Deutch, 1991) is worth reproducing in its entirety:

> Cultures and societies . . . are not like watertight compartments, which may seldom confront one another in reality and interact. They do interact with each other, sometimes generating violence, sometimes peacefully and almost unconsciously accepting value trade-offs and value rejections. (p. 151)

Orientalism. The need to maintain historical, cultural, religious, political, economic, intellectual, or racial dominance, superiority, and hegemony has been cited as a factor contributing to misinterpretation, depreciation, and marginalization of other cultures to the advantage of one's own. In the East-West dialogue, such tendencies on the part of the West towards the East that do not promote real understanding but on the other hand have been used by the West to define the East and to wield hegemony over it have been termed critically as *orientalism* by Said (1978). Developed initially in relation to the West's encounter with Islam and the Middle East and later extended to the East in general, *orientalism* is a theory that the West's understanding of the East is a "system of ideological fictions" to maintain Western superiority, developed in the context of "a relationship of power, of domination, and varying degrees of complex hegemony" (Said, 1978, pp. 321 & 325).

A brief review of the extensive literature on *orientalism* that gained most prominence through Said (1978) can be found in Oldmeadow (2004, pp. 7-16). Only a few writers with a more balanced view of *orientalism* are presented below. Gabrieli (1965) is of the view that the presence of *orientalism* in Western colonialism cannot be denied but it has been "unjustly exaggerated, generalized, and embittered" (p. 81). Eliade (1982) is in agreement that the West has indeed pillaged other cultures but points out that "there have been other Westerners who have deciphered the languages, preserved the myths, salvaged certain artistic masterpieces" (p. 68). Oldmeadow (2004, p. 15) and Clarke (1997, p. 9) both share the view that the equating of all Western interactions with the East with imperialism is overstated and unbalanced and that it ignores the positive motivations and outcomes of many Western encounters with the East.

Radical postmodernism. Although for different reasons, radical postmodernism might also lend support to the view that the possibility of intercultural communication, dialogue, and understanding might be limited. Postmodernism holds that reality is contextualized on specific cultural perspectives or interpretations to such an extent that, in order to understand another culture, one has to adopt completely the point of view of the other, which is made next to impossible by the extent to which the other's perspective or interpretation is considered to be extremely unique (Wilbur, 2000, pp. 168-170). Therefore, radical postmodernism like *cultural enclavism* runs the risk of minimizing the commonalities that might exist among cultures and maximizing the differences among them, lowering the probability of fruitful intercultural dialogue.

The challenges seen by *orientalism*, *cultural enclavism*, and radical postmodernism to intercultural dialogue might appear daunting. However, Clarke (1994, p. 23) offers the hopeful view that the demonstrated ability on the part of the West for critical self-reflection, an increasing need in the West for universalism or the need for common principles that can bring humanity together, and an approach based on hermeneutics that respected and sought to understand the multiplicity of contexts brought to such interactions, can together effectively counteract the divisive and distorting tendencies in intercultural dialogue.

A brief history of Western explorations of Eastern thought

The brief account of Western explorations of Eastern thought presented below is not exhaustive. It is a selective account and its primary purpose is to sketch the historical

contexts in which such explorations took place and to understand the major motivations that stimulated the dialogue in each period.

Ancient and Medieval periods. According to Radhakrishnan (1939), the East-West dialogue has gone on for a much longer period and to a greater extent than commonly believed. Almond (1986), Garbe (1959), Gruber and Kersten (1995), Guenon (1941), Halbfass (1988), McEvilley (1982), Mackenzie (1928), Marlow (1954), Radhakrishnan (1939), Tarn (1938), West (1971), and Wilson (1964) offer descriptions of East-West cultural interactions during ancient and medieval periods. Clarke (1994, p. 8) cites Needham as characterizing East-West exchanges as a 3,000-year cross-fertilization. Schwab (1950/1984, p. 117) cites as evidence the discovery of an ivory carving of an Indian god in Pompeii to establish an ancient date for East-West exchanges. Halbfass (1990, pp. 8, 12), Isichei (1991, pp. 66-67) and Oldmeadow (2004, pp. 1-2) write about the encounters between ancient India and Greece involving Socrates, Herodotus, Pythagoras, Alexander the Great , Diogenes, Clement, and Plotinus, the Roman philosopher who studied in Alexandria. Aristotle, who tutored Alexander the Great, is said to have held as an ideal the "marriage" between Europe and Asia (Halbfass, 1988, p. 7).

Danielou and Hurry (1979) present links between Greek mystery religions and Hinduism. Buddhist monks were known in the Hellenic world and the Indian emperor Asoka in the 3rd century BC sent Buddhist monks west to spread Buddha's message through Greek and Aramaic translations (Clarke, 1997, pp. 37-38). Halbfass (1988, p. 17) and Harris (1982) present links between Indian thought and Neoplatonism. Halbfass (1988, pp. 17-18), Radhakrishnan (1939, p. 126), Thundy (1993) and Welburn (1991)

present links between Hinduism and Gnosticism which played an important role in the early development of Christianity. Of the evidence on relationship between Christianity and Eastern traditions, Clarke (1997) offers the following opinion:

> Much of this is again speculative . . . but what remains certain is that any attempt to separate out Western from Eastern tradition is highly artificial. Even though direct lines of influence are difficult to trace, it is possible to make much better sense of emergent Christianity, especially its concern with the soul and its tendency towards mysticism, if we view its origins within a wider context. (p. 39)

Interrupted by a rise in Islam starting in the 7th century, the intellectual exploration of the East by the West gained momentum again starting with the Jesuit missions of the late 16th century to China, India, and Japan. Their primary motive was converting Asians to Christianity, but the West also sought to outflank Islam, to find new trade routes to the East, and to expand its markets. However, those who went to the East in this period also carried with them the intellectual openness from the Renaissance (Clarke, 1997, pp. 39-40).

The era of enlightenment and Chinese thought. Eastern thought brought over by the Jesuits starting in the second half of the 16th century, mostly from China and to a lesser extent from India, had a profound influence on the formation of the ideas of the Enlightenment in the 17th and 18th centuries (Edwardes, 1971, p. 103). Malebranche, Bayle, Wolff, Leibniz, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Diderot, Helvetius, and Quesnay are important Enlightenment thinkers who showed much interest in Eastern thought. Voltaire and his contemporaries found in Chinese thought, especially Confucianism, a nonreligious, philosophical, humanistic, and rational basis for social order and personal morality with which to challenge the dogmas of Western Christianity and the social order and personal morality based on it (Zhang, 1988, p. 118). Leibniz, whom Jung greatly

admired, found in Chinese thought, especially the metaphysical universal principles of Taoism, the basic inspiration (Needham, 1956, pp. 496-505) or the needed corroboration (Mungello, 1977, p. 15) for his approach to reconciling the religious beliefs and practices of the warring Catholics and the Protestants.

The era of romanticism and Indian thought. The Romantic period, which dated from the end of the 18th century to the first half of the 19th century, saw considerable Western interest in Indian thought, especially among the German Romantics such as Fichte, Schleiermacher, Novalis, Tieck, the Von Humboldts, Herder, Goethe, and Schelling, the Schlegel brothers, and Schopenhauer (Dumoulin, 1981; Halbfass, 1988; Hulin, 1979; Iyer, 1965; Marshall, 1970; Said, 1978, p. 50; Schwab, 1950/1984, p. 11; Willson, 1964, pp. 239-40). The translation of Sanskrit texts by European scholars made possible by the collapse of the Mogul empire in the second half of the 18th century was a source of inspiration for the Romantics. Romanticism was a response to the European disillusionment with the unsatisfactory spiritual foundations of Judaeo-Christianity on the one hand and "the materialism and anti-religious stance of the Enlightenment which appeared to abolish the possibility of spirit altogether" on the other (Clarke, 1997, p. 55). The German Romantics found remarkable parallels between their Idealist philosophy and Indian metaphysics (p. 32). To the Romantics, the Indian *Vedas* and *Sanskrit* gave an origin that predated Homer and the ancient Greeks and possibly the Bible itself that led Herder to point to India as the source of all civilizations and Schlegel to point to it as the primary source of all ideas (Iyer, 1965, pp. 194 & 200). The Romantics, in search for a solution to the loss of sense of oneness with nature and of oneness with all of mankind, found in the possibility of a universal religion with a single God in Indian thought a way

to unite all of humanity, to re-unite it with nature, and heal the fragmenting nature of European thought and religion. Schelling thought that the *Vedas* offered a basis for the historical truth of the primitive unity of mankind (Schwab, 1950/1984, p. 218) and Schlegal thought that Asia and Europe formed a single great family and their literatures need to be seen as one continuous development (Iyer, 1965, p. 200).

Buddhism in 19th-century Europe. In the middle of the 19th century, the discovery of Buddhism by the West by the likes of Schopenhauer, Wagner, and Nietzsche once again offered the possibility of another nonmetaphysical alternative to the Judaeo-Christian tradition that did not depend on an ontological absolute (Almond, 1988, p. 100; Welbon, 1968, p. 219). The pre-dating of Christianity by Buddhism also led to suggestions that Christian beliefs might have had a source in Buddhism, independent of Judaism. Schopenhauer, even though he had been familiar with the ideas in the *Upanishads* for many years before the publication of his major work, *The World as Will and Idea,* denied that the basics of his philosophy were influenced by them. However, he drew close parallels between his philosophy and Hinduism and used the latter liberally for illustrating, articulating, and clarifying his ideas (Halbfass, 1988, p. 120).

Twentieth century. Jung's interest in Hinduism, Buddhism, and the new arrivals of Zen and Taoism in the first half of the 20th century reflected a wider ongoing interest in Eastern systems of thought in Europe and North America (Clarke, 1994, p. 35). The West turning to the East in the 1960s over the disillusionment of Western values can be regarded as yet another instance of an earlier pattern of the West turning to the East for self-criticism and rejuvenation.

Dominant themes in East-West dialogue

The brief review of the literature on Western explorations of Eastern thought reveals the following motives on the part of the West. The West used Eastern thought for self-criticism with which to challenge its traditions and to widen its outlook. The West used Eastern thought as a source of inspiration as well as corroboration for reformulating its conceptual frameworks. The West also used the East as a framework for finding universal principles for uniting all of mankind and for uniting mankind and nature, fragmented by Western thought, science, and Christianity. During enlightenment, inspired primarily by ancient Chinese thought, it took the form of criticism of Christianity and sought to reconcile the religious and consequent political antagonisms that were tearing Europe apart. During Romanticism, inspired primarily by ancient Indian thought, it took the form of criticism of science and sought to re-integrate man and nature as well as all of mankind into a spiritual whole. During the Victorian era, it found in Buddhism nonmetaphysical principles to challenge orthodox Christianity that postulated an ontological absolute.

Collective attitudes in East-West dialogue

Individuals from one culture engaging another culture in a dialogue can bring to the dialogue, consciously and unconsciously, certain attitudes that their culture or significant subgroups in their culture have towards the other culture at the time. An understanding of the inevitability of the involvement of such collective attitudes in an intercultural dialogue can help in overcoming the potential distraction that they can cause to focus more on the fundamental value of the dialogue. An example of such attitude on

the part of the West is the tendency to view East-West differences in terms of strong polarities with "the extravagant assumption of a basic dichotomy in modes of thought and ways of life" (Iyer, 1965, pp. 5 & 7). Such important collective attitudes found in the literature on both sides of the East-West dialogue are presented below:

"An endemic Eurocentrism, a persistent reluctance to accept that the West could have borrowed anything of significance from the East, or to see the place of Eastern thought within the Western tradition as much more than a recent manifestation. . ." (Clarke, 1997, p. 5); the exclusion of Eastern philosophies in histories of philosophy and dismissal of Eastern philosophies in the West with the attitude that philosophy is strictly Western, with origin in Greek thought (Critchley, 1995, p. 18; Halbfass, 1988, pp. 145-159); the understanding of the Eastern psyche as distant, unknown, to be feared, "the repository of all that is dark, unacknowledged, feminine, sensual, repressed, and liable to eruption" (Batchelor, 1994, p. 234); the tendency to view East-West interactions as "clash of civilizations" involving fundamental and monumental differences (Huntington, 1993); or in terms of mutually complementary opposites such as viewing the basic orientation of the Eastern mind as inward and that of the Western mind as outward (Radhakrishnan, 1939, p. 48); the racist and other attitudes of superiority involved in colonialism that perceived the East as an inferior complement to the West to be ruled "armed with gun-and-gospel truth" (Koestler, 1960, p. 11); the attitude of unqualified admiration, elevation, and emulation of the East on the part of some in the West who assumed the role of a "pilgrim in sackcloth and ashes, anxious to prostrate himself at the guru's feet" (Koestler, 1960, p. 11); the attitude of outright dismissal of Eastern thought by some as in Macaulay's condemnation of Sanskrit texts as "less valuable than what

may be found in the most paltry abridgements used at preparatory schools in England" (Young, 1990, p. 728); the use of strong stereotypical dichotomies in understanding and describing East-West differences such as "a rational, democratic, humanistic, creative, dynamic, progressive, and masculine West versus an irrational, despotic, oppressive, backward, passive, stagnant, and feminine East (Oldmeadow, 2004, p. 8); the tendency to criticize and distrust all of Western interactions with Eastern thought in terms of arising from and distorted by the self-serving power dynamic of colonialism (Said, 1978, p. 104; Guenon, 1941, pp. 135, 156; Gellner, 1992, p. 39); the tendency to lump together and overgeneralize to diverse Western as well as Eastern traditions conclusions from analyses of specific Western and Eastern traditions (Faure, 1993, pp. 5-6; Mackerras, 1989, p. 3; Almond, 1988, p. 5); the characteristic attitude on the part of many Indian thinkers "that Indian wisdom is superior to the recent visions of Westerners" that borders on arrogance (Borelli, 1985b, p. 193); and the dismissal of Western explorations of Eastern thought as "imaginative escape" from reality (Bishop, 1993; p. 16) and a retreat from the modern world into irrationalism (Clarke, 1997, p. 18).

Controversies in East-West Dialogue on relative impact

Impact of the East on the West. There are differences of opinion in the West itself and between the West and East on the extent to which the dialogue with the East has been useful to the West and the extent to which Western thought has been influenced by Eastern thought. In the West, as to the usefulness of the East, the opinions have ranged from outright dismissal to unqualified admiration: Voltaire claimed that the West owed everything to the East, Schopenhauer equated his own philosophy to Buddhism and

Hinduism, Heidegger wrote that it was urgent that the West engaged the Eastern thinkers in a dialogue, while C.S. Pierce expressed contempt for Eastern mysticism, and Arthur Koestler dismissed Eastern religions as absurd (Clarke, 1997, p. 3). However, over time, in the final analysis, "there is a persistent reluctance to accept that the West could have borrowed anything significant from the East (p. 5). Underscoring the need for a greater understanding of the impact of the East on the West, Dutch theologian Kraemer (1960) states that "there is also an Eastern invasion of the West, more hidden and less spectacular than the Western invasion, but truly significant" (p. 228). On the much over-looked impact of Eastern scientific thinking on the West, Needham (1969, p. 57) notes that Chinese precedents were "important influences on modern science during the Renaissance period" in the West (p. 57).

Criticisms of the West on its failure to adequately acknowledge the East range from not understanding or acknowledging the extent to which the East has influenced Western thought (Radhakrishnan, 1939) to appropriating or usurping Eastern thought into Western thought and denying the origins of the former in the latter (Said, 1978). Radhakrishnan (1939), in his book *Eastern Religions and Western Thought,* develops the case for the probable influence of Indian thought on Greek thought and Christianity, through Alexandrian Judaism, Christian Gnosticism, and Neo-Platonism. Radhakrishnan then goes on to argue that Christianity, which came from an Eastern background and got identified with the European culture early on in its development, will find its rebirth in a renewal of alliance with its Eastern heritage.

Impact of the West on the East. Clarke (1997) notes that in comparison to the relative lack of studies on the impact of the East on the West, "the transformation and

modernization of Asia through the varied instruments of Christianity, science, technology, capitalism, socialism, and democracy have become the objects of extensive study" (p. 18). The East did not in most instances seek this dialogue out but had it imposed upon it by the West (Halbfass, 1988, p. 380; Kraemer 1960, p. 230). Many Indian thinkers regard Eastern wisdom regarding the psyche superior to Western wisdom with the latter having little to contribute to the former (Borelli, 1985b, p. 193). However, the Indian philosopher Mehta (1985, p. 163) is of the view that the English language and Western philosophical and religious concepts have played an important role in the revival of traditional Vedanta philosophy in the 19th century.

Jung in the context of larger East-West dialogue

Jung's interest in Eastern thought had a lot to do with finding external support for the perspectives he was evolving in his understanding of the psyche that differed from the prevailing psychological, scientific, and religious views in the West. In reaching outside of one's culture to develop or to support a point counter to the prevailing modes of thought within one's own culture, Jung was following a tradition of Western thinkers who sought the East out for inspiration or confirmation of their thinking in different periods in its history. Jung's efforts were a part of a larger movement in the West over a longer period of time to critically appraise and re-imagine its own psyche and correct imbalances in it by engaging in dialogue other cultures with points of view different than one's own (Clarke 1994, p. 25).

Jung was a significant contributor to the overall dialogue in the West to help bring the Western understanding of the psyche and the world back into balance from

imbalances introduced in it by enlightenment on the one hand and scientific materialism on the other (Clarke, 1994, p. 179). Enlightenment and scientific materialism can themselves be regarded as part of the dialogue in the West in modernity to further its premodern understanding of the psyche and the world and to help correct the imbalances in it; just as the modern and perhaps postmodern dialogue to which Jung was a significant contributor can be regarded as part of the dialogue to shift the West's modern understanding of the psyche and the world and to help correct the imbalances in it.

Eastern thought and Western psychology

The interest in integrating Eastern wisdom into Western psychotherapy has increased in the West, in part due to Jung himself. Apart from transpersonal psychology (eg., Grof, 1985; Wilbur, 1990), Buddhist psychotherapy (eg., Epstein, 1995), and psychoanalysis (eg., Fromm, 1960/1986; Welwood, 1979), the growing interest in integrating Eastern thought into Western psychotherapy can be found in a number of smaller integrative schools such as psychosynthesis (Assagioli, 2000). Walsh and Shapiro (2006) review a large number of studies on the meeting of Eastern meditative disciplines and Western psychotherapy.

Section summary and discussion

East-West dialogue has continued to unfold, in particular in philosophy, psychology/psychotherapy, and religion/spirituality, the domains of immediate interest of this dissertation. It also appears that the dialogue over the value of the East-West dialogue itself, its benefits, its harmful effects, and the relative contributions of the East

and West to the dialogue and to each other continue to be sifted, sorted, assessed, re-assessed, and corrected. Both of these trends might be cited as evidence for the ongoing usefulness of the dialogue, for at least one side.

From the above, it appears that the dialogue among cultures has been going on for a long time, and through varied means, although its duration and extent not always grasped. Intercultural dialogue appears to have been an important part of how mankind's overall knowledge of the psyche and the world has grown. Factors that make such dialogues at times inherently difficult can also make cultures encapsulated. Hurtful attitudes and motives can be brought to the dialogue which can also make cultures self-protective. But the cultures do not appear to be so encapsulated that meaningful dialogue cannot take place between them, given that those who engage in such encounters bring to them certain attitudes and sensitivities to ensure that misunderstanding and harm are minimized and understanding and benefits maximized.

Even when a dialogue has been imposed upon a culture from the outside with noticeable harm, it is not always without some benefit to the culture on which the dialogue has been imposed. This is in part because the motives and attitudes with which cultures have engaged have not been all negative, even in colonial contexts. However, at the same time, potential harm from such exchanges should not be overlooked. Nor should the possibility that a particular dialogue might have been all negative be discounted. There is a need for caution in taking at face value assessments of the relative contributions of the cultures to the dialogue, and of their relative influence, and the interpretations of one culture by another. They might be all biased by a need on the part of one culture to maintain its hegemony over the other culture. It is also important to be

aware of and separate from counter-productive, distracting, and emotionally charged characteristics or collective attitudes that two cultures can bring to each other so as to grasp the essential value of the dialogue between them.

Given the nature of the topic of the dissertation, a cross-cultural enquiry that spans a great deal of time, from premodernity to modernity to postmodernity, it is important, while acknowledging the possibilities for distortion or exploitation in cross-cultural dialogues and the hurt and damage they have the potential to cause, to hold as well an understanding based on the long-term history of mankind that intercultural dialogue is worth the while after all. This is because ongoing dialogue appears to be the way in which the knowledge of the nature of the psyche and the world has been incrementally revealed to mankind through what appears to be a rough and tumble dialogical process, with its gifts as well as curses. With increasing migrations of peoples across national and cultural boundaries, made all the easier by the breakdown in travel, language, and political barriers, the likelihood, the need, as well as the unavoidability of intercultural dialogue greater than ever, the potential for fostering mutual understanding among cultures and reaping the fruits of intercultural dialogue appears to be greater than ever as well.

Next, the key concepts in Jungian thought are presented first before the relationship between Jungian psychology and Eastern thought is reviewed. This exposition of the basic concepts of the two systems is at the introductory level. The reader is referred to the relevant readings in the references and the appendix for further study.

Basic Concepts in Jungian Psychology

Libido

One of the fundamental differences that led to the break between Freud and Jung early on in Jung's career was over the nature of libido or psychic energy hypothesized as the fundamental basis and motivation for all human experience and behavior. While Freud maintained that the sexual libido or energy and its sublimation was behind all human endeavors and pathology, Jung thought that it was a much broader phenomenon with sexuality as only one of its aspects (Jacobi, 1973, pp. 52-55), an argument in which Jung would eventually prevail in the course of development of Western psychology. According to Jung, the libido is "an energy-value which is able to communicate itself to any field of activity whatsoever, be it power, hunger, hatred, sexuality, or religion, without ever being itself a specific instinct" (Jung 1952/1956, p. 137). Munroe states that Jung gave the term libido "a different meaning that is at once more monistic and more pluralistic. He means by the term a life energy underlying all natural phenomena, including the human psyche" (Munroe, 1956, p. 541). In his formulation of a more general theory of the libido, Jung appears to have been inspired or supported by Eastern concepts such as *citta, rajas,* and *Brahman* (Coward, 1985, p. 31).

The psyche and its reality

Influenced deeply by Western phenomenology in general and Immanuel Kant in particular, Jung argued that psychic reality is all that can be known by a human being and that physical reality is only our psychic experience of it. "All our knowledge is conditioned by the psyche which, because it alone is immediate, is superlatively real" (Jung, 1933/1961, p. 220). Jung's argument that our "purely" psychic experiences such

as thoughts, dreams, and visions are even more immediate than our experiences of physical reality and therefore ought to be given as much validity as the latter is his case for establishing the reality of the psyche. "The psyche is endowed with the dignity of a cosmic principle, which philosophically and in fact gives it a position coequal with the principle of physical being" (Jung, 1957/1974, pp. 46-47). Jung argued a case for the reality of the psyche at a time when Western science held that matter alone was real and that consciousness was a mere epiphenomenon of matter in a view of reality characterized as *epiphenomenalism* by Goswami (1995, p. 17). Jung found the emphasis on the psyche in Eastern thought supportive of his case for the reality of the psyche (Adler & Jaffe, 1973a, p. 128; Adler & Jaffe, 1973b, p. 128).

The structure of the psyche: The conscious, the personal unconscious, and the collective unconscious

The Freudian model of the psyche consisted of the conscious and the unconscious, with the unconscious merely a repository of an individual's life experiences that have become unconscious. The Jungian model of the psyche consisted of the conscious, the unconscious according to Freud that Jung termed the personal unconscious, and a layer of the unconscious he termed the collective unconscious that Jung theorized an individual shared as an inheritance of evolved general psychic dispositions not just with one's culture but with the rest of mankind (Jacobi, 1973, pp. 5-9). Jung believed that all individuals, regardless of culture, were alike in the depth of their psyches because they shared a collective unconscious psychic inheritance of general dispositions from the entire history of all of mankind. "The collective unconscious

comprises in itself the psychic life of our ancestors right back to the earliest beginnings" (Jung 1929/1960, p. 112).

However, these general dispositions of the collective unconscious were less of a specific content such as a specific cultural image of God and more of a general disposition towards experiencing and making sense of oneself and the world such as a general tendency to create a God image which could be observed cross-culturally throughout the history of mankind. Jung writes that "the autonomous contents of the unconscious . . . are not inherited ideas but inherited possibilities . . . for reproducing the images and ideas by which these dominants have always been expressed" (Jung, 1927/1960, p. 372). Jung called the layer of the conscious psyche that an individual shared with the rest of the collective as the collective conscious.

Although Jung often emphasized the general dispositions of the collective unconscious such as the tendency to form images of wholeness or God in the psyche of a human being across all cultures, he also allowed for the possibility of layers of the collective unconscious in the individual psyche that carried images of a particular culture, race, tribe, and nation to which the individual belonged (Jacobi, 1973, p. 34).

The archetypes

The general dispositions of the collective unconscious, called archetypes of the collective unconscious by Jung, ultimately formed the basic structure of all aspects of the psyche, the conscious as well as the unconscious, in the Jungian model (Jacobi, 1973, pp. 39-51; Jung, 1916/1966a, pp. 90-113). Jung theorized that all structures and processes in the psyche, conscious and unconscious, had archetypal underpinnings in the collective

unconscious. Even the ego, defined as the only center of consciousness in the psyche, had its roots in an archetypal disposition in the unconscious, as did all complexes, understood as constellations of tendencies towards experience and behavior in the personal unconscious of an individual such as the good mother or bad mother complex. "The mother archetype forms the foundation of the so-called mother-complex" wrote Jung (1938/1959, p. 85). It is through archetypal dispositions that all psychic activity, conscious and unconscious, was structured in the psyche of a human being. This included perception, the sensing in the psyche of the world through the five senses; apperception, making sense of what is sensed through the functions of thinking and feeling; and intuition, making sense of what is sensed through archetypal dispositions in one's unconscious.

The Jungian typologies of the psyche, introversion/extraversion, thinking/feeling, and sensing/intuiting, dispositions that were theorized to account for variations among individuals in how they energized themselves and how they understood themselves and the world around them, also had archetypal bases in the collective unconscious and in turn served as conduits through which archetypal contents were psychically apprehended (Jung, 1920/1971, pp. 376-77). The shadow, the unconscious disowned or undeveloped aspects of being human which is usually projected on others, also had an archetypal template in the collective unconscious.

Of all the archetypal dispositions in the collective unconscious, three played a major role in the psychology of Jung: the anima, the animus, and the self. The anima was the contrasexual opposite in the psyche of a male and the animus the contrasexual opposite in the psyche of the female, which, when relatively divested of their personal

unconscious contents attached to them in the form of complexes, had the potential to be an individual ego's guide and mediator to the unconscious (Jacobi, 1973, pp. 114-123). The self, the archetype of archetypes, was conceptualized to be the center of the totality of the psyche as well as well as its circumference. Encompassing all of psyche, it played a central role in coordinating all aspects of it, the conscious as well as the unconscious (Jacobi, 1973, pp. 126-131; Jung, 1951/1969, pp. 5-6). Jung (1954/1969b, p. 484) defined the ego as the (only) center of consciousness in the psyche and therefore regarded the self as unconscious. At the same time, Jung (1951/1969, p. 5) believed that the self had a superordinate role in relation to the ego in guiding it towards greater consciousness.

Just as the physical world could only be indirectly grasped by the images it formed in the psyche, the inner world of archetypes could only be grasped indirectly by the images it formed in the psyche. Jung cited as evidence for his theory of archetypes images from dreams and visions of his clients, himself, American Indian and African tribes, images of gods and goddesses and other symbols from different cultures, religious traditions, mythologies, and alchemy (Jung 1954/1959, pp. 1-41). Jung found in Eastern religions evidence for his theory of archetypes in their personifications of gods and goddesses in yet another cultural context (Jung, 1950/1959, pp. 356-357).

From the presentation on archetypes above and on the self and individuation that follows, the archetypes of the collective unconscious can be understood as having five inter-related functions. One, they provide the fundamental structure or basic template for all aspects of the psyche including the ego. Two, they provide the psyche overall governance as in the over-arching and orchestrating role attributed to the self in relation to all aspects of the psyche. Three, they provide the conscious aspects of the psyche the

wisdom of the ages in the form of intuitions from unconscious psychic dispositions inherited from the entire history of mankind as well as specific contents derived from the history of the individual's culture, race and tribe. Four, they provide the conscious aspects of the psyche compensatory/complementary attitudes from inherited unconscious dispositions to keep the overall psyche in balance (Jung, 1957/1960c, p. 69). Five, they help the ego and the overall psyche including the self grow through the archetypal impulse towards individuation whereby the ego, with the guidance of the self, differentiates and individuates on an ongoing basis by facing and assimilating more and more its unconscious contents. Jung's thinking on the role of the self in the ego's individuation process is presented in greater detail next.

The self and individuation

The principle of opposites characterizes all of human experience. Everything eventually turns into its opposite and creates psychic tension. Jung invoked the principle of *enantidromia* from Greek philosophy as partial support for the principle of opposites in the psyche. Jung described the self as the totality of the psyche that held together the dynamic tension of all the opposites in it (Jacobi, 1973, p. 53). Jung (1939/1969b) wrote, "I have chosen the term 'self' to designate the totality of man, the sum total of his conscious and unconscious contents. I have chosen this term in accordance with Eastern philosophy" (p. 82) and "I have defined the self as the totality of the conscious and the unconscious psyche, and the ego as the central reference-point of consciousness" (Jung, 1955-1956/1963, p. 110).

The experience of the archetype of the self is one of wholeness. Individuation is an archetypal impulse in the human psyche towards conscious differentiation and integration of its personal and collective unconscious contents towards an increasingly greater sense of wholeness, especially in the second half of one's life (Jacobi, 1973, pp. 107-109). The impulse towards individuation, towards differentiation as well as wholeness, is a common archetypal impulse in all of mankind, "it is a natural process; it is what makes a tree turn into a tree" (Jung, 1980, p. 206). In the tension between the conscious and unconscious attitudes brought about eventually by the principle of opposites, the self ultimately plays a super-ordinate mediating role through the transcendent function (Jung, 1957/1960c, p. 69) to allow the ego to eventually experience an easing of the tension of the opposites, a sense of integration, and a greater degree of wholeness. In Jungian psychology, symbols that represent the conflict of opposing attitudes and at the same time transcend them in some way are important psychic devices for transformation (Jacobi, 1973, p. 135). The very act of symbolization of a conflict can in itself be considered an act of transcendence over it.

In mandala symbolism, Jung found the ultimate symbol of the psyche and the self where all aspects of the psyche, the entire mandala, are oriented towards its center, the self (Jacobi, 1973, p. 136). Jung called this aspect of the structure of the mandala, that all of its aspects oriented toward its center, circumambulation. Jung also used the term *circumambulation* to describe the process of individuation he witnessed in his clients and himself whereby all aspects of the psyche appeared to orient themselves to the self eventually and the self appeared to orient all aspects of the psyche repeatedly to itself (Jung, 1951/1969, p. 224). He found in the mandala symbols of the East cross-cultural

evidence for the archetype of the self as well as the process of individuation, with its aspects of differentiation, circumambulation, and wholeness (Jung, 1934/1959).

Jung considered individuation as a life-long process, with no finite end or goal, with the possibility of increasing levels of experience of integration and wholeness for the ego with the ego running into the same or different issue on higher and higher levels of the spiral of growth (Edinger, 1972, p. 6). The conscious is always relatively small in relation to the unconscious akin to a cork floating on an ocean. As a consequence, "the life of the unconscious goes on and continuously produces problematic situations . . . . There is no change which is unconditionally valid over a long period of time. Life has always be tackled anew" Jung (1957/1960, p. 72). The ego was the only center of consciousness in the psyche by definition and therefore the unconscious self needed the ego to evolve which it did by the process of individuation (Jung, 1954/1969b, pp. 484-485).

The process of individuation appears to proceed in stages (Jacobi, 1973, pp. 105-132; Edinger, 1972; Jung, 1948/1960). The first stage consists of working through one's persona or public self that an individual formed in response to societal influences throughout one's life. The second stage consists of working through the shadow, the complexes in the personal unconscious formed from aspects of the psyche deemed undesirable for being human and therefore excluded from or undeveloped in one's personality. The third stage consists of consciously encountering the archetypes of the collective unconscious such as the anima and animus, the wise man and the wise woman, and the archetype of all archetypes, the self, and the never-ending movement of the locus of control from the ego to the self.

The nature of religious experience

Jung theorized that the psyche's cross-cultural disposition to create diverse images of God and to seek religious or what he called "numinous" experience arose from a basic universal motive in the human psyche: its search for meaning, purpose, and wholeness. Jung wrote that "a religious attitude is an element in psychic life whose importance can hardly be overrated" (1933/1961, p. 77) and that religious myth "is one of man's greatest and most significant achievements . . . the bridge to all best in humanity" (1952/1956, p. 231).

The self cannot be known directly except through the images that appear in relation to it in the experience of the conscious ego. "The idea of a self is itself a transcendental postulate" which "does not allow of scientific proof" without which "I could give no adequate formulation of the psychic processes that occur empirically" (Jung, 1916/1966a, p. 240). Jung stated that he could not empirically differentiate between images of the self or wholeness and images of God.

> The symbols of divinity coincide with those of the self: what, on the one side, appears as a psychological experience signifying psychic wholeness, expresses on the other side the idea of God. This is not to assert a metaphysical identity of the two, but merely the empirical identity of the images representing them, which all originate in the human psyche . . . . What the metaphysical conditions are for the similarity of the images is, like everything transcendental, beyond human knowledge. (Jung, 1926/1964, p. 339)

However, Jung's interest was more in the psychology of religious experiences and their form and purpose in an individual psyche than in the metaphysical and theological truth claims associated with them. Jung (1954/1969b) responded to those who criticized him for reducing religion to psychology by stating that "to treat a metaphysical statement as a psychic process is not to say that it is "merely psychic"" (p. 296) and that the truth

claims in religious and metaphysical statements are for theologians and philosophers to debate.

Jung's theory of the development of religions

Jung had a four-stage theory of religious development (Coward, 1985, p. 83; Jung, 1933/1961, pp. 95-114). In Stage 1, polytheism, the Gods are conceptualized as many and as external entities living in far-off places but at the same time projected and experienced as immanent in many things and forces in the immediate external environment. In Stage 2, monotheism, the idea of God is consolidated into a single God or a divine couple but still placed on the outside of the human psyche through projection. However, the consolidation of many Gods into one God or a pair points to the development of a more unitary concept such as the self on the inside. In Stage 3, the idea of the God incarnate is developed whereby the possibility of a connection between the human and the divine is acknowledged to some extent. In Stage 4, sophisticated religions of ideas such as Eastern religions such as *Vedanta* are formulated where a universal possibility of the connection between the human and divine is acknowledged or the divine is demystified as universal principles, accounting for the final stage of religious development in the human psyche.

Synchronicity and psychoid archetypes

Jung developed his theory of synchronicity to account for what appeared to be meaningful but not necessarily causal (acausal) connections between purely subjective experiences of the psyche and its "more objective" empirical observations of the world of

matter such as a scarab beetle appearing on the window when a client was exploring the image of it from a dream during his analysis (Jung, 1952/1985). Quantum physics findings that an observer cannot be separated from the observation, the observer affected the observation, and that matter can appear as either particle or wave depending on the observer inspired Jung to formulate his theory of synchronicity (Jung, 1952/1985, p. 133). "This means . . . that a connection necessarily exists between the psyche . . . and the space-time continuum" (Jung, 1946/1960, p. 230) offered the possibility for explaining how acausal but meaningful events can occur across psyche and matter.

Inspired by quantum physics, Jung reformulated his earlier concept of the psychoid archetype. The new formulation of the psychoid archetype had psyche and matter as but two of its inseparable aspects (Spiegelman, 1976, p. 108). In contrast, the old formulation of the psychoid archetype had psyche and instinct as two of its inseparable aspects (Jung 1952/1985, p. 27). Formulated in analogy with the quantum physics finding of particles and waves being two inseparable aspects of one underlying matter, the new formulation sought to explain acausal but meaningful events across psyche and matter and in the process enlarged Jung's earlier concept of the psyche. Of Jung's reformulation of the psychoid archetype to explain synchronistic (acausal but meaningful) phenomena, Spiegelman (1976) states:

> Jung concluded that beyond the world of the psyche and its causal manifestations and relations in time and space, there exists a trans-psychic reality (the collective unconscious), where both time and space are relativized. At that level, there is acausality and space-time relativization parallel to the findings in physics. The archetypes are then conceived of as "psychoid", i.e., not exclusively psychic. . . . The psychoid archetype lies behind both psyche and matter and expresses itself typically in synchronistic events. (p. 108)

The methodology of Jung

Empirical and scientific. Jung often described his approach as scientific and empirical, but with the qualification that the often subjective nature of empirical evidence in psychology set it apart from the standard for empirical evidence in the physical sciences (Shamdasani, 2003, p. 99). Jung strongly believed that any knowledge of the psyche must be based on personal experience and is necessarily so because all human knowledge is contingent on the individual perspective of the knowing subject (Jung, 1933/1961, pp. 134-138). Because he believed that purely psychic experiences such as thoughts, dreams, and visions had as much reality as impressions of the world outside, and even though such purely subjective phenomena could not be observed by multiple subjects at the same time and therefore be rejected as inadequate empirical evidence by the natural sciences, he accepted such psychic phenomena as adequate empirical evidence for his theories as "sufficient reliable observations" (Shamdasani, 2003, p. 96). Jung drew not only from personal experience, his own and those of others, but also from all sorts of human expressions found in texts, myths, religions, art, literature, and architecture of different cultures from different periods. The development of the theory of mandalas as a symbol of wholeness and the self is an illustration of his empirical methodology that is based on evidence across individuals, cultures, and time periods.

Importance of personal experience. Jung, however, appears to have had a tendency to be resistant to taking as evidence personal experiences of others if he did not also have such experiences himself. He discounted on theoretical grounds Eastern claims that the theory of ego-transcendent states of consciousness was based on actual experiences of yogis and other adepts. There have been some criticisms that Jung might

have resisted ego-transcendent states as possibilities for the human psyche because he himself had not been able to achieve them in his lifetime (Jordens, 1985a, pp. 164-165). The theory of re-incarnation offers another example. Jung appears to have started believing tentatively in the possibility of re-incarnation only after he himself had personal dreams which he believed referred to his other lives.

Hermeneutical. Whether he was trying to understand a personal experience of a client or a symbol from another culture from another time, Jung's approach displayed many features of the hermeneutical method: "holism, contextualism, open-endedness, tolerance, self-reflectiveness, and historical relativism" Clarke (1994, pp. 147). Jung found in hermeneutics the inspiration and/or validation for his method of amplification which employed to place an image in a network of individual and collective meanings (Jung, 1916/1966d, pp. 291-292). Jung was aware of the lack of scientific standards of proof in such an approach. "There is no science on earth by which these . . . could be proved right" and "their validity is proved by their intense value for life" (p. 291).

Provisional. That Jung held all of his formulations of the psyche as provisional even after he "had introduced all of his key signature concepts" is noted by (Shamdasani, 2003, p. 89).

Philosophical bias. Jung disagreed with the idea that consciousness was a mere epiphenomenon of matter and argued for the reality of the psyche. In his formulations of synchronicity and of the psychoid archetype, he suggested the possibility of a third factor from which both matter and psyche arose. However, it appears as though Jung continued to be influenced by an underlying philosophical assumption in Western science regarding

consciousness: It arose from matter in whole or in part, it evolved, and human beings played a central role in its evolution. Clarke's (1992) remarks on Jung in this regard are worth quoting at length:

> There runs through his [Jung's] work a tension between a dualistic and monistic point of view on the mind-body question, a tension which I do not think that he ever resolved, though he clearly saw the need to do so, and lamented that he never had the opportunity to subject his theories to adequate philosophical analysis. Thus at times the material world appears to confront the mind as something ontologically distinct; at others it appears as a manifestation or projection of mind. I have argued that in *Synchronicity* he does in fact offer an outline of a position that seeks to reconcile the two positions, making use of something like Schopenhauer's 'double-aspect' theory in which the mental and the physical are viewed as two aspects of one and the same unified reality. (p. 198)

Jung's Interactions with the East

History of interactions

Jung had a lifelong association with the East. Even when he was a young child, he used to ask his mother repeatedly to read to him from a children's book containing Indian mythological stories of Hindu gods Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva, which he found "an inexhaustible source of interest" (Jung 1961/1989, p. 17). During his formative years as a young man, Jung was influenced by European philosophers such as Schiller and Schopenhauer, whose writings were significantly influenced by Eastern thought. The German philosopher Schopenhauer, whom Jung discovered while in school, had a great influence on the development of his thinking. "Jung continuously pays tribute to Schopenhauer as an original and great mind," writes Jarret in Bishop (1999, p. 202). Schopenhauer drew a close correspondence between his philosophy and Vedantic and Buddhist philosophies. Jung himself writes that "we cannot pass over Schopenhauer without paying tribute to the way in which he gave reality to those dawning rays of

Oriental wisdom which appear in Schiller only as insubstantial wraths" (Jung, 1920/1971, p. 136).

Brief references to Eastern thought appear even in Jung's "Zofingia" lectures of his student days which anticipate many themes of his later contributions (Clarke, 1994, p. 58). Both of Jung's early works, the 1912 *Symbols of Transformation* (Jung 1952/1956) and the 1920 *Psychological Types* (Jung, 1920/1971) treat Vedic, Buddhist, and Taoist concepts from primary and secondary sources on par with symbolic material from Western sources. These concepts are widely used in these early works to build the case for the reality of the psyche and in the development of his emerging theory of the psyche, the principle of opposites, and the relativity of the god-image in the human psyche.

During the 1920s, Jung's interest in Eastern ideas appears to have been further stimulated by two men with a great deal of interest in the East. Herman Keyserling, who believed that the West had lost its spiritual bearings and needed the East to regain it, who established the School of Wisdom at Darmstadt to further that objective, had an influential friendship with Jung from the early 1920s till his death in 1946 (Shamdasani, 1933/1996, p. xix). "In many respects Jung's works marks an attempt at the kind of synthesis of oriental and occidental ideas which had been one of the principal aims of Keyserling's School of Wisdom," observes Oldmeadow (2004, p. 100). And Richard Wilhelm, a Christian missionary and sinologist, by whom Jung felt "so very much enriched . . . that it seems to me as if I had received more from him than from any other man" (Jung, 1930/1966, p. 62). Wilhelm's translation of the Taoist text *The Secret of the Golden Flower* offered Jung crucial cross-cultural evidence for his theory of the archetypes of the collective unconscious and confidence in his own approach to working

with the psyche from discovering that he "had been unconsciously following that secret way which for centuries had been the preoccupation of the best minds of the East" (Jung, 1929/1967, p. 11). And Wilhelm's translation and interpretation of the *I Ching* had an important seminal influence on Jung's later development of the concept of synchronicity.

In 1932, Jung gave the controversial Kundalini seminars in response to the confusion his students had experienced from the seminars on Kundalini yoga by indologist J. B. Hauer (Jung, 1975, 1976). Jung's exposure to Eastern thought continued through the Eranos seminars held annually on the shores of Lake Maggiore beginning in 1933, attended by a wide range of scholars including German indologist Heinrich Zimmer who was, according to Oldmeadow (2004, p. 98), another important source Eastern thought for Jung. Jung attended most years from 1933 to 1951. These seminars, which initially had the goal of finding a common ground between Eastern and Western thought, were broadened to include a diversity of topics relating to the history and psychology of religious experience (Oldmeadow, 2004, pp. 100-103). The essay *Yoga and the West* (Jung, 1936/1969a) was published in 1936.

In 1938, Jung made use of an invitation from the British government to attend the celebrations of the 25th anniversary of the founding of the University of Calcutta to have an extended visit to India and Sri Lanka (Jung, 1961/1989, p. 274). Jung (1939/1964a; 1939/1964b; 1944/1969; 1961/1989, pp. 274-283) was moved by many aspects of India such as its timelessness, wholeness, deep historical roots, and the ability of its people to live at ease with themselves and with nature. The visit to the stupas of Sanchi where the Buddha delivered the "fire sermon" moved him deeply (Jung, 1961/1989, pp. 278-279). At the same time, he refused to meet with the holy men of India to avoid being tempted

to accept from others what he could not find on his own (p. 275). He found India "dreamlike" and felt that his very European notion of what was real challenged him. He explained, "my own world of European consciousness has become peculiarly thin, like a network of telegraph wires high above the ground," leading him to suggest that "it is quite possible that India is the real world, and that the white man lives in a madhouse of abstractions" (Jung, 1939/1964a, p. 518). Jung spent much of his spare time in India and on the long sea voyage studying a Latin alchemical text and described his whole trip as an interlude in his study of Western alchemy. Jung was hospitalized for 10 days with a severe bout of amoebic dysentery in a Calcutta hospital (Jung, 1961/1989, p. 280), which he later described in jest, "I got dysentery because I could not digest India" (Jung, quoted in Paine, 1998, p. 106).

Even though Jung was more focused on alchemy and Western religions in the last three decades of his life, he continued to interact with Eastern thought and be inspired by it. *The Dreamlike World of India* (Jung, 1939/1964a) and *What India Can Teach Us* (Jung, 1939/1969b) were both published in 1939 shortly after his return from India. His *Foreword to Suzuki's "Introduction to Zen Buddhism"* (Jung 1939/1969a) was published in 1939. T*he Psychology of Eastern meditation* (Jung 1943/1969) was published in 1943. *The Holy Men of India* (Jung 1944/1969) was published in 1944.

In 1950, he was again immersed in the study of Ch'unag-tzu's writings (Adler & Jaffe, 1973a, p. 560). In his *Foreword to the I Ching* (Jung, 1950/1969), published in 1950, he challenged the Western notion of causation. In *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle* (Jung, 1985/1952), published in 1952, he challenged the Western notion of causation in greater depth, drawing parallel support from Taoism on the one

hand and quantum physics on the other. *Psychological Commentary on "The Tibetan Book of the Dead"* (Jung, 1935/1969) was published in 1935. Jung wrote that the book "has been my constant companion [to which] I owe not only many stimulating ideas and discoveries, but also many fundamental insights" (p. 510). *Psychological commentary on "The Tibetan book of the great liberation"* (Jung, 1954/1969b) was published in 1954. And in 1960, the year before he died, he was busy studying the Buddha's sermons, "trying to get near to the psychology of the Buddha himself" (Adler & Jaffe, 1973b, p. 548).

Assessment of extent of influence

From the review of the literature, the issue of the extent to which Jung was influenced by Eastern thought in the formulation of his psychology and the extent to which he merely saw parallels and therefore additional evidence in Eastern thought is a difficult one to sort out. Seeman (2001, p. 103) notes that while some, like Coward, believe that many central concepts of analytical psychology derive directly from Eastern thought, others, like Spiegelman, are of the view that the concepts arose from Jung's empirical study of the psyche for which he found parallels in other places including Eastern thought.

This issue is compounded by the fact that some of the Eastern influences on Jung were indirect, through European philosophers such as Schopenhauer and Schiller, who had been influenced by Eastern thought. If Jung's theory of the collective unconscious as a common repository of the collective wisdom of the history of all of mankind is valid, it would make difficult a clear determination of the direction of influence between two

cultures, especially if there is also a history of interactions between the two. Jung himself expresses these possibilities in another context as follows: “The entry of the East [into the West] is rather a psychological fact with a long history behind it. The first signs are found in Meister Eckhart, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and E. von Hartmann. But it is not at all the actual East we are dealing with but the fact of the collective unconscious, which is omnipresent” (Adler & Jaffe, 1973a, p. 87).

In assessing the influence of Eastern thought on Jung, Clarke (1994) writes that Jung’s “close involvement with Eastern thought from about 1912 onwards coincided with the seminal period in the development of his most characteristic ideas, and although it is impossible to specify in detail the exact points and measure of influence, the two appear to be inextricably intertwined“(p. 199). And Coward (1985) concludes his analysis of Jung and Eastern thought with the following summation:

> Our comparative studies show that several of Jung’s major theoretical notions contain significant influence from the East. Joseph Henderson sums it up best when he suggests that Jung attempted to balance between the empirical considerations of Western psychology and the mystical tradition of self-centering in Being, as found for example in the *Upanishads*. Jung, observes Henderson, treated both traditions seriously but in the end remained true to his own “reality of the psyche.” (p. 189)

However, Coward (1985, p. 98) as well as Clarke (1994, p. 193) are of the opinion that there has not been enough acknowledgement of the influence of Eastern thought on Jung, especially among Jungians. Coward (1985), after giving an example that Jacobi, Jung’s systematizer, totally overlooked the role of karma theory in the formulation of the theory of archetypes even though Jung himself clearly gave credit to karma theory for filling in his notion of archetypes, goes on to suggest that “the apparent attempt to hide or ignore the Eastern content in Jung’s archetype may be an example of

Western bias, or of a fear among the Jungians that such an admission would make their already suspect psychology even less acceptable to the mainstream of Western psychology." (p. 98).

Specific Influences of Eastern Thought on Jungian Psychology

Jung described himself as an empiricist who first generalized concepts from his and his clients' personal experiences and then sought corroborating evidence for such experiences and concepts from other times and cultures, at times also inspired by such encounters in the formulation of his concepts (Adler & Jaffe, 1973a, p. 195). For example, Jung (1929/1967) describes that it is only after encountering corroborating evidence in *The Secret of the Golden Flower*, a Taoist text, for the theory of the collective unconscious he had been developing for 15 years that he was finally able to publish it (pp. 3-4).

Many of Jung's concepts, the principle of opposites, psychological types, and individuation might have originated or at least received strong support in the writings of Christian Gnostics from the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd centuries CE (Coward, 1985, pp. 12-13). Jung was frustrated with the lack of the availability of Gnostic writings due to their suppression by the early Christian church and the lack of a bridge between Gnostic and modern thought in the Western world (Jung 1961/1989, p. 201; Jung, 1929/1967, p. 3). Even though Jung eventually found supporting material and a bridge in medieval Western alchemy, he appears to have turned to Eastern thought first out of necessity. Such a turn on Jung's part to the East, Coward (1985) thinks, was natural, as Origen, a Gnostic who most fascinated Jung was much influenced by Eastern thought and Schiller, who Jung

was reading at the time, was strongly influenced by Schopenhauer, who championed Eastern yoga as it was presented in the Hindu Upanishads (pp. 12-13).

Chinese thought

The Secret of the Golden Flower. Jung wrote a psychological commentary on the Taoist alchemical text *The Secret of the Golden Flower* by Lao-tzu in 1929 (Jung, 1929/1967). On receiving the text from Richard Wilhelm in 1928, "I devoured the manuscript at once, for the text gave me undreamed-of-confirmation of my ideas . . . . That was the first event that broke through my isolation" (Jung 1961/1989, p. 197). The text offered him from another culture and from another time evidence for many aspects of his developing psychology: the concept of archetypes of the collective unconscious (Jung, 1929/1967, p. 3); the concept of wholeness in the union of opposites in the uniting structure of the self in the Tao, a uniting and regulating principle that is hidden, nameless, and at the same time the source of all creation (pp. 20-21); the concepts of the self, psychic wholeness, and circumambulation of the self in its mandala symbolism (Jung 1961/1989, p. 197; Jung, 1929/1967, pp. 21-28); and parallels between Hun and P'o, the contrasexual masculine and feminine principles in woman and man in Taoism, and his concepts of animus and anima (Jung, 1929/1967; pp. 38-43). Coward (1985) writes that Jung's "basic understanding as to how to interpret *mandalas* was first gained from Eastern yoga" starting with the Tibetan Buddhist text, *The Secret of the Golden Flower* (p. 50).

In the commentary on *The Secret of the Golden Flower*, Jung also drew a parallel between the Taoist concept of *wu-wei* or action through inaction and his own way: "The

art of letting things happen, action through non-action, letting go of oneself as taught by Meister Eckhart, became for me the key that opens the door to the way" (Jung, 1929/1967, pp. 16-17). In the psychic processes he saw in *The Secret of the Golden Flowe*r, Jung found support for his case for the need to accord the psyche its due reality for psychic development towards wholeness, his concept of individuation and its nonlinear and back-and-forth nature, his technique of active imagination, and "the importance of creative fantasy in the economy of the psyche" in the images in the text used to further psychic growth (Clarke, 1994, p. 86).

I Ching. In 1950, Jung wrote a psychological commentary on the ancient Chinese text *I Ching* as a foreword to Richard Wilhelm's English translation (Jung 1950/1969). Even prior to receiving Wilhelm's translation, Jung had been using the *I Ching* as a method of exploring the unconscious of his patients and his own (Jung, 1961/1989, pp. 373-374). Both branches of Chinese philosophy, Confucianism and Taoism, had common roots in the oldest of the five classics of Chinese thought, the *I Ching*. The consistent and significant nature of the responses Jung received from the *I Ching* with respect to the questions he posed appears to have played an important role in Jung's development of the concept of synchronicity to account for such meaningful coincidences that could not be explained in terms of the traditional scientific notion of causality alone (Clarke, 1994, pp. 96). In *Synchronicity: an acausal connecting principle,* Jung (1952/1985) uses the ability of the Chinese mind to see "the detail as part of the whole" (p. 49) as a conceptual framework in addition to others including quantum physics to explain "the simultaneous occurrence of a psychic state with a physical process as an equivalence of meaning . . .

the same living reality was expressing itself in the psychic state as in the physical" (p. 51).

Indian thought

"Jung's interest in Indian thought in general dated from the intense period of study and religion and mythology in preparation for his book *Symbols and Transformation*, first published in 1912 . . ." (Clarke, 1994, p. 103). At the time, in departure from Freud, Jung was developing a more general concept of libido and a more comprehensive and less reductive understanding of the psyche. "In this line of research important parallels to yoga have come to light, especially with *kundalini* yoga and the symbolism of tantric yoga . . . ", Jung (1936/1969) wrote, and that their rich symbolism offered him " invaluable comparative material for interpreting the collective unconscious" (p. 537). The connections between key Jungian concepts and Indian thought are presented below.

Principle of opposites. In *dvandva*, the Sanskrit term for opposites, Jung found a parallel to his principle of opposites. Jung reviews the concept of principle of opposites in *Psychological Types* (Jung, 1920/1971, pp. 195-197) as presented in the Hindu Vedas, Upanishads, and Yoga Sutras. Jung quotes from several Indian sources including the epic the *Ramayana*:

> The *Ramayana* says: "This world must suffer under the pairs of opposites forever." Not to allow oneself to be influenced by the pairs of opposites, but to be nirdvananda (free, untouched by the opposites, to raise oneself above them, is essentially an ethical task, because deliverance from the opposites leads to redemption. (p. 195)

Libido. In the concept of *rajas*, one of the three *gunas* of *rajas*, *tamas*, and *sattva* that are properties of psyche or *citta* as well as matter or *prakrti*, the dual metaphysical entities in Samkhya Yoga systematized by Patanjali, Jung found a parallel for his concept of libido (Coward, 1985, p. 32). In a series of lectures "The Process of Individuation" given in Zurich in 1939, Jung discussed the concept of *citta* at length and linked his own idea of libido as a neutral source of energy with the Indian notion of "the world as a manifestation of fundamental energetic force" (Clarke, 1994, p. 106). And, according to Coward (1985), the way Jung (1952/1956, pp. 121-131, 147-152, 160-170) develops his concept of the libido in *Symbols of Transformation* appears to be "definitely influenced" by Indian thought because Indian Vedic symbols dominate the text throughout his analysis of the flow of the neutral energy of libido (p. 31). Jung also drew a parallel between the Hindu concept of *Brahman* and his notion of libido. Jung (1920/1971) writes that "it is clear that the Brahman concept . . . coincides with that of a dynamic or creative principle which I have termed libido" (p. 201). Zaehner (1957, p. 91) equates the concept of libido in Jungian psychology with the concept of *prana* in Indian thought. Jordens (1985b, pp. 169-176) mentions Jung's (1936/1969, p. 535) interest in the Indian concept of *prana* and compares the concepts of libido and *prana*. Jung also found in the Indian concepts of *rta* (divine cosmic order) and *dharma* (universal moral law) the functions of balance, regulation, and purpose inherent in the neutral energy of the libido. "The concept of *rta* is a libido-symbol like sun, wind, etc. Only, *rta* is less concretistic and contains the abstract element of fixed direction and regularity, the idea of a predetermined path or process" (Jung, 1920/1971, p. 211).

Individuation. In the *Upanishads*, the ultimate psychic achievement is the attainment of the knowledge of the equivalence of the *atman*, the soul of the individual, with the *Brahman*, "the union and dissolution of all opposites" which "at the same time stands outside as an irrational factor" (Jung, 1971/1920, pp. 198-199). Viewed psychologically, this model of psychic integration involving the *atman* and the *Brahman* discussed at length in *Psychological Types* (Jung, 1971/1920, pp. 189-213) appears to have offered Jung "a close analogy to individuation" and a corroboration of "'his 'strange and inaccessible ideas' . . . foreshadowed in metaphysical form several thousands earlier" Clarke (1994, p. 105). The first outline of Jung's central concept of individuation appears in *Psychological Types* (Jung, 1971/1920, pp. 448-449).

The self. At the height of one's personal development, the individual discovers that the A*tman* or one's higher self on the inside is the same as the *Brahman*, the essence of what manifests as the world. According to Coward (1985), "it is this uniting of the internal and external in the *Atman-Brahman* symbol that becomes the model of Jung's concept of the self (p. 53). Henderson (1975) writes that Jung's definition of the self acknowledges its debt to Indian thought even though it came first from Jung's empirical study of the unconscious (p. 110). Jung himself writes that that "in considering the psychology of the self we should do well to have recourse to the treasures of Indian wisdom" (Jung, 1945/1966, p. 102). And Clarke (1994) adds that "in *Psychological Types* we can witness the birth of this Jungian notion through the conjunction, on the one hand, of Schiller's idea of spiritual sublimation through aesthetic experience, and on the other, of the Indian notion of the unity of *Atman* and *Brahman*" (p. 106).

Archetypes. Jung (1961/1989) drew a personally "both illuminating and reassuring" analogy between Indians having spirits of spiritual masters as gurus and his spirit guide in the form of Philemon, describing them as "thought beings" and understanding them as psychically real archetypal realities (p. 184). He found a parallel between *Shiva* and *Shakti,* the masculine and feminine principles in Hinduism, and his concepts of the animus and anima (Coward, 1985, p. 44). Of the anima, Jung (1946/1966) writes that "interposed between the ego and the world, she acts like an ever-changing Shakti" (p. 295).

Jordens (1985a, pp. 145-168), in a comparative study of Jungian psychology and the Indian Samkhya philosophy as systematized by Patanjali in the Yoga Sutras, points out that Jung himself proposed the equation of the Samkhya yoga concept of *prakrti,* the matrix of all physical and psychic being in creation, with the primal archetype of "the Great Mother" on the basis of similarities in the attributes of *prakrti* and the Great Mother archetype (p. 153). Jung (1938/1959) writes that "Sankhya philosophy has elaborated the mother archetype into the concepts of *prakrti* (matter) and assigned to it . . . fundamental attributes . . . goodness, passion, and darkness . . . three essential aspects of the mother" (p. 82). In his comparative analysis, Jordens (1985a) also points to the similarities between the idea of inflation of the ego from its identification with the archetypes in Jungian psychology and the idea of cosmicization in Samkhya yoga when individual consciousness becomes identified with *prakrti* (p. 155).

Karma and archetypal theory. In Eastern thought, *karma* relates to the dispositions that an individual is hypothesized to carry over from one life to the next. *Karma,* believed to arise from consequences of past actions, can consist of individual as

well as collective components. In relation to the influence of the notion of *karma* in Eastern thought on Jungian psychology, Clarke (1994) writes that "in constructing the theory of the collective unconscious and the related concept of commonly inherited archetypes, Jung was clearly encouraged and influenced by a similar idea in Indian philosophy, namely *karma*, and its related idea of rebirth" (p. 107). Clarke adds: "There is no clear evidence of direct influence to Jung's notion of archetypes and the collective unconscious, but from the various remarks from his writings and lectures in the 1920s and 1930s it is evident that he found this Indian notion congenial and allowed it to inter-penetrate his own thinking" (p. 108).

Coward (1985) writes that Jung's concept of archetype "evolved slowly in his mind, interacting constantly with the Indian notion of karma" (p. 97). Inferring that Jung's primary understanding of *karma* probably came from an in-depth study of Patanjali's Yoga Sutras, Coward (pp. 97-98) adds that Jung admits to a deliberate extension of the archetype notion by means of *karmic* theory and to *karma* being essential to a deeper understanding of the nature of the archetype in *On the Psychology of the Unconscious* (Jung, 1916/1966c, p. 77).

In Jung's early thinking, there is only the collectively inherited *karma* of one's ancestors and no personally inherited *karma* as in the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali. "There is no inheritance of individual pre-natal, or pre-uterine, memories", Jung (1935/1969g) wrote in 1935. However, towards the end of his life, Jung appears to have become more open to the possibility of personal *karma* and its psychological function in rebirth, in part because he observed in himself "a series of dreams which would seem to describe the process of reincarnation with somewhat different eyes though without being in a position

to assert a definite opinion" because "I have never come across any such dreams in other persons" Jung (1961/1989, p. 319). Towards the end his life Jung (1961/1989, pp. 317-322) also thought of the possibility of *karma* as an individual as well collective motivation for knowledge that took a soul from one life to the next in search of knowledge. "In my case it must have been primarily a passionate urge towards understanding that brought about my birth," Jung (1961/1989, p. 322) wrote in *Memories, Dreams, and Reflections.*

Active imagination. Coward (1985, pp. 34-37) discusses Jung's description of the concept of *tapas* in the Indian yoga sutras as "self-brooding" (Jung, 1920/1971, p. 118) and then teases out a parallel between one of the interpretations the yogic concept of *tapas* as a creative act and the Jungian concept of active imagination.

Kundalini yoga

Kundalini yoga as an Eastern tradition has its roots in the Tantric branches of Hinduism as well as Buddhism. Kundalini yoga offers "a path to enlightenment which begins deep down in the unconscious and rises up and beyond into a state of super-consciousness in which the ego attains unity with the universal self" (Clarke, 1994, p. 116). In Kundalini yoga, the vital energy is said to circulate through subtle body of a human being through conduits called *nadis*, and the cosmic energy is said to exist in a latent state in centers in the subtle body of the human being called the called chakras (Coward, 1985, p. 112). In Kundalini yoga, in a simple description, the Kundalini energy (the *Shakti* or female aspect) at the first chakra at the base of the spine of an individual is awakened and guided by a guru to arise through the other chakras to release their latent

cosmic energies and to distribute the consequent vital energies through the nadis in such a way that the Kundalini energy finds its union with its *Shiva* or male aspect in the seventh or crown chakra on the top of the head leading to enlightenment for the individual.

References to Kundalini yoga appear throughout Jung's writings in the Collected Works (Jung, 1936/1959, p. 70; Jung, 1950/1959, pp. 357, 359, 362, 366, 368-369, 370, 372; Jung, 1928/1964, p. 84; Jung, 1935/1969, p. 520; Jung, 1936/1969, p. 537; Jung, 1944/1968, pp. 95, 144, 154; Jung, 1929/1967, pp. 24; Jung, 1945/1967, p. 265; Jung, 1946/1966, p. 185, Jung, 1966, pp. 327-338; Jung, 1935/1977a, pp. 11, 120; Jung, 1932/1977, p. 516). However, in 1932, to clear the confusion created in his students by a seminar given by indologist J. E. Hauer on J. G. Woodroffe's *The Serpent Power*, a Tantric text, Jung gave a controversial alternative psychological interpretation of the process of Kundalini yoga recasting it in terms of his model of individuation (Jung, 1975, 1976, 1933/1996, pp. 3-78). "We can only understand . . . the world . . . on our own terms. Therefore I make the attempt to approach it from a psychological point of view" said Jung (1975, p. 13) of his approach. In his interpretation, Jung saw the chakras as merely symbols and an individual's ascent through the chakras as the ego's journey from the surface of consciousness through the successive layers of the unconscious assimilating the unconscious contents along the way in the process of individuation. Jung sees the ascent as going deeper into the unconscious to become more conscious whereas Kundalini yoga's ascent is seen as going from the unconscious to a state of super-consciousness where the subject-object duality is lost. "In the East," Jung (1975) stated, "the unconscious is above, while with us it is below" (pp. 12-13).

Clarke (2004, pp. 111-113) and Coward (1985, pp. 111-112, 123) summarize the parallels or points of attraction between Jungian psychology and Kundalini yoga: (a) a teleological developmental model with well-defined stages for the self-realization of the individual; (b) the possibility of psychic development of the individual through one's own efforts; (c) the need to go beyond ego consciousness to grow; (d) the need to integrate the darker forces of the psyche; (e) a positive life-affirming view of the body, passions, and shadow regions of the psyche; (f) a holistic outlook where there is less or no distinction between the body and psyche; and (g) rich symbolism that lends itself to ease of comparative study with the individuation process.

Buddhist thought

To Jung (1961/1989), Buddha, like Christ, "is an embodiment of the self" but "the more complete human being" and therefore "easier for men to understand" and "became a model for men to imitate" (pp. 279-280). Jung studied Buddhism from the early days of the development of his psychology to the very end of his life and was in general less critical of Buddhism than other Eastern traditions. In Buddhism, Jung was attracted to the emphasis on "the transformation of the ego in order to help an individual to overcome the 'dis-ease' of life brought about by impermanence" (Spiegelman & Miyuki, 1985, p. 172). And that the healing came through the effort of the individual and on the basis of his or her direct experience were parallels that attracted Jung to Buddhism.

The Tibetan Book of the Dead. While the *Hinayana* school of Buddhism teaches that the world of pain and sorrow is to be renounced, the *Mahayana* school teaches that this pain and sorrow are illusory and that freedom can be found by recognizing that all

things arise in the mind and by clearing the mind of its illusion to arrive at one's Buddha nature, the true essence of the mind that is the true essence of all things that exist. Tibetan Buddhism is part of the *Mahayana* tradition that was introduced from India in the 7th century, CE. And Jung agreed to write a psychological commentary on the German edition of a Tibetan Buddhist text, *The Tibetan Book of the Dead*, in 1935 (Jung, 1935/1969). The text offers the soul a guide through the various stages of the journey after death, including reincarnation, with descriptions of the forces and spirits that it might encounter in each stage depending on its karma. Jung's interpretation of the whole process as an archetypal journey in the individuation process is well captured in the following quote:

> The whole book is created out of the archetypal contents of the unconscious. Behind these there lie – and in this our Western reason is quite right – no physical or metaphysical realities, but 'merely' the reality of psychic facts, the data of psychic experience. . . . The world of gods and spirits is truly 'nothing but' the collective unconscious inside me. (Jung, 1935/1969, p. 525)

The Tibetan Book of Great Liberation. Jung wrote a psychological commentary for the Tibetan Buddhist text, *The Tibetan Book of Great Liberation*, in 1939 (Jung, 1939/ 1969b). The text, attributed to a monk, Padma-Sambhava, who brought Tantric Buddhism to Tibet in about 747, CE, emphasizes the doctrine that all reality, including material reality, is a product of the mind, or consciousness. There is only one Mind and that freedom is attained when one realizes that all things including one's own self are illusory. (Jung, 1939/ 1969b) found in the text a further confirmation of his case for the reality of the psyche, used it to argue for a balance between matter and psyche and extraversion and introversion in the West, interpreted the gods mentioned in the text as

archetypal forms, recast the concept of self-liberation in the text as individuation, and rejected the text's claim of nonduality.

Zen Buddhism

Jung believed that Zen Buddhism, which grew from Chinese Buddhism in the 6th century, CE, was close in spirit to both Western Christian culture and Western psychology. "Zen is a true goldmine for the needs of the Western psychologist" Jung wrote (Adler & Jaffe, 1973a, p. 128). In response to a question on the essence of his method by a student Ira Progoff, Jung said: "It would be too funny. It would be a Zen touch (Moacanin, 1986, p. 48). The two surviving Zen schools, *Rinzai* and *Soto*, emphasize meditative absorption through 'just sitting' and the *koan* involving the use of paradox respectively to bring about enlightenment. Zen, without the elaborate ritual and the rich imagery that characterized Tibetan Buddhism, was introduced to the West by Daisetz Suzuki in 1927 and found immediate interest in the American psychologist William James. Jung wrote a foreword to Suzuki's German publication of *Introduction to Zen Buddhism* in 1939 (Jung, 1939/1969a).

In Zen Buddhism, Jung (1939/1969a) found a number of parallels to his psychology: (a) its invitation to transcend rational thinking and words; (b) its emphasis on mental image such as the *koan*; (c) its emphasis on direct experience; (d) its importance on self-knowledge achieved through individual effort; (e) its emphasis on the need to enlarge consciousness through experiences such as *satori* which he likened to Christian conversion experience; (f) its techniques such as the *koan* and meditation which enabled the unconscious contents to come forth and be integrated into consciousness; and

(g) its emphasis on attaining wholeness, which he saw as evidence of a cross-cultural and cross-temporal impulse motivating religious experience in the human psyche.

Jung's Criticisms of the East

This section on Jung's criticism of the East is presented more or less in his own words, as many passages from this section form the basis for the dialogue between Jungian psychology and Advaita Vedanta in the body of the dissertation.

Rejection of Eastern metaphysics on empirical, psychological, and philosophical grounds

Jung's approach to the East was essentially empirical. He wrote:

> I am first and foremost an empiricist who was led to the question of Western and Eastern mysticism only for empirical reasons. For instance, I do not by any means take my stand by the Tao or any yoga technique, but have found that Taoist philosophy as well as yoga have many parallels with the psychic processes we observe in Western man. (Adler & Jaffe, 1973a, p. 195)

And the perspective with which Jung approached the East was psychological. He treated Eastern metaphysical statements as psychological statements, rejecting Eastern claims that they were based on the empirical study of subjective states.

> My admiration for the great philosophers of the East is as genuine as my attitude towards their metaphysics is irreverent. I suspect them of being symbolic psychologists, to whom no greater wrong could be done than to take them literally. If it were really metaphysics that they mean it would be useless to try and understand them. But if it is psychology, we can not only understand them but can profit greatly by them, for then the so-called "metaphysical" comes within the range of experience. (Jung, 1929/1967, p. 50)

Jung's rejection of metaphysical claims of the East as well as the West had as its ground the philosophy of Kant. He took care, however, not to be understood as someone who denied the truth claims of Eastern and Western religions.

> The fact that I am content with what can be experienced psychically, and reject the metaphysical, does not amount, as any intelligent person can see, to a gesture of skepticism or agnosticism aimed at faith and trust in higher powers, but means approximately the same as what Kant meant when he called the thing in itself a "merely negative borderline concept." (Jung, 1929/1967, p. 54)

Criticism of Easter introversion as one-sided

As much as Jung admired the East for its introversion, he also criticized it for its one-sidedness in its psyche:

> The two standpoints, however contradictory, each have their psychological justification. Both are one-sided in that they fail to see and take into account those factors which do not fit in with their typical attitude. The one underrates the world of consciousness, the other the world of One Mind. The result is that in their extremism, both lose one half of the universe; their life is shut off from total reality, and is apt to become artificial and inhuman. (Jung, 1954/1969b, p. 493)

Criticism of claim of centers and states of consciousness other than ego

Jung also criticized and rejected Eastern claims of centers or states of consciousness in the psyche that did not involve the ego. To Jung, the ego was the only center of consciousness in the human psyche having formulated his concept of ego in terms of the consciousness function in the human psyche. Jung defined the ego as

> the complex factor to which all conscious contents are related. It forms as it were, the center of the field of consciousness; and, in so far as this comprises the empirical personality, the ego is subject to all personal acts of consciousness. The relation of a psychic content to the ego forms the criterion of its consciousness, for no content can be conscious unless it is represented to a subject. Jung (1951/1969, p. 3)

Having defined the ego in the above manner, as the only subject of all conscious contents in the psyche, Jung could not imagine the possibility of consciousness outside of the ego. He wrote "To us, consciousness is inconceivable without an ego; it is equated with the relation of contents to an ego. If there is no ego there is nobody to be conscious of

anything. The ego is therefore indispensable to the conscious process (Jung, 1954/1969b, p. 484).

Thus, in the human psyche, Jung believed that 'I' or the subject of the ego was necessary to make the object of any unconscious content conscious.

In the following passage, Jung was even clearer in his rejection of Eastern claims of centers and states of consciousness on the basis of his definition of the ego.

> The Eastern Mind, however, has no difficulty conceiving of a consciousness without an ego. Consciousness is deemed capable of transcending its ego condition; indeed, in its 'higher' forms, the ego disappears altogether. Such an ego-less mental condition can only be unconscious to us, for the simple reason that there would be nobody to witness it. I do not doubt the existence of mental states transcending consciousness. But they lose their consciousness to exactly the same degree that they transcend consciousness. I cannot imagine a conscious mental state that does not relate to a subject, that is, to an ego. . . . The unconscious, however, is a mental condition of which no ego is aware. It is only by indirect means that we can eventually become conscious of the existence of the unconscious. . . . But there is no evidence that the unconscious contents are related to an unconscious center analogous to the ego; in fact there are good reasons why such a center is not even probable. (Jung,1935/1969, p. 484-485)

Jung understood ego-transcendent states claimed by the East as states without a subject, an 'I'.

> No matter how far an *ekstasis* [religious ecstasy] goes or how far consciousness can be extended, there is still the continuity of the apperceiving ego which is essential to all forms of consciousness. . . . Thus it is absolutely impossible to
>
> know what I would experience when that "I" which could experience didn't exist any more. (Adler & Jaffe, 1973a, pp. 262-264)
>
> Even when I say "I know myself," an infinitesimal ego the knowing "I" – is still distinct from "myself." In this as it were atomic ego, which is completely ignored by the essentially non-dualistic standpoint of the East, there nevertheless lies hidden the whole unabolished pluralistic universe and its unconquered reality.
>
> The experience of "at-one-ment" is one example of those "quick-knowing" realizations of the East, an intuition of what it would be like if one could exist and not exist at the same time. (Jung, 1935/1969b, p. 505)

Jung, in rejecting the claims of higher states of consciousness claimed by the East that transcended the ego, equated them to his concept of the collective unconscious instead.

> There is no doubt that the higher forms of yoga, in so far as they strive to reach *samadhi*, seek a mental condition in which the ego is practically dissolved. Consciousness in our sense of the word rated a definitely inferior condition, the stage of *avidya* (ignorance), whereas we call the "dark background of consciousness" is understood to be a "higher" consciousness. Thus our concept of the "collective unconscious" would be the European equivalent of *buddhi*, the enlightened mind. (Jung 1953/1969, p. 485)

Jung believed that the techniques of yoga aimed at the attainment of a trance-like state in which the ego becomes absorbed into the unconscious and as a consequence the self-conscious subject disappears. To Jung, "'universal consciousness' is logically identical with unconsciousness . . . a state in which the subject and object are almost completely identical" (Jung, 1939/1959, p. 288). Of the possible confusion of mistaking other states for higher states of consciousness, Jung writes that "wherever there is a lowering of the conscious level we come across instances of unconscious identity or what Levy-Bruhl calls "participation mystique" (Jung, 1954/1969b, p. 504).

Throughout his writings, quoted throughout this section, Jung offers a number of such reasons for rejecting what he considered to be erroneous Eastern claims of the possibility of higher states of consciousness in the human psyche that transcended the ego: The lack of critical thinking or critical philosophy; the lack of a psychology and a confusion between psychology and philosophy; a pre-Kantian attitude to reality with belief in the apprehension of the objective reality of the inner and outer worlds; the projection of intuitive cognitions as realities: the lack of empirical and scientific orientations; an ability to see the whole but limited an inability to see the parts; the

mistaking of states of trance, unconsciousness, and participation mystique as higher states of consciousness; the claim of omniscience in higher states of consciousness; the claim of freedom from tension of opposites in such states; the claim that the ego had real inherent knowledge of inner and outer realities which was merely covered by memory or ignorance; and a less developed intellect with respect to its ability to recognize the above limitations.

Criticisms of Eastern epistemology

On the pre-Kantian nature of the East's epistemology and its lack of a psychology and confusion between psychology and philosophy, Jung wrote:

> The Indian lacks the epistemological standpoint just as much our own religious language does. He is still "pre-Kantian." This complication is unknown in India and it is still largely unknown with us. In India, there is no psychology in our sense of the word. India is "pre-psychological": when it speaks of the "self," it *posits* such a thing as existing. (Jung, 1944/1969, p. 580)

On the relative lack of development of psychology as a separate discipline in the East, Jung said that "there is no psychology worthy of its name in East Asia, but instead a philosophy consisting entirely of what we would call psychology" (Adler & Jaffe, 1973b, p. 438).

With reference to Jung's criticisms of the East's lack of empirical orientation and its tendency to confuse projected intuited cognitions with reality, Coward writes:

> In line with other modern Western thinkers Jung claimed to follow the scientific method of keeping a clear distinction between the description of cognitive processes and truth claims attesting to the objective reality of such cognitions. Any reductionistic collapsing of philosophy into psychology or *vice versa* is the cause of what Jung critically calls Eastern intuition "over-reaching itself." For Jung, this "over-reaching" of yoga is particularly evident in the widespread Eastern notion that the individual ego can be completely transcended and some form of universal consciousness achieved. In Jung's eyes, this was nothing more

> than the psychological projection of an idea which had no foundation in human experience. (Coward, 1985, p. 61)

Jung thought the East made such errors is because it lacked the advancement in scientific thought that the West had achieved and that its psychology was based on metaphysical concepts which often had little relation to empirical facts. The modern psychologies of the West, including Freud's psychoanalysis and Jung's analytical psychology, on the other hand, had such an empirical foundation, in Jung's opinion (Adler & Jaffe, 1973b, pp. pp. 234-235).

Coward (1985, p. 74), also writes that Jung, in page 136 of his Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) lectures delivered from 1931 to 1941, dismisses as fanciful projection the claims of Eastern scholars that the descriptions of ego-transcendent states are from actual experiences of the yogis. To Jung, if the cognitive structures of ego are not functioning in higher states of consciousness as claimed by yogis, then they are simply unconscious trance states because there is no ego to be conscious of such states. And of Jung's rejection of the Eastern claim of a memory or ignorance-obscured ego having the inherent knowledge of inner and outer reality in page 11 of the ETH lectures, Coward (1985) writes:

> In Jung's view, such a claim is one-sidedly subjective. It does not take seriously the experiential fact that the subjective categories of the mind do not possess knowledge themselves, but merely shape external stimuli so that perceptual knowledge results. The one-sided yoga theory, therefore, is to be dismissed as unwarranted metaphysical speculation. (Coward, 1985, p. 68)

Rejection of claim of omniscience

One of the reasons why Jung rejected the Eastern notion of higher consciousness had to do with the differences he had with the East on the extent to which the

unconscious could be made conscious. Jung believed that the ego can only make a small portion of the unconscious conscious.

Jung rejected the Eastern claim of omniscience in higher states of consciousness:

> No consciousness can harbor more than a very small number of simultaneous perceptions. All else must be in the shadow, withdrawn from sight. Any increase in the simultaneous contents immediately produces a dimming of consciousness, if not confusion to the point of disorientation. Consciousness not only requires, but of its very nature strictly limited to, the few and hence the distinct. (Jung, 1939/1969a, p. 550)

Of the yogic claim that the simultaneous perception of the sum total of all available sense perceptions and all the subliminal contents of the unconscious are associated with the higher states of consciousness, Jung described it as "a most audacious fantasy" (pp. 550-551). In Jung's view, the very maximum consciousness can achieve is a small portion of the external sensory input and the store of psychic potentials in the unconscious.

> You can expand your consciousness so that you even cover a field that had been unconscious to you before, but then it is your ego that is conscious of this new acquisition, and there is absolutely no reason to believe then that there is not a million times more unconscious material beyond that little bit of a new acquisition. (Adler & Jaffe, 1973a, pp. 262-263)

Rejection of claim of freedom from the tension of opposites

Jung rejected the Eastern claim that it is possible to experience freedom from the tension of opposites in higher states of consciousness that transcended the ego as in the following manner:

> It is certainly desirable to liberate oneself from the operation of the opposites but one can only do it to a certain extent, because no sooner do you get out of the conflict than you get out of life altogether. So liberation can only be partial one. It can be the construction of consciousness just beyond the opposites. Your head may be liberated, your feet remain entangled. Complete liberation means death. (Adler & Jaffe, 1973a, p. 247)

Criticism of transcendence as a value

For all of the above reasons, Jung recommended that statements about transcendence are to be avoided:

> Every statement about the transcendental is to be avoided because it is only a laughable presumption on the part of a human mind unconscious of its limitations. Therefore, when God or the Tao is named as an impulse of the soul, or a psychic state, something has been said about the knowable only, but nothing about the unknowable, about which nothing can be determined. (Jung, 1929/1967, p. 54)

Jung understood Eastern transcendence as going away from nature, away from human beings, and away from life itself. Based on that understanding, in the following passage, he rejects Eastern transcendence for himself favoring instead an orientation towards involvement in life.

> The Indian goal is not moral perfection, but the condition of *nirdvandva*. He wishes to free himself from nature; in keeping with his aim, he seeks in meditation the condition of imagelessness and emptiness. I, on the other hand, wish to persist in the state of lively contemplation of nature and of the psychic images. I want to be freed neither from human beings, nor from myself, nor from nature: for all these appear to me the greatest of miracles. Nature, the psyche, and life appear to me like divinity unfolded--and what more could I wish for? To me the supreme meaning of Being can consist only in the fact that it is, not that it is not or is no longer. (Jung, 1961/1989, p. 306)

And in the following passage, Jung suggests that such an orientation of noninvolvement in life might not be consistent with Western values and therefore not suitable for Westerners.

> Of course, if anyone should succeed in giving up Europe from every point of view, and could actually *be* nothing but a yogi and sit in the lotus position with all the practical and ethical consequences that this entails, evaporating on a gazelle-skin under a dusty banyan tree and ending his days in nameless non-being, then I should have to admit that such a person understood yoga in the Indian manner. But anyone who cannot do this should not behave as if he did. He cannot and should not give up Western understanding. (Jung, 1943/1969, p. 568)

One of the reasons why Jung cautioned the West against adopting the ways of the East, why he urged that that the West "must get Eastern values from within and not from without, seeking them in ourselves, in the unconscious" (Jung, 1954/1969b, pp. 483-484), is that he believed the introverted East oriented away from nature and life as opposed to the extraverted West that oriented towards them. It is also a reason why he steadfastly refused to meet with the holy men such as Ramana Maharishi in India. Jung's controversial recommendation that Westerners not practice Eastern methods is not in itself a criticism of the East. His other reasons for such a recommendation will be taken up in detail in the next section.

General Summary of the Dialogue on Jungian Psychology and Eastern Thought

This section presents a general summary of the literature on Jungian psychology and Eastern thought. This general summary bridges the material that has been presented in the previous sections with the material presented in the sections that follow. The details of the literature on Jungian psychology and Eastern thought, the specific themes and their corresponding references, are presented in three sections that follow: Criticisms that have been leveled at Jung on Eastern thought; assessment of Jung's positive impact and influence on the West as well as the East; and research that has been stimulated by Jung's writings on the East.

Jung and Eastern thought: A summary

Jung had a lifelong involvement with Eastern thought, directly through primary and secondary sources, and indirectly through the influence of Western thought on his

thinking, thought that had already been influenced in its formulation by Eastern thought. Jung drew inspiration as well as support for his theories from Eastern thought throughout his life. Both the extent of his involvement with Eastern thought and the extent to which he drew inspiration and support from Eastern thought have been disputed. However, it appears as though that both aspects have been underestimated, especially by Jungians, according to the books by Clarke (1992, 1994, 1997) and Coward (1985, 2007), containing perhaps the most comprehensive academic research on Jung and Eastern thought to date. It appears that Jung's own contribution to Western thought has also been underestimated in the West which is the subject of Clarke's 1992 book, *In Search of Jung*.

Eastern thought (Hinduism, Tibetan Buddhism, Zen Buddhism, Taoism, Chinese Buddhism, and the *I Ching*) was a source of inspiration for Jung's theories as well as methods. Eastern thought was also a source of support and evidence for his theories and methods, offering links between ancient and modern thought on the subject of the psyche, an enterprise to which Jung devoted himself with much enthusiasm throughout his life. All of the important Jungian concepts, the libido, the reality of the psyche, the principle of opposites, psychological types, the collective unconscious, the archetypes, the anima, the animus, the self, individuation, circumambulation of the self, the stages of religious development, the relativization and psychological nature of the God-image in the human psyche, the psychoid archetype, and synchronicity, appear to have drawn different degrees of inspiration, or support, and evidence from Eastern thought, though the exact nature of the influence has been hard to measure and been subject to debate.

Jung approached the East and West as displaying opposing but complementary aspects of the psyche that needed each other. In the tradition of a long line of Western thinkers before him, Jung found in Eastern thought a vantage point from which to critically examine the West, its science as well as its religion. Using Eastern thought as a contrasting point of view, he criticized the one-sidedness of the Western scientific point of view that held matter as more real than the psyche for contributing to a pathological disconnection in the Western psyche to its interior, and attempted to establish the reality of the psyche on an equal footing with matter. Also using Eastern thought as a contrasting point of view, he criticized the Western religious point of view for polarizing the principle of opposites in the psyche (a principle for which he found a great deal of support in the East) and for remaining stuck in images of an external God that could no longer inspire in the Western psyche a connection to its inner depth, meaning, and wholeness, thereby adding to its crisis and pathology.

Jung admired Eastern thought as one of the greatest achievements of mankind and thought that the West had a lot to learn from the East and earn it through due effort of its own. Like many other Western thinkers before him, he challenged the prevailing notion that the West was superior to the East because of its science and religion. At the same time, he thought that the West had to guard against blindly adopting the knowledge and methods of the East. He thought that the right and the wise way for the West to use the wisdom of the East was to be inspired by the reality of the complementary aspects of the psyche the East represented and the methods it used to cultivate them and then find its own ways to develop the corresponding aspects in its psyche, using the history of its own culture as the basis.

Literature on Jung and Eastern thought: A summary

In the literature on Jungian psychology and Eastern thought, the major interrelated areas of controversy involve Jung's oft-repeated warnings against Westerners practicing Eastern methods and his rejection of Eastern claims of ego dissolution and of overcoming the tension of opposites as possibilities in the human psyche.

Jung offered some reasons for his rejection of Eastern methods for Westerners, and others have since added additional reasons on the basis of analysis of his writings. As can be seen below, Jung's reasons for rejecting Eastern methods for Westerners, in addition to reasons that bear on the West alone, include all of his major criticisms of the East, of its methodology, metaphysics, and its stance towards reality and life.

According to Borelli (1985a, pp. 79-92), Jung's reasons for rejecting Eastern methods for the West are as follows: (a) The West was in a different stage of religious development than the East and therefore was not ready; (b) the West had much to deal with in terms of the darker aspects of its psyche that it had not dealt with and therefore might be at risk in terms of flooding and even psychosis from Eastern methods that had the benefit of a longer history of inner exploration and development of safeguards for dealing with such phenomena in the encounter with the unconscious; (c) the Western psyche with its overdeveloped will might simply, characteristically, and aggressively acquire and use Eastern methods to further develop its will and to suppress the contents from its unconscious that it really needs to deal with in order to individuate and balance itself; (d) some in the West might just go East in an attempt to avoid facing themselves adopting the world-denying or life-denying aspects of the East (that Jung did not approve of); (e) the East and the West were too different in terms of the principle of

complementary opposites, with the West too extraverted and the East too introverted, the West too symbolic or content-laden and the East too non-symbolic or content-free in its thinking and psychic processes for the transfer of Eastern methods to the West to work; (f) some of the goals of Eastern methods such as overcoming the tension of the opposites and dissolution of ego consciousness while one was alive were impossible for the human psyche to achieve and were based on the lack of critical thinking in psychology and philosophy and the lack of empirical and scientific orientation on the part of the "pre-Kantian" and "primitive" aspects of the Eastern mind; and (g) the West was too different from the East in terms of religion as well as psychological makeup for it to benefit from blind adoption of Eastern methods and the only way it could really benefit from it is by being inspired by it to develop its own methods based on its own cultural and religious history. And Coward (1985, p. 48) adds an additional reason that Jung thought that Westerners did not have the necessary cultural orientation, discipline, and attitudes of surrender and sacrifice required for benefiting from the guidance of Eastern gurus and therefore were better off turning to Western psychotherapy for that role and function.

While some (Avens, 1980; Byles, 1960; Hillman, 1975; Zaehner, 1970; Whitfield, 1992) have offered varying levels of support to Jung's objection to Westerners practicing Eastern methods, more (Jacobs, 1961; Parker, 1967; Borelli, 1977, 1985a; Ajaya 1983; Coward, 1985, Jordens, 1985a; Clarke, 1994; von Moltke, 2000) have questioned the validity his conclusion as well as reasons or have offered other reasons for his objections that undermine his position. The overall position of the debate at present appears to be one where Jung is credited by some with anticipating the difficulties and the risks that might be involved in Westerners practicing Eastern methods but one where Jung is

believed to have really overestimated the differences, difficulties, and the risks of such an encounter to Westerners, even for his times. Some adjustments and modifications might be necessary for this inter-cultural exchange to be effective but the difficulties are not considered to be so insurmountable that the West cannot have a fruitful encounter with Eastern methods. In that spirit, some have suggested a combination of Eastern and Western methods including Jungian psychology to overcome difficulties that Jung foresaw in the West's attempt to incorporate Eastern methods and to extend the possibilities for the goals as well as means for achievement by the human psyche (Watts, 1937, 1940, 1953; Linssen, 1950; Frantz, 1968; Borelli, 1977; Ajaya, 1983; Whitfield, 1992).

The explosion in the practice of the Eastern methods in the West (that Jung himself contributed to through his writings) has been pointed out as possible proof against his recommendation as well as its underlying reasons (Coward, 1985; Clarke, 1994). Jung has been criticized for practicing a limited form of *cultural enclavism* in often repeating the warnings against Westerners practicing Eastern methods (Clarke, 1994). In issuing such dire warnings often, Jung is seen as having overlooked the extent to which cultures have been interpenetrating each other over time and gone against his own understanding of the commonality of all of mankind that led him to formulate the theory of the collective unconscious in the first place.

The specific reasons Jung cited for his recommendation that Westerners do not practice Eastern methods have been questioned. Jung's theory of the stages of religious development has been questioned by historians of religions with evidence that a sophisticated religion of ideas such as Vedanta has been around in the East for a long

time (Borelli, 1985a). His theory of the differences between the East and the West, Eastern introversion versus Western extraversion, has been criticized for oversimplification and stereotyping of East-West differences (Jacobs, 1961; Borelli, 1977). His understanding of Eastern theory and practice such as its stance towards life as one of negation and its meditation goals as states of trance and unconsciousness has been challenged (Sen, 1943, 1952; Avens, 1980; Bishop, 1984; Miyuki in Spiegelman & Miyuki, 1985).

Jung's rejection of Eastern claims of overcoming the tension of opposites and ego dissolution as well as his rejection of Eastern methods for Westerners have been attributed to misunderstanding based on knowledge acquired primarily through textual material (Clarke, 1994), poor translations (Graham, 1989; Cleary, 1991; Reynolds, 1989), lack of adequate personal experience (Jordens, 1985a; Clarke, 1994), lack of a practitioner perspective (von Moltke, 2000, Seeman, 2001), inability to imagine the possibility of consciousness outside the context of subject-object duality (Watts, 1973; Welwood, 1979); Western scientific bias (Jacobs, 1961;Clarke, 1994), philosophical differences (Coward, 2002); and the inadequacy of the psychological model that Jung brought to the encounter (Ajaya, 1983; Wilbur, 1990). There have also been challenges to Jung's claim that Eastern claims of ego-transcendent consciousness and of ability to overcome the tension of opposites is evidence of a lack of critical thinking and philosophy (Clarke, 1994) and lack of empiricism in the East (Jordens, 1985a; Moacanin, 1986).

Jung's insistence that the West finds its own way through its own cultural history to achieve what the East had already achieved in theory as well as practice, and his

pointing to the development of Western psychology as the yoga of the West, have been criticized for possible personal and professional ego dynamics vis-à-vis the East (Seeman, 2001). It has also been suggested that Jung might have held his position strongly to defend against criticisms of his psychology as mystical by its association to the East and to give it more respect and credibility in the West by distancing himself and his psychology from Eastern methods and metaphysics (Borelli, 1977, 1985a).

Although some have questioned Jung's understanding, others have questioned the adequacy of Jung's methodology in the study of Eastern traditions (Jacobs, 1961; Jordens, 1985a; Coward, 1985; Clarke 1994). It has been suggested that Jung might have been too ambivalent towards the Eastern traditions and to its living proponents the gurus, too vocal in his protestations of the appropriateness of Eastern methods for Westerners, too clinging to his own culture, philosophy, psychology, and methods, and too intent on developing his own way to allow the other enough space to speak for itself in the hermeneutical dialogue he sought to engage it in (Clarke, 1994). There have been suggestions that Jung's psychological constructs are inadequate for a proper understanding of Eastern concepts (Welwood, 1979; Jones, 1979) and that Jung, in attempting to understand the East through his psychological framework, engaged in psychological reductionism (or *psychologism*) of religious and spiritual experiences (Jacobs 1961; Krishna, 1975; Ajaya, 1983; Reynolds, 1989; Wilbur, 1990; Aziz, 1990; Samuels, 1992; Leon, 1998), something he has also been criticized in the West in relation to Christianity as well (Buber, 1957).

Despite all the inadequacies in Jung's approach to the East and his understanding of it, and the Western biases he brought to the encounter, he appears to have remained

true to his hermeneutical approach (Clarke, 1994). He maintained that his conclusions were tentative and adhered to the perspective that his context gave him but at the same time allowed the other in this case the East enough space to speak for itself even though he did not always understand it or agree with it which had mostly to do with the Western philosophical framework he brought to the encounter. Jung, as one of the first of Western psychologists to engage Eastern thought, has been credited with providing inspiration for other Western psychologists, in allied fields of analytical and archetypal psychologies (Hillman, 1975) as well as in the alternative field of transpersonal psychology (Grof, 1985). The conceptual and methodological framework with which Jung engaged the East and his findings have continued to be of use and influence in the fields of comparative religion (Eliade, 1960; Zaehner, 1957, 1970) and mythology (Campbell, 1973).

Criticisms of Jung on Eastern Thought

In this section, criticisms leveled at Jung's writings on the East are presented in greater depth along major thematic categories with specific references for each category of criticism.

Ambivalence

Several authors (Clarke, 1994, p. 158; Moacanin, 1986, p. 92) have found troubling the high degree of ambivalence in Jung's attitude to the East, the contrast between the high degree of enthusiasm he displayed for the East and the strong vehemence with which he often expressed his opinion about the unsuitability of its ways for the West. According to Leon (1998), Jung's depth psychological writings about India reveal a mixture of reverent praise for and irreverent condemnation of Hindu spiritual

values. The suggestion is that the ambivalence of Jung's part might have compromised his understanding of the East. Leon (1998), critical of Jung for viewing India through the distorting medium of his meta-psychological law of compensating opposites and for proscribing the practice of yoga in the West, offers a possible subjective origin for Jung's exaggeration his highly revealing and ambivalent psychological reactions while in India in 1937-38 including his perceptions of the "otherness" of Hindu spirituality and "the dreamlike world of India."

Cultural enclavism and orientalism

Clarke (1994) criticizes Jung for some measure of *cultural enclavsim*, a view that holds cultures are too different to communicate and benefit from each other, and for overlooking the fact that "throughout our history, peoples and their ideas have perpetually inter-penetrated and interacted" (p. 160). Clarke (1994) is also of the view that Jung can be criticized to some extent of practicing "orientalism," a term Said (1978) invented to describe a tendency on the part of the West to interpret the East according to its own needs, citing the way Jung lumped together diverse traditions to arrive at his generalizations about the East to support his psychological ideas.

Psychological stereotyping

Jacobs (1961) and Borelli (1977, pp. 88-90) criticize Jung for stereotyping the differences between the East and West in terms of extroversion and introversion. Clarke (1994, pp. 161-163) criticizes Jung for oversimplification of the psychological differences among cultures often with binary distinctions such as Eastern introversion versus Western extroversion and sweeping generalizations and extreme characterizations

like the following: the Eastern intellect is childish compared to Western intellect; the Indian does not think but rather perceives the thought and in this respect resembled the primitive; and critical philosophy is foreign to the East.

Psychologism

Psychologism is a tendency to reduce religious, spiritual, and other experiences to the intrapsychic level (Clarke, 1994, p. 175). Samuels (1992, p. 24) criticizes Jung for trying "to expand his role as a psychologist to the point where he could seem to regard the nation as an exclusively psychological fact to be observed solely from a psychological point of view." Aziz (1990) states that "it is one thing for Jung to say that he is solely concerned with the study of the phenomenology of religious experience, and yet another thing to assert that religious experience ultimately derives from the archetypal level of the psyche" (pp. 48-49). Buber (1957), in his book *The Eclipse of God*, criticizes Jung's psychological treatment of religious experience. Buber considers religious experience to be non-psychological because it is about a relationship to an essentially other. He accused Jung of promoting "the religion of pure psychic immanence" and denying the transcendent nature of God (pp. 83-84). Even though Jung consistently clarified that his psychology was "a science of mere phenomena without any metaphysical implications" (Jung, 1954/1969a, p. 476), Clarke (1994, p. 176) suggests that Jung might have been trying to have it both ways "to leave open the possibility of making metaphysical assertions while at the same time offering us a psychological theory that purports to close the door to them" offering as evidence Jung's statement that "every statement about the transcendent is to be avoided because it is only a laughable

presumption on the part of the human mind unconscious of its limitations" (Jung, 1929/1967, p. 82) and Jung's suggestion that metaphysical statements in Eastern thought were originally intended to symbolically represent psychological states (p. 50).

Many (Jacobs, 1961; Krishna, 1975; Ajaya, 1983; Coward, 1985; Reynolds, 1989; Wilbur, 1990) have criticized Jung for treating psychologically what are essentially spiritual experiences and have accused him of trying to squeeze spiritual traditions and experiences unnaturally into his model of psychological development. According to Wilbur (1990), spiritual experiences are higher levels of consciousness where dualisms created by the ultimate reality of the ego are transcended, which have been at the core of the perennial philosophy that has returned to the West via the East.

Adequacy of Jung's method

Jacobs (1961) and Clarke (1994) are of the view that Jung's European scientific bias played an important role in Jung misunderstanding several aspects of Eastern thought. Clarke (1994) writes that Jung's hermeneutical methodology failed to "address adequately the cultural and historical context in which religious and philosophical ideas arise" and that gives Jung's essentially textual understanding of Eastern thought a "disembodied quality" (pp. 164-166).

Jordens (1985a) suggests that Jung's failure to appreciate and accept the final stage of yogic samadhi and the doctrine supporting it might have arisen in part from Jung not understanding that "Patanjali belonged to a tradition which considered as natural the transition from experience and reasoning to metaphysical statements." And that his

function was that of a guru showing "very small numbers of possible adepts the method of realizing what he considered the acme of mystical realization" (p. 164).

Clarke (1994, pp. 166-167) suggests that what appears to be Jung's overriding need for cross-cultural evidence for his formulations in combination with to what appears to be Jung's "clinging to too firmly to his own cultural territory, protesting too much that we must "build on our own ground with our own methods" offers a possibility that Jung's hermeneutical approach might not have allowed the other cultures sufficient space to speak for themselves.

Another criticism of Jung concerns itself with the extensive use of analogies in his methodology. Clarke (1994, p. 168) points to the notorious inexactitude of the science of drawing analogies and to Jung's extensive use of them in his method, with some that appear to be drawn quickly and superficially, to point out another possible weakness in his methodology and therefore his findings. Coward (1985, p. 123) is of the view that Jung's interpretation of Kundalini yoga is unacceptable and that his interpretation had more to do with his theory of individuation than with Kundalini yoga. Jones (1979) offers a stronger criticism of Jung that he distorted Eastern texts by drawing parallels which are essentially inappropriate by overlooking conceptual differences between his model and Eastern traditions, citing several possible errors in the comparison of his individuation concept with the concept of self-liberation in the Eastern traditions.

Adequacy of Jung's understanding

Translation. Some have questioned Jung's understanding of Eastern thought based on the poor quality of the translations he used to arrive at his insights. Cleary

(1991, p. 3), who did a later translation of *The Secret of the Golden Flower*, writes that Jung used "a garbled version of a truncated version of a corrupted recension of the original work" in using the translation by Richard Wilhelm. Graham (1989, p. 358) writes that Richard Wilhelm's translations from Chinese texts had a great deal of room for improvement. Reynolds (1989, pp. 107-108), who did a later translation of the *The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation*, writes that the Evans-Wentz translation used by Jung is fundamentally flawed. Reynolds writes that a number of mistakes that Jung made in his understanding of Eastern thought might have easily come in part or entirely from the faulty translations he used. Two of his examples of misunderstanding that might have arisen from poor translation are Jung's tendency to think of the East inhabiting a dream world versus the West inhabiting a more tangible world and Jung's equation of the collective unconscious in his psychology with the states of super-consciousness or cosmic consciousness in Eastern thought.

Meditation. Clarke (1994) writes that although it might represent some aspects of Eastern spiritual practices, Jung's general view of meditation as something that led to "the loss of rational, conscious awareness and the withdrawal from the external world, from the body and the senses . . . fails to do justice to the whole range of such practices found in Asia" (p. 172). Bishop (1984, pp. 49-50) criticizes Jung for misunderstanding meditation as a trance-like state in which one withdraws from the world and is identified with the unconscious. Avens (1980, p. 80) is also critical of Jung's understanding of meditation as "a one-sided attempt to withdraw from the world, dissolving the ego and leading back to an indefinite experience of oneness and timelessness." Miyuki challenges the view that Eastern religions typically aim at ego dissolution (Spiegelman &

Miyuki, 1985, pp. 137-138) and Guenther (1975) states that the objective of meditation "is not to develop trance-like states; rather it is to sharpen perceptions, to see things as they are" (p. 27).

Ego dissolution. Jung's rejection of Eastern claims of ego dissolution on the basis of the argument that there "must always be somebody or something left over [a subject or an "I"] to experience the realization of [egolessness]" (Jung, 1954/1969b, p. 505) has been criticized by many as a major misunderstanding in Jung's understanding of Eastern thought with different authors offering different reasons for this limitation in Jung's thinking.

Sen (1943), in an early critique of the view in Jung's book *The Integration of Personality* that the consciousness of Indian yogis is identified with the unconscious, characterizes it as a major misunderstanding and offers an alternative view that yogis are in super-conscious existence in states of *samadhi*. Sen (1952), in describing the method of yoga developed by Sri Aurobindo as an empirical psychological system that incorporates Western psychology and natural sciences that views the evolution of personality as part of a larger pattern of cosmic evolution, credits the psychology of Jung as more complete than other Western psychologies but faults it for failing to understand the super-conscious states that Sri Aurobindo studied extensively. Sen states that the experiences of yogis offer empirical evidence that challenges Western psychology's a priori assumptions about the human psyche.

Watts (1973) criticizes Jung for clinging to the substantiality of the ego despite his recognition of its relativity in relation to the whole psyche and offers an explanation of Jung's difficulty with the Eastern notion of ego transcendence as a Western bias

arising from the subject-predicate structure of its languages and from a philosophy that human beings require ego-consciousness to rise above their primitive nature and origin to become civilized. Interpreting Eastern nondual states of consciousness as higher states of consciousness in which the ego is not dissolved but sublimated, Watts suggests that Jung's Protestant background would not allow him to believe in a human being's ability to rise above suffering and therefore achieve freedom from the grip of a conscious ego.

According to Ajaya (1983), the subject is not abolished in the state of pure consciousness but the subject-object duality of the manifest world around oneself is clearly seen as a projection and therefore an illusion. Whereas Clarke (1994, p. 174) is of the view that whether this involves a misunderstanding on Jung's part or a confusion in Eastern thought is a matter of philosophical judgment, Moacanin (1986, p. 94) points out that transpersonal experiences of nonduality are not unknown in the West.

Clarke (1994, p. 117-118) offers the possibility that some of Jung's misunderstanding of Eastern thought might have arisen from how the sources that Jung relied on for understanding it might have been biased in the direction of Jung's misunderstanding. As examples what Jung had to work with, he points to recent reinterpretations of Indian thought in the West with the emphasis shifting from that the world is an illusion (from Jung's days) to that the world needs to be seen without distorting illusions (later) and Suzuki's psychological emphasis in his interpretation of Zen Buddhism from the influence of American psychologist William James.

Incompleteness of Jung's psychological model

Ajaya (1983), while recognizing Jung for expanding the model of the psyche to include the archetypes, criticizes Jung for failing to carry this further to the recognition that the archetypes themselves are a creation of the mind. According to Ajaya, Buddhist and Vedanta psychology go beyond Jung in recognizing "that the entire universe, including the inner world of archetypes, is a projection of the unified and undifferentiated consciousness" and yoga psychology explores "those modes of experience found above the realm of archetypes" (p. 160). Wilbur (1990, pp. 225, 255) criticizes Jung for confusing the higher self with prepersonal structures (as in participation mystique) on the one hand and for not making a distinction between a lower and a higher level of the collective unconscious that would allow the self to evolve to a higher level of a truly transpersonal experience where the self realizes the unity with everything without being obliterated in the process.

Criticisms of Jung for his rejection of Eastern methods for Westerners

Schultz (1934) argues that the attempts to utilize yoga in psychotherapy are justifiable on two grounds. First, as yoga can be regarded as techniques for mental and physical concentration without any specific world-view to achieve higher states of consciousness, its practice would not be an adoption of an alien cult. Second, as yoga embodies universal religious and mystical intuition that is shared by great German mystics, the German soul has a particular affinity for it. Byles (1960), while agreeing with Jung's recommendation that Westerners not practice Eastern meditations might be applicable to beginners, recommends Buddhist meditation after certain difficulties

peculiar to Westerners are dealt with. Parker (1967), in reviewing the eight aspects of Patanjali yoga and finding that the expansion of consciousness is a common goal in Jungian psychology as well as Patanjali yoga, takes exception to Jung's criticism of Westerners practicing yoga on the basis that yoga is foreign to many Hindus as well and that there is no loss of individuality in yoga. Borelli (1977, pp. 88-90) criticizes Jung for getting carried away by his notions of complementarity and compensation to such an extent in his analysis of East-West differences that he contradicted himself on his very notion of the essential unity of all of mankind and for perhaps getting too carried away by his own preference for symbols that he failed to appreciate the value of Eastern methods for the West. He offers as proof for the validity of his criticisms of Jung the widespread interest and practice of Eastern methods in the West in such a short time since Jung's warning. Clarke (1994, p. 172) suggests that Jung's "failure to encourage or to anticipate the growth of a responsible and disciplined practice of yoga must be seen as a serious shortcoming in his bridge-building enterprise." Jacobs (1961, p. 146), Coward (1985), and Clarke (1994) view Jung's strong discouragement as possibly having the effect of depriving the West of opportunities for spiritual transformation.

Lack of practitioner perspective or direct experience

Reynolds (1989, p. 114) thinks that if Jung had had an opportunity to deal directly with the texts and practitioners of Tibetan Buddhism, he might have well have revised his views on the nonsuitability of Eastern spiritual practices for Westerners. Clarke (1994, p. 172) wonders whether if Jung had been more prepared to experiment with a variety of meditation techniques as he did with the *I Ching*, his views on Westerners practicing

Eastern methods would have been less harsh. Von Moltke (2000) suggests that Jung might have been constrained in his understanding of the possibilities of yoga through the study of translated texts and others' interpretations of them alone and that he might have appreciated the possibilities of yoga better with the help of a teacher, likening his refusal to have one or even engage one to a person attempting to do an analysis by oneself. Jordens (1985a) concludes that *Purusha*, the final stage of yogic *samadhi* in Samkhya yoga, appears to have remained beyond Jung's reach to which Spiegelman (in Spiegelman and Vasavada, 1987) takes a strong exception with the statement that "the psychological point of view of Jung is hard to come by" involving "a simultaneous experiencing and carrying of the opposites of objectivity and subjectivity, resolved in the concept of *psychic reality,* which knows it own limits" (p. ii).

Assessment of the Positive Impact of Jung's Eastern Explorations

Clarke (1994, pp. 187-192), in summing up his assessment of Jung's work, notes the following: (a) Even though "Jung failed for the most part to convey an adequate picture of these [Eastern] traditions, and often saw them within the distorting mirror of European discourse which served to perpetuate some of the standard cultural prejudices of the day" (p. 179), he remained adequately open in his interactions with other cultures and modestly tentative in his conclusions about them to serve as a useful model for building intercultural bridges; (b) his work played an important role in the stimulation of inter-cultural dialogue between the East and West, especially in psychology; (c) his work challenging the prejudice of the pre-eminence of the European culture and his view of cultural relativism and pluralism that the East and West were equal and complementary

not only demonstrated an even-handed approach but also reflected a "morality of sympathy and mutual understanding" in his approach to other cultures; (d) his work helped to provide an answer to the spiritual crisis in the West by providing a more personal and meaningful interpretation of religious experience; (e) his illuminated contemporary psychological questions by means of a detailed comparison with religious and philosophical ideas from China and India; and (f) even though he showed signs of 19th-century metaphysics with formulations such as the collective unconscious on the one hand and was accused of psychological reductionism and mysticism on the other, Jung played a major role in challenging and deconstructing Eastern as well as Western metaphysics with the benefit of greater clarity accruing to both in the ensuing dialogue.

Ulanov (1992, p. 46), in assessing Jung's domain of influence, writes that "Jung's explorations of Eastern thought and religion . . . have stirred responses almost as far-ranging and full of feeling as his psychological investigations." Fox (1990, p. 299) observes that that transpersonal psychologists looking to the East for concepts and methods followed the lead by Jung (p. 184). Grof (1985) calls Jung the "the first representative of the transpersonal orientation in psychology" (pp. 187-188). The use of Jungian psychological concepts can be seen in analytical frameworks of comparative religion (eg., Zaehner, 1957, 1970; Eliade, 1960) and comparative mythology (Campbell, 1973). As to the benefit of Jung to the East, Spiegelman and Miyuki (1985, p. 172) find the positive influence of Western thought on Eastern thought in the form of re-examination and clarification of Eastern spiritual concepts in terms of Western psychological concepts. And as an interesting of evidence of the impact of Jung on the

East is the Indian Psychotherapeutic Society dedicating the very first (April 1956) issue of its journal *The Psychotherapy* to Jung and appointing him as its advisor-in-chief.

Research Stimulated by Jung's Writings on Eastern Thought

This section looks at the research that Jung's writings on Eastern thought have stimulated. Containing only brief general references to the work that has been described elsewhere in this chapter, it offers more details on the work that has not been discussed elsewhere.

Comparative studies classified by scope

The comparative studies of Jungian psychology and Eastern thought vary considerably in their scope, from broad comparisons of Jungian psychology with Eastern thought across a number of traditions to comparisons with specific Eastern traditions to comparisons that involve specific concepts in Jungian psychology and specific concepts in Eastern thought, with the concepts common to many traditions or specific to a particular tradition. The comparative studies also vary considerably in terms of the apparent effort involved and the number of topics covered, with some clearly more comprehensive and better researched than others.

Religion and the cure of souls in Jung's psychology by Schaer (1950) is an early attempt to offer a synopsis of Jung's ideas on Eastern traditions. *Western psychology and Hindu sadhana: A contribution to comparative studies in psychology and metaphysics* is an early attempt by Jacobs (1961) at a critical analysis of the underlying philosophies of Freud, Jung, and Indian yoga in search for commonalities that can contribute to a unified

pattern of life within man. This book, however, has been criticized by Borelli (1985b, p. 204) for molding Jungian positions to fit Indian thought.

The books by Coward (1985) and Clarke (1994) are more recent attempts at comprehensive analyses of Jungian psychology and Eastern thought covering among other things the history of Jung's interactions with the East, Jung's writings on different Eastern traditions, the influence of different Eastern traditions on Jung, the criticisms that have been leveled at Jung on his writings on Eastern thought, and an overall assessment of Jung in relation to the East. Spiegelman and Miyuki (1985) in *Buddhism and Jungian psychology* and Spiegelman and Vasavada (1987) in *Hinduism and Jungian psychology* offer comparative analyses of Jungian psychology and Eastern traditions broadly classified under the umbrellas of Hinduism and Buddhism.

There are studies that compare very specific Eastern traditions and Jungian psychology and its derivatives: Advaita Vedanta (Whitfield, 1992; Anand, 1980); Vedanta (Thornton, 1965). In Krishna (1970), Hillman compares Kundalini yoga and archetypal psychology, a derivative of Jungian psychology. And there are studies that compare concepts and approaches in Jungian psychology with concepts and approaches in Eastern thought, concepts and approaches common to a number of traditions or from one specific tradition: mind in Patanjali yoga (Kenghe, 1976); the self (Pal, 1947; Thomas, 1974; Henderson, 1975 & 1985); prakrti in Samkhya yoga and collective unconscious in Jungian psychology (Jordens, 1985a; Zaehner, 1957); psychological states (Jordens, 1964); and dream interpretation (Pascal, 1978).

Comparative studies classified by concept or method

Details of some of the comparative studies that have not been discussed elsewhere are presented below, classified by concept or method.

Self. Pal (1947) surveys psychoanalytic theories and the Indian views of the self. Borelli (1985b, p. 207) criticizes Pal (1947) for misunderstanding the archetypes as purely racial. Thomas (1974) is a comparative study of the concepts of the self in Mead, Jung, and Mahayana Buddhism. Henderson (1975, 1985) offers an analysis of the sources of Jung's concept of the self highlighting the Eastern contribution, especially the Hindu contribution.

Mind. Kenghe (1976) defines the mind from the point of view of Patanjali yoga and then contrasts it with the depth psychological views of the mind of Freudian and Jungian psychologies which he finds as essentially materialistic in nature.

Karma. Coward (1983) offers an analysis of how the Indian notions of *karma* and rebirth influenced Jung, especially in his final years, when his own dreams led to a fuller understanding and perhaps a greater acceptance of the reality of this aspect of psychic inheritance.

Individuality. Marsh (1959) compares the concept of individuality in the psychologies of Jung and Sri Aurobindo.

Dreams. A major conclusion of the study by Pascal (1978) of Indian and Buddhist traditions of dream interpretation is that both traditions display ambivalence towards the interpretation and meaning of dreams.

The unconscious. Sreenivasachar (1941-42, pp. 261-68) discusses the role of samskaras in his analysis of the formulations of the unconscious in yoga and psychology.

Scott (1974) compares Jungian and Buddhist notions of the unconscious. Jordens (1985a) compares the Samkhya yoga concept of *prakrti* with the collective unconscious. Zaehner (1957) compares *buddhi* as well as *prakrti* with the collective unconscious, energy and *prana*, and spirit and union.

Yoga. Jordens (1964) focuses on practical comparisons in relation to psychological states in Jungian psychology and Indian Samkhya yoga systematized by Patanjali. Faber and Saayman (1984) study the relation of the doctrines of yoga to Jung's psychology.

Self-actualization. Kuppuswamy (1976) discusses the concept of self-actualization according to Jung, Maslow, Rogers, and Allport, in relation to the yoga sutras of Patanjali.

Comparative studies classified by nature of findings

The comparative studies can also be classified on the basis of their major findings: similarities, differences, complementarities, shortcomings, and possibilities for improvement of one by the other or both through syntheses.

Similarities. Winter (1918-19) is early attempt to show similarities between yoga and psychoanalysis by stressing the unity of human mental processes by evidence of general symbols. Avens (1973) analyzes Jung's individuation process and several Eastern spiritualities and suggests that both share goals of self-awareness, transformation of ordinary consciousness, and transcendence. Coukoulis (1976) argues that despite verbal and conceptual differences, as experienced in guru-student and analyst-analysand relationships, the experience and meaning of the self is the same in Indian, Buddhist, and

Jungian relationships. Mokusen (1977) relates Jungian analysis to Buddhist practices such as Zazen and Koan meditation.

Differences. Zimmer (1935) concludes that in the West the unconscious leads, whereas in the East the guru leads. Coward (2002), in his recent book *Yoga and Psychology*, explores how Western psychology has been influenced by incorporating or rejecting Patanjali's yoga and concludes that there is a crucial difference between Eastern and Western thought with regard to how limited or perfectible human nature is--the West maintaining that human beings are psychologically, philosophically, and spiritually limited or flawed in nature and thus not perfectible, while Patanjali's yoga and Eastern thought generally maintains the opposite.

Complementarities. Frantz (1968) offers the view that meditation and analysis are complementary and can lead to wholeness when employed together. Borelli (1977) states that Jung's findings, especially the archetypes, can add to the knowledge of yoga (p. 80). Whitfield (1992), in a comparative study of Jungian psychology and Advaita Vedanta, offers the following complementarities between the two systems of thought. The Vedanta self or the *Brahman* that Jung did not understand or could not accept for epistemological reasons, can add to the Jungian concept of the self as an additional dimension of achievement for the human psyche beyond the goal of individuation offered by Jungian psychology; Jungian psychology and its individuation process, on the other hand, can offer Advaita Vedanta practitioners, especially Westerners, additional means or *sadhanas* for developing one's psyche to have it more qualified for enlightenment, a step beyond individuation.

Syntheses. Watts (1937, 1940, 1953), explores concepts from Eastern and Western psychologies and attempts to find a middle ground between the two. Parker (1979) offers a synthesis of analytical psychology and the teachings of Paramahansa Yogananda.

Shortcomings. Using Buddhist psychological theory, Welwood (1979) constructs a holistic model over the conscious/unconscious polarity and contrasts it with the depth psychological model of C. G. Jung, which he criticizes as limited by dualistic thinking. In a study of Jung and Eastern religions, Jones (1979) concludes that Jung's psychological concepts are not adequate to understand Eastern religions.

Studies that employ Jungian psychology to interpret, understand, or complement Eastern thought

Nath (1952) analyzes Patanjali yoga from the perspective of modern Western psychology. Abegg (1952) applies the Jungian typology of psychological types to understand the mind of "the East Asian character." Coward (1979) uses Jungian psychology to interpret some devotional songs by the Tamil poet Tirunaavukarasar within a common set of assumptions shared by Jungian psychology and South Indian devotional poetry. Roy (1979) uses the Jungian ideas such as animus to explain Hindu mythology as primarily a projection of familial relationships. Scott (1980) explores the psychological implications of the doctrines of Buddha using analytical psychology. Elder (1983) analyzes the life of Buddha as laid out in various Buddhist texts from the Jungian perspective focusing on the growth in wisdom in terms of successful confrontation of certain psychological factors.

Wood (1974) applies Jungian psychology to interpret Eastern dreams.

Wanner (1978) subjects visions and experiences of Muktananda to Jungian psychological technique of dream amplification. Sharma and Siegel (1980) interpret Eastern dream legends with Western psychology. O'Flaherty (1982) reviews Indian sources containing the theme of dreaming another's dream with reference to interpretations by Jung, Freud, and others. Leon (1998) suggests the possible use of Jung's law of compensating opposites to examine the internal dynamism of the Hindu spiritual tradition.

Weiser (1999) interprets the dialogue between Krishna and Arjuna in the Bhagvad Gita as between the ego and the self from the Jungian perspective and claims that "using Jung's technique of amplification to explore the images contained in the Gita works to illuminate certain profundities that might otherwise be inconceivable" (p. iii).

Studies that employ Eastern thought to interpret, understand, or complement Jungian psychology

Linssen (1950) takes certain ideas from Jung and then tries to complete them and improve them with Indian philosopher and spiritual teacher J. Krishnamurti's teachings. Harding (1968) illustrates the development of ego-consciousness and the stages of assimilation of levels of unconscious contents using the chakras of the Kundalini yoga tradition. Parker (1978) analyzes transitional phases in American culture using the themes from the symbol of Kali in Hinduism. Of the value of the East to the West, Weiser (1999) says, "The East long ago reached the psychological level that understands religious imagery to be the phenomenology of the objective psyche. As the God-image of the West falls out of the heavens and into psyche, we can turn to the East, as Jung did, to find the Archimedean Point necessary from which to view our spiritual evolution" (p. iv).

Studies that analyze Jung's rejection of Eastern methods for Westerners

Borelli (1977) analyzes the reasons for Jung's criticisms of the practice of Eastern spiritual methods by Westerners and classifies them into six inter-related themes. (1) as a warning against escapism on the part of the West to avoid having to face its own darkness; (2) as a possible defense against criticisms against him that undermined his psychology by over-identifying it with Eastern perspectives and methods; (3) as a warning about the risk of imposing a more developed religion from one culture on another culture with a less developed religion based on his theory of the natural course of the development of religion; (4) his rejection of the possibility of certain Eastern goals such as universal consciousness, transcendence of the ego, and freedom from the tension of the opposites, and the appropriateness of "non-symbolic" Eastern methods (that tried to isolate the spirit away from specific psychic contents) for "symbolic" Westerners who were quite oriented towards them; (5) his belief that the differences between the East and West in terms of introversion and extroversion, religions, and other things were too great for the transplantation of one on the other to work; and (6) his belief that yoga is just another method for self-awareness and that the extroverted West should find its own gradual way towards introversion, develop its own yoga, through images and methods from its own culture and use the introverted East only for an inspiration for the needed complementary attitude. And Kakar (1994), in examining the impact of Freudian and Jungian thought on India and the influence of India on Freud and Jung, offers the view that these psychological encounters were decisively shaped by the colonial situation.

Studies that attempt to clear Western misunderstanding of Eastern thought

Marlan (1980, pp. 53-63) differentiates the concept of the self in a number of Eastern schools of thought that Jung might have sourced his concept of the self from in an attempt to clear up some false ideas of the Eastern ideas of the self. Borelli (1985b, p. 205) critiques Marlan's study for not distinguishing his exact positions on the self in relation to Jung's idea of the self. Starcher (1999) undertakes a close reading of the *Sat-Cakra-Nirupuna* a primary text in the Hindu chakra system to provide a more accurate interpretation of the chakras to correct the numerous inaccuracies he found in the Western psychological literature especially among transpersonal authors.

Studies that engage Jungian Psychology and Eastern traditions in dialogue

Anand (1980) engages Jungian psychology in a dialogue with Vedanta and concludes that the Vedantic atman-Brahman relationship is compatible with the ego-self relationship in Jungian psychology. Von Moltke (2000) engages the yoga sutras of Patanjali and the psychology of Jung in a dialogue and concludes that, even though both systems are based on articulation of experience, they are products of different cultures and times with considerable variation in their foundations and goals, with yoga focused on the mind with teachings that are metaphysical in nature and Jungian psychology focused on the psyche with writings that are psychological in nature. Seeman (2001) engages in dialogue Jung's commentaries on Kundalini yoga from Kundalini yoga practitioner's perspective.

Basics Concepts of Advaita Vedanta

A very simple overview of Sankara's Advaita Vedanta is presented in this section. The details of different aspects of the system will be presented in the body of the dissertation as needed in the dialogue between Jungian psychology and Advaita Vedanta. This section has as its main reference the books *Indian Philosophy*, Volume 1 (1923/1994a) & Volume 2 (1923/1994b) by S. Radhakrishnan, who served at Oxford University as a professor of philosophy for many years before becoming the first president of India.

History

The ancient basis of Indian philosophy can be traced back to the four Vedas, Rg, Yajur, Sama, and Atharva Vedas, that are dated from 1500 BCE to 600 BCE, the Vedic period (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994a, p. 57). The Vedas, considered to be compilations of writings of numerous unknown authors from the Vedic period, consist of three sections: The *Mantras*, the *Brahmanas*, and the *Aranyakas* and *Upanishads* (p. 65). The *mantras* are religious hymns written by poets, the *Brahmanas* religious rituals created by priests, and the *Aranyakas* meditations and *Upanishads* philosophical statements written philosophers. The *Aranyakas* and *Upanishads,* the end portions from each of the four Vedas, together as a body of knowledge came to be referred to as the Vedanta, meaning literally 'the end of the Veda' (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, p. 430).

The rise of Jainism and Buddhism in India in the 6th century, BCE, challenged the polytheistic, ritualistic, and dogmatic aspects that were dominating Vedic religion and metaphysics at the time (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, pp. 17-18; 1923/1994a, pp. 360-

361). The challenge posed to Vedic thought by Jainism and Buddhism through logic and reason and the development of the six Brahmanical systems of thought (Gautama's Nyaya, Kanada's Vaisesika, Kapila's Samkhya, Patanjali's Yoga, Jaimini's Purva Mimamsa, and Badarayana's Uttara Mimamsa or the Vedanta) to meet the challenge and to build a deeper foundation for Vedic thought based on logic and reason ushered in a golden age in the development of critical philosophy in India (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, pp. 17-18). The *Brahma Sutras*, attributed to Badarayana and dated by Indian scholars from 500 to 200 BCE, is an attempt at systematization of the contents of the *Upanishads* which "are but a series of glances at truth from various points of view, and not an attempt to think out the great questions consecutively" (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, pp. 430-431). And, in commenting on the contemporary relevance of Vedanta, Radhakrishnan (1923/1994b) states that "in one or the other of its forms the Vedanta determines the world view of the Hindu thinkers of the present time" (p. 430).

Advaita Vedanta, dating back to the 6th century CE, is a system that developed in the tradition of Badarayana's *Uttara Mimamsa* or Vedanta. Sankara, who is dated by historians as having lived in India anywhere from the 6th century to 9th century CE became its main exponent in a short life that spanned only 32 years (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, pp. 447-448). Sankara, "a philosopher and a poet, a savant and a saint, a mystic and a religious reformer" (p. 450), through his commentaries on numerous ancient texts including the *Brahma Sutras*, developed a system of thought "to reconcile contemporary standards of knowledge and belief with the ancient texts and traditions" (p. 449); and "to formulate a philosophy and religion which could satisfy the ethical and spiritual needs of the people better than the systems of Buddhism, Mimamsa, and Bhakti"

(p. 449), with their tendencies towards asceticism devoid of life, ritualism devoid of spirit, and devotional theism devoid of reason, respectively.

Though they lived in very different times, it is of interest to note the similarities in Sankara's and Jung's quests. They both saw value in ancient wisdom and tried to connect it with modern thought using contemporary standards of knowledge. And they were both reformers who made it their life's mission to address the psychological, spiritual, and other crises they saw in their midst. It is also of interest to note that the concepts of *Atman* and *Brahman* from the *Upanishads* played a central role in the formulation of the theories of both men.

Basic concepts

Introduction. "The aim of the Vedanta is to lead us from an analysis of the human self to the reality of the one absolute self" (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, p. 595). The aim of the analysis is the demonstration of the essential identity or oneness of the individual self, the *jiva or* the *vijnanatman*, which is subject to change, with the *atman* or the *paramatman*, which is free from all change; and the identity of the *atman*, the unchanging self arrived at from the analysis of the *jiva* or individual, with the *Brahman*, the unchanging self arrived at from the analysis of *jagat* or the phenomenal world of names and forms (p. 595). The following presentation of the basic concepts of Advaita Vedanta, drawn primarily from Radhakrishnan (1923/1994b), goes from the macro to the micro, from an analysis of the *Brahman*, the unchanging basis of all creation, to an analysis of *jiva* or the individual.

The Brahman. According to Sankara, the *Brahman* cannot really be described other than that it is without a second or *advaitam* or nondual (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, p. 535). However, it has to be described in some manner with the caveat that when it is known, it would be beyond all descriptions of it. To describe it is to be in the relative or the dual and the nondual cannot really be adequately described from the relative standpoint of subject-object duality. "In the supreme *Brahman* there is a natural dissolution of all relativities. It is not a system or a whole that can be achieved by an endless process of reconciling opposites (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, p. 541).

The *Brahman* is described as *sat-cit-ananda* where *sat* means real or existence, *cit* means consciousness, and *ananda* means bliss (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, p. 589). The term *ananda* has also been interpreted as *ananta* meaning infinite or unlimited or freedom arising from *ananta* by Advaita Vedantin Swami Dayananda Saraswati (Dayananda, 2002). The basic postulate of Advaita Vedanta is that the source of all consciousness (awareness) and existence (reality) in the universe is the indivisible, infinite, and immutable *Brahman* that does not depend on anything else for its existence and consciousness.

The *Brahman* cannot be known as an object of consciousness. Whereas everything else is an object of consciousness to the *Brahman*, the *Brahman* has the ability to be conscious of itself without becoming or having to be an object of consciousness. Whereas everything is evident to the *Brahman*, the *Brahman* is evident to itself (self-evident) without being an object. The *Brahman* is self-numinous (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, p. 481).

The *Brahman* is not subject to change and therefore eternal in nature. If it changed, that would imply that it depended on something else that was there before it (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, p. 555). And all things depend on the *Brahman* for their existence or consciousness (p. 554). Because the *Brahman* is changeless, the dependence of anything on the *Brahman* for either existence or consciousness does not alter the *Brahman*.

The Brahman, Isvara, jagat, and maya. "The *Brahman* is not subject to the mutations of the world' (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, p. 566). The unexplained and perhaps unexplainable mystery of the phenomenal world of subjects and objects, the *jagat*, arising out of the immutable *Brahman* is called *maya* (p. 578). "The world has its basis in *Brahman*. But *Brahman* is and is not identical with the world. It is, because the world is not apart from *Brahman*; it is not, because *Brahman* is not subject to the mutations of the world" (p. 566). The *Brahman* is absolute in that it is not subject to change and the world is relative in that it is.

According to Radhakrishnan (1923/1994b), Sankara defines the real as "what is present in all times" and "that which ever was, is and will be" (p. 562). By that definition, the *Brahman* is real and the world or *jagat* is not. Because the world is dependent on the *Brahman*, the world is *Brahman*. However, because the world does not alter the *Brahman*, the *Brahman* is not the world. And because the world does not affect the *Brahman*, "the world resides in *Brahman* even as the illusion of a snake is said to reside in the rope" (p. 570). In the above manner, the *Brahman* is immanent as well as transcendent in relation to the world.

The *jagat* is the creation and *Isvara* its creator. The immutable or *nirguna* (indeterminate) *Brahman* that is neither a knower nor a doer becomes a knower and doer in the *saguna* (determinate) *Brahman* called *Isvara* through *maya,* a mystery. *Isvara* combines in its nature both being and nonbeing (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, p. 555). *Maya* "is the creative power of the eternal God, and is therefore eternal . . . it is in *Isvara* even as heat is in fire. Its presence is inferred from its effects" (p. 572), in that its phenomenology can be observed to exist without affecting the *Brahman. Isvara* contains within itself all that exists, in actuality and potentiality (p. 554). *Isvara* is the material as well as the efficient cause of the world and is therefore the same as the world or *jagat* in all its actual and potential forms (p. 547).

Jiva, saskin, atman, and Brahman. The individual's subjective self is called *jiva* in Advaita Vedanta. Radhakrishnan (1923/1994b, p. 602) uses the phrase "empirical ego" to describe *jiva*. There appear to be two variations in the definition of *jiva* in Advaita Vedanta. At times, the subjective experience of an individual is divided into a witness self, the *saskin*, and *jiva*, the experiencing self. A simple illustration of this differentiation can be found in the experience of a person observing himself in the act of thinking or doing something in the waking state. "The witness self cannot be identified with the qualified *Brahman* or *Isvara,* since it is defined as absolute, devoid of qualities; nor is the witness to be identified with the *jiva*, who is a doer and enjoyer of actions and their fruits" (p. 602). At times, *saskin,* the witness self, is regarded as a part of *jiva* as opposed to being a separate entity. "*Jiva* has two aspects, one real and the other unreal, that of *saskin* or passive spectator, and *abimanin* or active doer and enjoyer" (p. 608).

The *jiva* is linked to a psychophysical system of a gross material body (*sthula sareera*) that the individual *jiva* casts off at death and a subtle material body (*sushma sareera*) that migrates with the *jiva* into the next life with impressions from all prior lives (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, pp. 596-597). *Jiva* is also understood as the individual soul. Radhakrishnan writes that "*Isvara* is the world soul, while the *jiva* is the individual soul" (p. 603).

In Sankara's Advaita Vedanta, as in the analysis of the phenomenal world that led to the logically reasoned postulate of the *Brahman* as the self-evident, infinite, immutable, immanent, transcendent, and nondual (indivisible) reality of all creation, there arises in the analysis of the self in the subjective experience of the *jiva* a logically reasoned postulate of the nondual (indivisible) reality of the *atman* as the self-evident, immutable, infinite, immanent, and transcendent source of all subject and object experiences of the *jiva* (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, pp. 475-485). "The *Atman*, which is the underlying basis of empirical egos, suffers no change and experiences no emotions (p. 604). Further conclusions follow: *Jiva* is *atman* as *Isvara* or world is *Brahman.* And, "*Atman* and *Brahman* have the same characteristics of being . . . . *Atman* is *Brahman*. The purely subjective is also purely objective" (p. 537). Therefore, *jiva* is *Brahman*, expressed in one of the *maha-vakyas or* major Vedanta statements, '*Tat tvam asi*' or 'That thou art'.

Avidya and adhyasa. The *jiva* remains ignorant of its nature as *Brahman* because of *avidya* or ignorance brought about by *adhyasa* or erroneous perception that is natural in the human mind that by its very constitution is inclined "to break up the nature of one absolute consciousness into a subject-object relation" (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, p. 507). Due to *adhyasa*, the mind can erroneously attribute the characteristics of the subject

to the objects and vice versa (p. 506). The object, the mind, can be seen to have consciousness which is really the characteristic of the only subject, the *atman*. The subject, the *atman*, can be seen to have the characteristics of the object, the mind, as when one says “I do” or “I think” or “I feel”. Due to *adhyasa*, the real, the *atman*, and the apparent, the objects of consciousness, are confused with each other leading to *avidya* or ignorance on the part of the *jiva* as to its true nature as *atman* or its equivalent the *Brahman*.

Anubhava, moksa, and jivan mukti. According to Sankara, the *jiva* cannot grasp the reality that it is *Brahman* as an object in a subject-object framework (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, p. 502). However, Sankara “admits the reality of an intuitional consciousness, *anubhava*, where distinctions of subject and object are superseded and the truth of the supreme self realized” (pp. 510-511). It is direct perception when “the *avidya* [ignorance] is destroyed and the individual knows that the *Atman* and *jiva* are one” (p. 511).

Moksa is “a matter of direct realization of something which is existent from eternity, though it is hidden from our view” (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, p. 630). According to Sankara, the nature of liberation or *moksa* is a state of oneness with the *Brahman* (p. 639) the possibility of which is available to all human beings (p. 513). However, “the realization of the truth does not mean the abolition of plurality, but only the removal of the sense of plurality” (p. 637). *Moksa* is “thus not the dissolution of the world but only the disappearance of a false outlook” and “the cause of pain is simply the error of false knowledge, and with deliverance from error comes liberation from pain” (p. 637) and possible freedom from birth, death, and rebirth (pp. 644, 646). Sankara does not

see an essential contradiction between action and *moksa* (p. 644) and admits to the possibility of a gradual liberation (p. 645). A human being who has attained *moksa* or enlightenment is called a *jivan mukti* (p. 644).

Sankara, religion, and god. Religion and God are viewed by Sankara as an intermediate step in the realization of the *atman* by the individual (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, p. 650). In Sankara's view, "the relation between the person worshipping and the object worshipped implies a difference between the two" and "is something to be transcended" because "it is an imperfect experience which exists only so long as we fail to rise to the true apprehension of reality" (p. 650). The conception of a personal God is understood by Sankara as a means by which an individual who has not felt oneness with his own nature (the *atman*) tries to grasp it and relate to it in the form of symbols that possess "a number of perfections" (p. 649). All concepts of God including the Vedic ones are to be understood in the above manner.

Sankara's epistemology

Radhakrishnan (1923/1994b) describes Sankara's Advaita Vedanta philosophy as a "great example of monic idealism" that is difficult to refute metaphysically (p. 657). Sankara brought logic and reason to ancient Vedic thought in the *Upanishads* to reconnect Hinduism to the eternal truths in it at a time when Buddhism was already in decline in India and Hinduism, weakened by Buddhism and Jainism, was characterized by ritualism on the one hand and feuding devotional sects on the other (p. 653). According to Radhakrishnan, Sankara attributed all his ideas to the Vedas and saw himself merely as someone who tried to bring clarity back to the eternal truths in the

Vedas that had been obscured by misinterpretation over time (p. 467). And, "unlike many other interpreters of the Vedanta, Sankara adopts the philosophical, as distinct from the theological attitude in matters of religion" (p. 652).

In comparing the methodologies of Sankara and Kant, Radhakrishnan (1923/1994b) notes that both philosophers chose to "solve the conditions of knowledge by the critical rather than the empirical method (p. 521). According to Radhakrishnan, while Kant sought "not so much the logical implications of experience as the *a priori* conditions of experience" and asserted "an extra-empirical world of things in themselves," Sankara sought to discover "the immanent principle within experience" and not a world beyond it (p. 521). Both philosophers however agree that the logical intellect, if it were to set itself as a sole determinant of reality, could become in Kant's words 'a faculty of illusion'. Radhakrishnan (1923/1994b), in commenting further on Jung and Sankara, writes:

> While Kant believes in a plurality of things in themselves, Sankara declares that there is only one fundamental reality. In this matter Sankara is certainly more philosophical than Kant, who illegitimately imports the distinction of the world into the regions of things-in-themselves. (p. 522)

Nature of Indian philosophy

Radhakrishnan (1923/1994a) notes that "philosophy in India is essentially spiritual" (p. 24). Unlike in the West, philosophy in ancient India was "an auxiliary to any other science or art" (p. 22) but "the master science guiding other sciences" (p. 23). Radhakrishnan (p. 23) cites the *Mundaka Upanishad* as describing *Brahma Vidya*, the knowledge of the *Brahman*, as the science of the eternal and basis for all sciences and quotes Kautilya as describing philosophy as "the lamp of all the sciences, the means of

performing all the works, and the support of all the duties." As to the criticism that has been directed at Indian philosophy that it is neither self-conscious nor critical, Radhakrishnan disagrees: "It is untrue to say that philosophy in India never became self-conscious or critical. Even in its early stages rational reflection tended to correct religious belief (p. 27). Sankara's methodology needs to be considered in the context of the nature of Indian philosophy as described above.

Paths to moksa or enlightenment in Advaita Vedanta

Nature of enlightenment. According to Sankara, for human beings, there is the possibility of higher wisdom of *moksa* or enlightenment that is absolute and the lower knowledge of pluralism that is relative that includes the experience of God (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, p. 519). "Transcendental absolutism becomes when it passes through the mill of man's mind an empirical theism, which is true until true knowledge arises, even dream states are true until awakening occurs" (p. 519).

Sankara did not believe that the *atman* could be comprehended by an individual as an object in a subject-object framework (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, pp. 481-482). However, he believed that the *atman* could be comprehended by an individual on its own terms when *avidya* or ignorance is removed and *moksa* attained through *anubhava* or intuition, due to the self-evident nature of the *atman.* (p. 512). Elaborating on Sankara's position on this topic, Radhakrishnan writes:

> The absolute is the unattainable goal towards which the finite intellect strives, and when it reaches its consummation, thought ceases to be what it is in our empirical life, and passes into a higher and more direct form of apprehension in which it and its object can no longer be distinguished. (p. 526)

And,

> *Anubhava* is not consciousness of this thing or that thing, but it is to know and see in oneself the being of all beings, the Ground and the Abyss. . . . The object of intuition is not a private fancy or a subjective abstraction in the mind of the knower. It is a *real object*, which is unaffected by our apprehension or non-apprehension of it, though its reality is of a higher kind than that of particular objects of space and time which are involved in a perpetual flux and cannot therefore be regarded strictly as real. . . . As for Plotinus, so for Sankara, the absolute is not presented as an object, but in an immediate contact which is above knowledge. (pp. 512-513)

Paths to enlightenment: Even though intuitional experience of *moksa* "carries with it "the highest degree of certitude" of the ultimate truth of oneself as the *atman* in one's own awareness, as in mystical states, "it has only a low level of conceptual clearness" requiring relative interpretations that are fallible that "require endless revisions" (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, p. 514). "*Anubhava* is a vital spiritual experience that can be communicated only through the language of imagination" (pp. 517-518) and *srutis*, brief statements that summarize Vedic thought, are such imaginal statements based on personal experience. Since the eternal truths presented in the Vedas are based on personal experience, "the Vedas are said to be their own proof, requiring no support from elsewhere" (p. 518). Although all individuals have the inherent capacity to become enlightened on their own (pp. 513-514), few do, and therefore the Vedas offer a path towards enlightenment for more, even though they are relative interpretations [of states of enlightenment and means by which they were reached] that are fallible that require endless revisions (p. 518). Of the possibility of enlightenment through the Vedas described by Sankara, Radhakrishnan writes: "Before we rise to intuition, we rise to *sruti*" (p. 545). Ultimately, it is an individual's personal experience that validates the

truth of the Vedas. "Sruti, of course, has to conform to experience and cannot override it" (p. 518).

Sankara admits to the possibility of a multiplicity of means for shedding *avidya* (ignorance) and gaining *moksa.* In Sankara's view, "there are many *vidyas*, or forms of contemplation advocated in the *Upanishads*" (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, p. 649). At the same time, Sankara points out the impossibility of a cause-and-effect relationship between a path towards enlightenment and achievement of enlightenment: "Knowledge does not wait even for the moment immediately next [to] the annihilation of duality, for if it did there would be an infinite regress, and duality will never be annihilated. The two are simultaneous. We reach the real when the wrong view is cleared up" (p. 515). As to how that might happen for an individual, Sankara states that it appears to depend ultimately on the mystery of the grace of God:

> If the question is asked as to how we are helped out of *avidya* to *vidya*---an illegitimate question, since, when error is destroyed, truth, which is self-sufficient, is revealed)---no better answer than assigning it to the grace of God is possible. (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, p. 515)

In Advaita Vedanta, there are however other views on whether individuals have the capacity to achieve *moksa* on their own. Badarayana, the author of the *Brahma Sutras*, who is regarded as the founder of the Vedanta tradition that is considered to be Sankara's lineage, "declares openly that there is no possibility of discovering metaphysical truth by means of *tarka* or reflection" (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, p. 435) and "admits of no other *pramanas* [means of knowledge]" (p. 436). This position also appears to be the one taken by Swami Dayananda Saraswati as reported by his long-term student Carol Whitfield:

> According to its tenets, this revelatory knowledge [Vedanta} can withstand any amount of logical analysis and is also not contradicted by one's experience. However, because the knowledge gained is outside of our epistemological limits, our own means of knowledge, as well as our logic and experience, can only substantiate the vision of Vedanta, they cannot produce it. The verification of Vedanta as a valid means of knowledge lies only in its use, because the knowledge it has to give cannot be gained elsewhere. (Whitfield, 1992, p. 147)

And, according to this tradition, one arrives at the higher knowledge promised by the Vedanta by a process where the doubts that arise in the process of study and contemplation of its teachings are removed with the help of a teacher. There are other traditions in Advaita Vedanta that have developed around individuals such as Ramana Maharishi who became enlightened without recourse to either the Vedas or a teacher (Sharma, 1993).

Qualifications for enlightenment

Discussions of the characteristics of an individual that constitute the qualifications for of enlightenment are found throughout the Vedanta. They are also found in the Bhagavad Gita, where Krishna offers Arjuna a list of the characteristics of an *adhikari* a person who qualifies (Dayananda, 2002). Whitfield (1992) lists the following characteristics of a qualified person as described in Advaita Vedanta:

1. Dispassion (*vairagya*)
2. Discrimination (*viveka*)
3. The six-fold group beginning with the discipline of the mind (*samadisaktkasampatti*):
   a. Discipline of the mind (*sama*)
   b. Discipline of the body and senses (*dama*)
   c. Single-pointedness of pursuit (*uparathi*)
   d. Endurance of the pairs of opposites (*titiksa*)
   e. Steadiness of mind (*samadanam*)
   f. Faith in the scriptures and the teacher (*sraddha*)
4. The desire for liberation (*moksa*).

> The attainment of these values is said to bring about a certain purity of mind (*anthakaranasuddhi*) which is necessary for gaining the higher wisdom offered by the Vedanta. (pp. 193-194)

Studies on Vedanta and Jungian Psychology

Thornton (1965) compares Jungian psychology and Vedanta using Sankara's commentary on the *Mandukya Upanishad* and sees Jung's empiricism as one level of experience in Advaita Vedanta. In a comparative study of the analytical psychology model of Jung with Vedanta, Anand (1980) finds ontological as well as epistemological compatibility between the two models. The models are found to have in common the impulse towards wholeness and completion and intuitive knowledge as part of the epistemology. The five *mahavakyas* (major statements) of Vedanta (One without a second; Consciousness is *Brahman*; Atman is *Brahman*; I am *Brahman*; That art thou) are analyzed to articulate a five-step progression against which Jung's notions of the self, process of individuation, and "final individuation of the self" are compared. Based on the finding of a high degree of compatibility between the two models, Anand (1980) recommends the use of Hindu meditative and yoga techniques in psychotherapeutic process and finds the ego-self model in Jungian psychology a valuable framework for the study of comparative religions, literatures, and descriptive studies of man.

Whitfield (1992), in a comparative study of Advaita Vedanta and Jungian psychology, finds that the nature of the self according to Advaita Vedanta as pure consciousness and of its relationship to the ego was not understood by Jung (p. 143). Elaborating on this misunderstanding, Whitfield writes:

> Jung understood the Eastern concept of pure consciousness to be beyond the ego and transcendent to it; thus pure consciousness and the ego became two distinct entities, and he identified himself with the knowing ego. Pure consciousness then

> became a transcendent "mental condition" beyond the ego consciousness . . . . For Jung consciousness is something created or accumulated as the ego gathers knowledge or extends its boundaries. Thus it is a product of knower/known duality. Jung did not venture into the essential nature of the knower, that is, of the ego itself, which according to the Vedantic vision, is pure consciousness. If the conscious ego is considered from its own standpoint, minus the objects of knowledge it has accrued, we are left with the essential nature of the knower/ego, which is consciousness itself, not consciousness of something . . . . The Self is the only source of consciousness, and it is the substantial center of the ego, that is, it is the ego's sense of the "I". Thus, the consciousness of the ego can never be transcended, being the ultimate center of all experience. However, the ego can resolve into consciousness in meditative experiences. (pp. 143-145)

According to Whitfield, Jung made the error of conceptualizing the ego and the self as two distinct centers in the psyche endowing only the ego with consciousness. Further, Jung did not understand the nature of pure consciousness or the self-conscious nature of the *Brahman* which can be conscious of itself without another object or itself being an object, which Jung could not imagine. Jung was caught in the subject-object duality and therefore could not imagine beyond it. In the process, he misunderstood the relationship between the ego and pure consciousness, in particular that pure consciousness or the *Brahman* was the substance and center of the ego which the ego could not grasp due to mutual superimposition that confused the subject with objects and vice versa. And the presence of objects in one's consciousness did not mean that the yogi had not reached a state of self-realization as implied in the following quote by Jung.

> Even when I say "I know myself," an infinitesimal ego--the knowing "I"--is still distinct from "myself". In this as it were an atomic ego, which is completely ignored by the essentially non-dualistic standpoint of the East, there nevertheless lies hidden the whole unabolished pluralistic universe and its unconquered reality. (Jung, 1939/1969b, pp. 504-505)

In conclusion, Whitfield suggests that the Jungian model can be extended by adding the *Brahman* as the invariant pure consciousness aspect of the Jungian self and that the

Jungian model of individuation can be particularly helpful especially to a person from the West as he or she prepares to become qualified to receive the higher knowledge of the *Brahman* from the East.

Future Directions for Jungian psychology and Eastern thought

There appears to be opportunity for research in the interface between Jungian psychology and Eastern thought involving methodologies that can complement each other; clinical and personal experiences that can help understand each other; and greater detail and specificity in the comparative studies so that they can be of practical use to the traditions compared. The possibilities for research in the area appear to ask of interested researchers a greater willingness to acquire expertise and immerse themselves in both traditions being studied.

Walsh (1989) states that several Western psychologists have reported that their understanding of Asian psychologies have deepened significantly as they undertook the corresponding contemplative practices such as meditation or yoga. He recommends that those who wish to be optimal translators, scholars, and communicators of Eastern psychologies become no less than what Jung termed "Gnostic intermediaries," people who imbibe a teaching or discipline so deeply that they can communicate and express it deeply from their own experience into the language and conceptual network of the people to whom they are communicating.

Borelli (1985b) offers the following assessment of opportunities and necessary orientations:

> The general area of Jung's psychology and Indian religious traditions, and the larger area of Eastern religious traditions, for that matter, is wide open. It is full of

opportunities for both historians of religions and Jungians. Obviously one gains expertise in either camp, and then knowledge and assurance within the other field comes slowly after much study, discussion, and advice from counterparts. Dialogue and exchange of methodologies will precede future contributions. What psychologists have gained through their own analysis, clinical experiences, and studies, and what historians of religions can offer from their own careful studies need to be exchanged. (Borelli, 1985b, pp. 193-94)

Chapter 3

Complementary Role for Advaita Vedanta in Jungian Psychology

Introduction

Jung's apparently rejected Eastern claims of greater possibilities for consciousness for three major reasons: (1) he did not think that the East's epistemology in this regard was adequate; (2) he disagreed with the East on a basic assumption regarding the locus of consciousness in the human psyche, and (3) he did not think that there was adequate empirical evidence for higher states of consciousness beyond the ego. This chapter is an attempt to understand and address these important theoretical and empirical issues (a) from a complementary perspective provided by Advaita Vedanta, a dominant school of Vedanta in India, (b) from a review of the empirical evidence for higher states of consciousness from the East as well as the West, (c) from a reflection on Jung's own writings on synchronicity that sought to broaden the understanding of the psyche in which early findings in quantum physics played a role, and (d) from the perspective based on more recent quantum physics findings. In this chapter, a complementary role for Advaita Vedanta in Jungian psychology is understood as having two aspects: (1) an expansion of the Jungian model of the psyche, its structure, process, goals, and means; and (2) the understanding and reconciliation of Jung's disagreements with Eastern thought, especially those in the way of the two models coming together to form a more comprehensive model of the psyche.

The chapter is organized in four sections. In Section 1, Jung's rejection of higher states of consciousness beyond the ego is explored from the point of view of Advaita Vedanta. Jung criticized the East for lacking critical philosophy a la Kant and for

conflating psychology, philosophy, and religion. In Section 2, Advaita Vedanta's epistemology and its basic assumptions are explored and compared with Jung's, especially in relation to the concept of the self. Whereas Jung's self is unconscious, the Advaita Vedanta self is conscious or self-aware. The objective of this analysis is to understand whether Jung's criticisms reflected adequate understanding of Eastern epistemology and its basic assumptions. In Section 3, the empirical evidence for higher states of consciousness from the East as well the West is studied. The objective is to determine the general characteristics of descriptions of higher states of consciousness and their adequacy as empirical evidence with respect to Jung's criteria. In his later writings on synchronicity, Jung appears to expand the boundaries of the psyche, attempting to provide an analogy if not scientific basis for it in early developments in quantum physics. And Section 4 presents a perspective that findings in modern quantum physics support Advaita Vedanta's claim of nondual consciousness as a basic characteristic of all reality and explores whether Jung himself might have been evolving in the direction of Eastern notions of the psyche.

Advaita Vedanta Perspective on Jung's Rejection of Eastern Claims of Higher States of Consciousness

This section begins with brief presentations of Jung's and Advaita Vedanta's perspectives on consciousness before Jung's difficulties with Eastern claims of higher consciousness are analyzed from the perspective of Advaita Vedanta.

Jung on consciousness

Jung defined the ego as the consciousness function in the psyche. He also regarded the ego as the only center of consciousness in the human psyche. He defined the self as the totality of the psyche, its center as well as its circumference of which the ego was an extremely significant part as it carried the sole function of consciousness. The self had a super-ordinate status in its role as the regulator of the entire psyche including the ego. The self, the totality of the psyche, was however unconscious with its center in the unconscious. It needed the conscious ego for its evolution. Individuation is the process by which an individual became increasingly differentiated by the ego's repeated encounters with the contents of the unconscious. The self helped the ego to assimilate the polarities in such encounters through the transcendent function. The impulse towards individuation was inherent in the psyche. There was no end to individuation and no limit to the extent to which the ego and the self could evolve.

Advaita Vedanta on consciousness

A Jungian analytical commentary on *Drk drsya viveka* was the original idea for this dissertation before its scope was enlarged. The verses from the Advaita Vedanta text by Sankara *Drg drsya viveka* (the title means seer-seen or subject-object discrimination) and the commentary on it by Swami Tejomayananda (1994) are used extensively as a primary source of Advaita Vedanta concepts in this section. Appendix B lists all primary Advaita Vedanta source books used with their authors, translators and commentators. They are also listed under the main references section of the dissertation.

In Advaita Vedanta, the source of all consciousness in an individual psyche is called the *atman* (*Drg drsya viveka*, verses 1-4, Tejomayananda, 1994, pp. 11-21; *Katha upanishad (*II, 2, 15), Radhakrishnan, 1953/1994, p. 641; *Atma bodha*, verse 27, Nikhilananda, 1946/2005, pp. 143-144). "The eye is the seer and the form the seen. The eye is the seen and the mind its seer. The witness alone is the seer of thoughts in the mind and is never the seen" says the first verse in the 31 verse classic text on Advaita Vedanta *Drg drsya viveka* (Tejomayananda, 1994, p. 11). The *atman* is also described as the unchanging or immutable witness in an individual psyche (*Drg drsya viveka*, verse 5, Tejomayananda, 1994, pp. 21-24).

Central to the understanding of how the ego appears to be an independent center of consciousness in the psyche in Advaita Vedanta is the concept of *adhyasa,* which translates to "super-imposition." Sankara defines *adhyasa* at the beginning of his commentary on the *Brahma sutras* as "the apparent presentation to consciousness, by way of remembrance, of something previously observed in some other thing. It is an apparent presentation . . . knowledge which is subsequently falsified; in other words, it is illusory knowledge" (Vireswarananda, 1936/1993, pp. 7-8). That is, one thing is mistakenly perceived as another or as a property of another in one's awareness. A classic example used to illustrate the concept of *adhyasa* is the erroneous perception of a rope as a snake. The illusory knowledge of the rope as a snake disappears as soon as the rope is correctly perceived.

In Advaita Vedanta, the ego is an object of consciousness and not an independent subject it appears to be. The ego, called the *ahamkara* (*aham* means I and *kara* means doing in Sanskrit), understood as arising from a mind modification called the *aham vritti*

(*aham* means I and *vritti* means modification in Sanskrit) as opposed to *idam vritti* or a mind modification caused by an object, appears to have consciousness and as a self-aware subject only because of its identification with (the reflection of) the consciousness or self-awareness property of the *atman* in the human psyche (*Drg drsya viveka*, verses 6-7, Tejomayananda, 1994 , pp. 25-31). The strong tendency towards this identification through the super-imposition (*adhyasa*) of the property of consciousness of the *atman* on the ego is stated to be inherent in the psyche of all human beings (*Drg drsya viveka*, verses 8-9, Tejomayananda, 1994, pp. 31-38). Thus, it is the superimposition of the reflection of the consciousness or self-awareness property of the *atman* on an unconscious sense of self (the *aham vritti*), an object of consciousness, which gives rise to the putatively conscious ego (the *ahamkara*), according to Advaita Vedanta. In this context, the *aham vritti* is also often referred to as the "I-thought."

The first superimposition that leads to the formation of a conscious ego (a conscious sense of a separate self, a conscious subject in a subject-object framework) lays the foundation for another kind of superimposition, identification, and a more elaborate definition of the individual in the psyche. This happens when the attributes of the unconscious body, mind, and senses are superimposed on the conscious ego and in turn are superimposed on the *atman*, the witness consciousness (*Atma bodha*, verses 10-14, Nikhilananda, 1946/2005, pp. 129-135). A strong tendency towards this identification through the superimposition of the properties of the body, mind, and senses of an individual on the *atman* through the ego is also stated to be inherent in the psyche of all human beings (*Drk drsya viveka*, verse 8, Tejomayananda, 1994, p. 32). The first superimposition leads to the ego appearing to having the property of consciousness and

the second superimposition leads to the *atman* (the witness consciousness on which the ego is superimposed and identified with) appearing to have the properties of the body, mind, and senses. As we saw earlier, in Advaita Vedanta, consciousness is considered to be neither the property of the body, mind, and senses of the individual nor the property of the ego. And the basis of the ego, the *aham vritti*, is no more than an unconscious derivative of the operations of the body, mind, and senses of the individual. "The ego rises with every thought" writes Tejomayananda (1994, p. 30).

According to Advaita Vedanta, one of the possibilities for an individual is a larger sense of self beyond a limited conscious ego and a limited individual which are both due to strong inherent tendencies in the psyche towards the superimposition *(adhyasa)* of the *atman* and the properties of the body, mind, and senses on each other (*Atma bodha*, verses 4-5, Nikhilananda, 1946/2005, pp. 121-123). "When ignorance is destroyed, the Self, which does not admit of any multiplicity whatsoever, truly reveals Itself by Itself" says verse 4 in *Atma bodha* (Nikhilananda, 1946/2005, p. 121). Such possibilities are personally and subjectively verifiable through higher states of consciousness that accompany the resolution of the limiting identification of the properties of the body, mind, and senses with the *atman* and the limiting identification of the properties of the *atman* such as consciousness with the body, mind, and senses or their derivatives such as the ego (*Drk drsya viveka*, verses 23-31, Tejomayananda, 1994, pp. 75-96; *Vivekacudaman*i, verse 498-501, Madhavananda, 1926/1995, pp. 185-186). Here, the word *limiting* is used in the sense that the identification limits the individual from sensing his larger sense of self. Because an individual (*jiva*) is understood as having many levels of the body, mind, and senses with structural tendencies for limiting

identifications through mutual super-impositions on each level (*Drg drsya viveka*, verses 6-7, Tejomayananda, 1994, pp. 25-31), a multiplicity of higher states of consciousness is possible in an individual in his evolution towards his highest potential.

The highest accomplishment possible for an individual is called enlightenment (*moksa*). It is a state where, with the cessation of all limiting identifications, the individual is identified with the *atman* and ceases to be an individual (*jiva*) (*Drk drsya viveka*, verse 17, Tejomayananda, 1994, pp. 58-61). The *atman* is ultimately indescribable (*anirvacaniya)* (Deutch, 1973, p. 29 & p. 32). "It is beyond all words" writes Dayananda (1997, p. 198) in his commentary on verse 225 of *Vivekacudamani*. However, the properties of existence, consciousness, and limitlessness (*satyam-jnanam-anantam*) are attributed to it (Dayananda, 1997, pp. 197-205). "*Saytam jnanamanantam brahma*" says verse 225 of Sankara's *Vivekacudamani* (Madhavananda, 1926/1995, p. 87). The *Taittiriya Upanishad* (chapter 2, section 1, and verse 1) describes the *Brahman* as "*satyam jnanam, anantam brahma*" (Radhakrishnan, 1953/1994, pp. 541-542). Sankara repeats his description of the *Brahman* as "*satyam, jnanam, anantam brahma*" in his commentary on the *Taittiriya Upanishad* (Gambhirananda, 1957/1989a, p. 307). *Jnanam* stands for knowledge and is often used in place of *cit* (consciousness) as an equivalent. *Satyam* or existence here implies independent existence, in the sense that it does not depend on anything else for its ability to exist. *Satyam* also stands for real. In this context, it is real because it does not depend on anything else for its existence with the implication that all things that do not meet this criterion for existence cannot be described as real. *Jnanam* (knowledge) here implies independent consciousness, the lack of dependence on any other entity for the ability to be conscious, with the ability to be

conscious or aware of self without being an object unto oneself. Everything else is evident to the self (the *atman*), but the self (the *atman*) is evident to itself, according to Advaita Vedanta. *Anantam* or limitlessness here implies lack of all limitation, time, and space.

Often, the word *cit* (pronounced as chit meaning consciousness) is used instead of the word *jnanam* (knowledge). Here, either consciousness (*cit*) or knowledge (*jnanam*) is to be understood as object-less self-awareness of (one's) existence and awareness of everything else as objects. Also, in the Vedic literature, the *atman* is often described as *sat-cit-ananda* with *sat* in place of *saytam*, *cit* in place of *jnanam*, and *ananda* in place of *ananta* with *ananda* translated as bliss. According to Swami Dayananda (1997, pp. 204-205), the use of the term bliss for *ananda* is problematic because it can be confused with ordinary states of the mind. However, "*ananda* is not different from *ananta*" (Dayananda, 1997, p. 204) because a certain *ananda* or bliss (*nitya-ananda* or bliss that is not subject to change) can be seen arising naturally from *ananta* or freedom from all limitations including those of time and space. Because the use of "*ananta*" in place of "*ananda*" in describing the *Brahman* can cause confusion due to the more frequent use of the latter in the literature with the translation of bliss, Dayananda (1997) is quoted at length below on the rationale for the choice of *ananta* (limitlessness) over *ananda* and on the correct usage of the attribute *"ananda"* in describing the *Brahman*.

> Again, it is *nitya-ananda*, always in the form of *ananda* and *ekarasam*, always in one form. This *ananda* does not undergo any change whatsoever. We are not talking about bliss, because experiential bliss cannot be in one form always. When someone talks about bliss he means that the previous happiness he experienced is something lesser than what he experiences now. . . . This *ananda* can never be uniform . . . . So we have many words like pleasure, happiness, joy, bliss, ecstasy, and so on with further adjectives to qualify them. Therefore when we use the word "*ananda*" for revealing the *swarupa* of the *atma* it should not be translated

> as bliss. The *ananda* is not different from *ananta*, limitless. So here *nitya-ananda* means *ananda* that is not subject to time, that which is not born. (p. 204)

In enlightenment (*moksa*), there is also the cessation of perception of all subject-object differences and there is a realization of nondifference between the self (the *atman*) and all inner and outer objects. "Nothing whatsoever exists that is other than Atman" declares verse 48 of *Atma bodha* by Sankara (Nikhilananda, 1946/2005, p. 157). The awareness of this nondifference, between the self (the *atman*) and what previously appeared as separate inner objects of one's psyche and outer objects of the world around, is called nondual or *advaita* (which literally means 'not two') says verses 56-57 of *Atma bodha* (Nikhilananda, 1946/2005, pp. 163-167) perhaps paralleling Jung's observation of psyche as the world.

In summary, the source of all consciousness is the nondual *atman* in which all subject-object differences resolve. Any awareness of a center of independent consciousness other than the nondual *atman* can therefore only refer to an apparent center of independent consciousness brought about by a limiting identification of the consciousness property of the *atman* with an object of consciousness such as the ego (*ahamkara*). The property of the *atman* of independent consciousness is attributed to or superimposed on an object of consciousness by an inherent tendency in the psyche. Therefore, all apparent centers of consciousness in the individual might appear separate and independent but are dependent on the *atman* for their ability to be conscious. All such dependent centers of consciousness are objects of consciousness appearing in the awareness of the *atman* from which they are ultimately inseparable.

On Jung's difficulty with the concept of a self-aware subject without an object

One reason Jung appears to offer for his rejection of Eastern claims of higher states of consciousness beyond the ego was that he believed that a consciousness could not logically be postulated without an object. For Jung, consciousness logically implied a subject being conscious of something, an object. "Even when I say "I know myself," an infinitesimal ego--the knowing "I"--is still distinct from myself" writes Jung (Jung, 1954/1969b, p. 505). From the Advaita Vedanta perspective that the *atman* "shines of itself" (*Drk drsya viveka*, verse 5, Tejomayananda, 1994, pp. 21-24), it appears that Jung could not allow for a subject, an 'I' outside of a subject-object context, an 'I' or a subject that could be aware of its existence without being an object to itself at the same time. This philosophical assumption on Jung's part that there could not be a self-aware subject without an object appears to be an important philosophical difficulty he had with Eastern claims of states of consciousness beyond the ego.

Many reasons can be cited for Jung's philosophical assumption that there could not be a subject without an object. Such an assumption is natural as it corresponds to the most common reality we face as human beings. The assumption is also consistent with the basic assumptions of science and phenomenology, two important sources of influence in Jungian thought. Science, with its materialistic conception of the universe, has held consciousness as an epi-phenomenon of matter. That consciousness is a derivative function of the brain is the prevalent hypothesis in science even now (Goswami, 1993, p. 17). In this view, it is unconscious matter that is the ultimate reality. And it has been pointed out that even though Jung argued for the reality of the psyche and criticized science for its over-emphasis of matter as the basis for the psyche, he did not rule out

matter as a basis for the psyche altogether, even though he eventually did write of the possibility that both psyche and matter depended on a common third (Clarke, 1992, p. 198) which we will see later is more in line with Advaita Vedanta. However, in that Jung stayed with his assumption of the ego as the only conscious function in the psyche, it appears that even this common third would have been an unconscious in Jung's new paradigm. And Western phenomenology, by which Jung was also greatly influenced, has held as a fundamental assumption that the consciousness of human beings was conditioned by ultimately by their physical organisms. Western phenomenology, in exploring the possibility of objective reality beyond all subjective filters, concluded that individual consciousness was always conditioned by a number of filters or 'brackets' of which the given physicality of the organism was an important if not the most important one (Moran, 2000; Merleu-Ponty 1945/1996). The following passage from Jung (1946/1960) reveals Jung's position that the psyche, which he equates with consciousness in the same writing (p. 184), has a physiological basis, at least in part.

> The fact that all psychic processes accessible to our observation and experience are somehow bound to an organic substrate indicates that they are articulated with the life of the organism as a whole and therefore partake of its dynamism-in other words, they must have a share in its instincts or be in a certain sense the results of the action of those instincts. . . . How life produces complex organic systems from the inorganic we do not know, though we have direct experience of how the psyche does it. Life therefore has specific laws of its own which cannot be deduced from the known physical laws of nature. Even though, the psyche is to some extent dependent upon processes in the organic substrate. (pp. 180-181)

From the Advaita Vedanta point of view, the difficulties that science, phenomenology, and Jung appear to share to a greater or lesser extent in (a) not being able to allow for a self-conscious subject without an object and (b) not being able to allow for a consciousness that is neither a derivative of matter nor constrained by it can

both be seen understandable and natural given the strong tendencies inherent in the psyche to fuse consciousness and objects of consciousness through mutual super-imposition (*adhyasa*). The basis of all kinds of definitions of the ego including the Jungian ego can be seen to lie in the fusion of the consciousness aspect of the *atman* and an unconscious sense of self that is a derivative of the body, mind, and senses, a fusion that is considered extremely natural (*Drk drsya viveka*, verse 8, Tejomayananda, 1994, pp. 31-34) and hard to overcome (*Drk drsya viveka*, verse 9, Tejomayananda, 1994, pp. 35-38). The inherent tendencies towards such fusion of the consciousness aspect of the *atman* and an unconscious derivative of the body, mind, and senses of an individual make possible (a) the attribution of consciousness to the body, mind, and the senses or their derivatives, (b) the attribution of the properties of the body, mind, and senses to the resulting apparent centers of consciousness such as the Jungian ego, (c) the perception and definition of oneself as a separate and limited individual, (d) an I-Thou world of subjects and objects on the outside as well as on the inside and, in particular, (e) Jung's definition of the ego as the conscious function and his assumption that it is the only conscious center in the psyche.

Modern neurological theories of the formation of the conscious sense of 'I' in an individual appear to lend some support to the Advaita Vedanta theory of the formation of the unconscious basis of the ego. In Advaita Vedanta, the unconscious basis of the ego, the I-thought or the aham vritti, is hypothesized to arise concurrently with any modification of the body, mind, and senses. "The ego rises with every thought" writes Tejomayananda (1994, p. 30) where thought is interpreted as any modification of the mind. Modern neuroscience theorizes that the formation of the sense of a conscious 'I' in

an individual involves two steps. In Step 1, an unconscious basis for the sense of 'I' is formed in the interactions of the body, mind, and senses. For example, Damasio (1999) posits that the constant hum of the feedback from the body to the brain is the unconscious basis of the most basic sense of 'I'. In Step 2, this unconscious basis of the sense of 'I' is made conscious by processes of the physical brain yet to be determined by science. For Siegal (1999), it is the unconscious sense of 'I' emerging from the integrating processes of the brain that forms the best candidate for the conscious sense of 'I' in an individual.

The similarities, however, end there. One major difference is that while modern neurological theories hypothesize consciousness as an unexplained physical property of the brain, Advaita Vedanta attributes the ego's apparent ability to be independently conscious to the natural and difficult-to-overcome identification of the consciousness property of the *atman* with the 'I-thought' or the *aham vritti* or the 'I-thought', a mind modification. Another major difference is that while modern neurological theories hold processes such as mind and perception as properties of an individual's physical body, Advaita Vedanta holds them as properties of an individual's subtle body enlivened by the consciousness property of the *atman* which does not always involve the physical body of the individual (Satprakashananda, 1965/1974, pp. 42-46). Given the body, mind, and senses of the individual at the subtle level, and its ability to operate free of the physical body, the ego or the *ahamkara* cannot be understood as arising solely from the body, mind, and senses at the level of the physical body as hypothesized by science even though the two might appear as one due to the inherent tendencies for mutual superimposition (*adhyasa*) in the psyche. The Advaita Vedanta theory of five levels of the body of the individual (*jiva)* will be discussed later in this chapter.

In summary, from the perspective of Advaita Vedanta, Jung's attribution of the function of consciousness to the phenomenal ego, his assumption that the phenomenal ego is the only center of consciousness in the psyche, and his belief that consciousness always involves a subject and an object are all valid views at the phenomenal level of reality of the individual which arises naturally from a fusion of a reflection of the consciousness aspect of the *atman* and an aspect of the body, mind, and senses of an individual called the *ahamkara* or the 'I-thought.' The existence of the phenomenal level of reality cannot be denied. As there appears to be some confusion as to whether Advaita Vedanta affirms or negates the reality of the phenomenal world, a confusion that Jung appears to have shared in relation to Eastern thought in general, Advaita Vedanta's view of the existential nature of the phenomenal world is presented next in the context of Jung's objections.

Jung's difficulty with the Eastern view of the unreality of the phenomenal world

One of the difficulties Jung had with Eastern thought was that he believed that it negated the reality of the phenomenal world and discouraged an individual's participation in it. The critique is often made that this attitude could lead an individual to turn his back on the world, become fatalistic, and disengage from productive activity, and so on. Jung appears to have shared this criticism as well to some extent, as can be seen in the following passage.

> Of course, if anyone should succeed in giving up Europe from every point of view, and be actually *be* nothing but a *yogi* and sit in the lotus position with all the practical and ethical consequences that this entails, evaporating on a gazelle-skin under a dusty banyan tree and ending his days in nameless non-being, then I should have to admit that such a person understood yoga in the Indian manner. (Jung, 1943/1969, p. 568)

Raju (1992), in the course of his account of Indian religions, writes that the impetus for further development of Vedic philosophies such as Advaita Vedanta that emphasized both inner and outer orientations (*sanyasa* or path of renunciation and *grahasta* or path of householder) as possible paths for spiritual development came from the reaction against the "one-sided inwardness brought about by Buddhism and Jainism in life and thought" (p. 182). According to Raju (1992), the three reasons for the downfall of Buddhism in India was "the neglect by the monks of this life and its values," "the more or less indiscriminate conversion of men and women into monks," and "the deterioration of the economic and political life of the country" (p. 183).

According to Advaita Vedanta, the phenomenal world is only an apparent reality from the absolute point of view of the *Brahman* in that its presence does not in any way alter the *Brahman*. Therefore, the phenomenal world cannot be described as real. However, because the existence of the phenomenal world is clearly verifiable from the point of view of the phenomenal ego, it cannot be described as unreal. "The non-existence of external things cannot be maintained because we are conscious of external things. In every act of perception we are conscious of some external thing corresponding to the idea, whether it be a post or a wall or a piece of cloth or a jar, and that of which we are conscious cannot but exist" writes Sankara in *Brahamasutra bhasya* (II, 2, 28, Vireswananda, 1936/1993, p. 197). Advaita Vedanta rejects a subjective idealistic interpretation of the doctrine of maya (that objects of experience can be reduced to the subject) and offers a realistic view that insists on "the separation of the subject and the object in the phenomenal world" (Deutch, 1973, p. 94). Deutch finds it "rather curious that this aspect of classical Advaita Vedanta has been overlooked frequently by Western

students of Indian thought" (p. 94). Therefore, it can be said from the Advaita Vedanta perspective that Jung's understanding of the East holding the phenomenal world as unreal is incorrect.

Jung's difficulty with the concept of ego resolution

In Eastern thought, the status of the ego in higher states of consciousness varies from transcendence or complete absorption, to resolution, destruction, or negation of the ego. These varying descriptions appear to have become one basis for the rejection of the possibility of higher states of consciousness when the resolution or negation of the ego is understood as an absence of a subject or a conscious 'I' (Sen, 1943, 1952; Watts, 1973). Jung also offered this misunderstanding as one of the reasons for his rejection of higher states of consciousness claimed by the East. He argued that "there must always be somebody or something left over [a subject or an "I"] to experience the realization of [egolessness]" (Jung, 1954/1969b, p. 504) which he implied was not possible given his understanding of the ego as the only source of consciousness or an 'I' in the psyche. Advaita Vedanta does not imply that there is an absence of a conscious 'I' in higher states of consciousness that transcend the ego. The realization of oneself as the Brahman "which is non-dual and infinite, eternal and one" (*Atma bodha*, verse 56, Nikhilananda, 1946/2005, p. 163), which is the unchanging source of consciousness in all three states of experience (waking, sleeping, and dreaming) (*Vivekacudamani*, verse 137, Dayananda, 1997, pp. 119-122), and whose existence is self-evident (*Vivekacudamani*, verse 227, Dayananda, 1997, pp. 197-205) leaves no doubt as to the presence of an 'I', a subject, in the state of enlightenment, according to Advaita Vedanta. The resolution of the ego refers

to the de-identification of the *atman* with the ego (the *ahamkara*) with which it appears to be fused by hard-but-not-impossible-to-overcome inherent tendencies in the psyche, a de-identification which resolves the identification (of the reflection) of the consciousness property of the *atman* with the 'I-thought' or the *aham vritti*, an unconscious product of the body, mind, and senses (*Drk drsya viveka*, verse 9, Tejomayananda, 1994, pp. 35-38).

Jung's difficulty with Eastern claims of omniscience associated with higher states of consciousness

Jung rejected claims of the possibility of omniscience in higher states of consciousness (Coward, 1985, p. 68). Jung appears to have understood omniscience as the ego becoming aware of all contents of the unconscious simultaneously. "No consciousness can harbor more than a very small number of simultaneous perceptions. All else must be in the shadow, withdrawn from sight" writes Jung (1939/1969a, p. 550). In Advaita Vedanta, *Isvara* or *Saguna Brahman*, the *Brahman* with the attribute of creation through the indescribable mystery called *maya*, which cannot be described as either real or unreal, is said to possess the properties of omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence, etc. An enlightened individual (*jiva*) who realizes his oneness with the *Brahman* is called a *jivanmukta*, one who is liberated while living (*Vivekacudamani*, verse 428, Dayananda, 1997, pp. 255-259). However, it does not mean that he is omniscient at the level of the individual (jiva), as Jung might have understood. Dayananda (1997) writes:

> The *jivanmukta* continues to be in the same body. His mind and ignorance also remain the same. If earlier he did not know French, now also he does not know it. His memory, the features of the body, etc., remain the same. The only difference is that he has the knowledge, 'I am whole'. This knowledge is not because of any

> physical or hormonal change much less it is because of change in his mind. If it is change based, the knowledge would also go! (p. 259)

The two-level theory of the Advaita Vedanta self as a reconciling framework for apparent contradictions in Jungian thought and Advaita Vedanta

Jung has offered varying and at times apparently conflicting perspectives of the self and of the relationship between the ego and the self in his writings. The self represents wholeness. The self as well as the ego is in constant evolution without an end. The self needs the ego to evolve. "The images of God could not be distinguished from the images of the self. The symbols of divinity coincide with those of the self," writes Jung (1926/1964) of his observation of "the empirical identify of the images representing them" (p. 339). Therefore, it is as though that God needs man to become conscious, to evolve. The self is the center as well as the circumference (the totality) of the psyche. The self is the central regulator of all aspects of the psyche including the ego. The ego has the ability to discriminate and to choose and in exercising these abilities helps the whole psyche (the self) to evolve. Therefore, the ego and the self need each other to evolve. However, the more Jung examined the evidence of the relationship between the ego and the self, the more apparent to him the super-ordinate status of the will of the self in relation to the will of the ego became. "It is, indeed, well known that the ego can not only do nothing against the self, but is sometimes actually assimilated by unconscious components of the personality that are in the process of development and is greatly altered by them" writes Jung (1951/1971, pp. 142-143).

The apparent contradictions in the characterizations of the self, of the levels of the self, and of the relationship between the ego and the self are also present in Advaita Vedanta. The self is omniscient, omnipotent, and omni-benevolent. The self is neither a

knower nor a doer. The self undergoes change. The self does not undergo any change. The individual has free will, limited free will, or no free will. An individual *(jiva)* can help the *atman* trapped in the limited identity of the individual to realize itself. An individual cannot do that. "The person is deluded by egoism thinks he is the actor when all actions are performed by the gunas of prakriti (nature)", says verse 27 in chapter 3 of *The bhagavad gita* (Bhaktivedanta, 1989, p. 173) on the common misperception of an individual *(jiva)* as a doer with a free will. See Waite (2007, pp. 67-84) for a comprehensive discussion of the different views on the concept of free will in Advaita Vedanta.

An understanding of the two levels of the self and of their relationship to the ego in Advaita Vedanta offers a framework for reconciling some of these apparent contradictions in Jungian psychology and Advaita Vedanta. In Advaita Vedanta, the level of the self called the *Brahman* is the self-existing, self-aware, and infinite ground for all levels of being. The level of the self called *Isvara* refers to the totality of the created universe in each cycle of creation. It functions to hold the creation together and to centrally regulate it. The individual (*jiva*) is a part of it. The *Brahman* is nondual, nothing exists apart from it and all distinctions are resolved in it (*Kena Upanishad*, 1, 4, Gambhirananda, 1957/1989a, pp. 49-52). And it is immutable, without change. Therefore, the creator, the preserver, and the destroyer (*Isvara*) as well the created (the totality of the universe) in each cycle of creation can only be apparent realities (*mitya*) in the *Brahman*. They cannot be taken as real, from the point of view of the *Brahman*. However, their existence cannot be denied as unreal either as they exist at the phenomenal levels of *Isvara* and *jiva*. The mystery of this apparent creation is called

maya which is considered unexplainable (*anirvacaniya*). As with *Isvara* and *jiva*, *maya* cannot be regarded as real from the absolute point of view of the *Brahman*. At the same time, it cannot be said that it is unreal at the phenomenal levels of *Isvara* and *jiva*. *Maya* is "neither existent nor non-existent," "neither same nor different," neither divisible nor indivisible, and it cannot be described by words, says Sankara in verse 109 of *Vivekacudamani* (Madhavananda, 1926/1995, p. 39).

The Jungian self is closer to *Isvara* than to the *Brahman*. Like the Jungian self, *Isvara* evolves. However, unlike the Jungian self, *Isvara* is a conscious entity that is conceptualized as having *maya* under its control or as an object of its awareness. The level of the created totality where *maya* is not under control is called *hiranyagarbha* which parallels Jung's description of the personification of the unconscious (Jung, 1931/1960f, pp. 349-350). In Advaita Vedanta, images of God formed in the individual psyche are regarded as attempts to symbolize *Isvara* and to relate to it. Like the Jungian self, *Isvara* is the center and the circumference of the psyche and its central regulator. In Advaita Vedanta, a basic step towards the greater consciousness of enlightenment involves the individual acquiring a good grasp of the relationship between *Isvara* and *jiva* and living accordingly with the understanding of the superordinate role of the will of *Isvara* in relation to the will of the *jiva* or the individual. This has a parallel in Jungian thought in that a mark of individuation in an individual is the establishment of the ego-self axis where the ego understands the superordinate status of the will of the self in relation to the will of the ego. The awareness of an individual (*jiva*) is capable of expanding to identify with *Isvara* (also called the *Saguna Brahman* or the *Brahman* with

attributes), and with the *Brahman* (also called the *Nirguna Brahman* or the *Brahman* without attributes).

As Jung continued to look at the evidence of the relationship between the ego and the self, he found that the will of the self appeared to be even more super-ordinate to the will of the ego than he had previously thought. Scientific research called perception research has consistently found that unconscious brain activity associated with a willful thought precedes the conscious willing of the thought leading to the suggestion that the notion that an individual has free will is not supported by science (Libet, 1985). However, these findings are not without scientific controversy (Arnold & Wilcock, 2007). Even in the Advaita Vedanta literature, at different times, an individual is understood to have complete free will, some free will, or no free will (Waite 2007, pp. 67-84). This confusion is probably due to the statements about free will being made with reference to different levels of reality. From the point of view of the *Brahman* and *Isvara*, with the resolution of the phenomenal ego and the sense of a separate individual, the issue of individual free will is moot as a sense of a separate individual is no longer there. However, from the point of view of the phenomenal ego, just as it cannot be said that the phenomenal world does not exist, it cannot be said that the free will does not exist for an individual at least to some extent. Advaita Vedanta as well as Jungian psychology agree on the superordinate role of the will of the self in relation to the ego even though their definitions of the self differ somewhat. However, as our understanding of the extent to which an individual has free will grows, it appears to point in the direction of less if not no free will at the individual level. Jung's statement that God needs man to become conscious and statements by some Advaita Vedantins that an individual's efforts towards

enlightenment can be regarded as the individual helping the *atman* trapped in the limited identity of the individual to realize itself can both be construed as belonging to the phenomenal level of the individual where there is some free will, in appearance if not in actuality.

Section summary

An in-depth presentation of Advaita Vedanta offers a complementary theoretical perspective to help understand and resolve Jung's difficulty with Eastern claims of centers of consciousness beyond the ego. In addition to Jung's philosophical biases from science and phenomenology, inherent tendencies towards fusion or mutual superimposition (*adhyasa*) of the subject and objects of consciousness in the psyche are understood as responsible for Jung's understanding of the ego as the only center of consciousness in the psyche and his understanding that there cannot be a conscious subject or 'I' without an object, insights considered valid by Advaita Vedanta for the phenomenal level of reality. The Advaita Vedanta perspective is also seen as helpful in understanding and correcting Jung's misunderstanding that the East regards the phenomenal world as unreal, that there is no 'I' or conscious subject in the state of enlightenment, and that the enlightened person (*jivanmukta*) is omniscient. The two-level theory of the self in Advaita Vedanta is seen as a good framework for understanding and reconciling the apparent contradictions in the descriptions of the self, of the relationship between the self and the ego, and of the extent of free will the ego has in relation to the self, in Jungian psychology as well as Advaita Vedanta. The Jungian self is seen as closer in conception to the Advaita Vedanta self of *Isvara* than to the Advaita Vedanta self of

the *Brahman*. These theoretical findings increase the complementarities between Jungian psychology and Advaita Vedanta by reconciling some major differences between two models.

Jung and Eastern Epistemology

Introduction

Jung believed that Eastern epistemology lacked the rigor of Western post-Kantian critical philosophy as well as a basis in empirical evidence. He criticized the mixing of psychology, philosophy, and religion in the East and pointed to it as possible evidence for the lack of a critical approach in Eastern philosophy. In turn, Jung in particular and the West in general have been criticized for overlooking the presence of systems of logic that underlie Eastern philosophies. The empirical basis of Eastern claims of higher states of consciousness is explored in the next section. In this section, Advaita Vedanta is examined closely for insights into the adequacy of Jung's understanding of the epistemological basis of Eastern thought. On close examination of the various aspects of Advaita Vedanta, the most dominant of the Vedic schools of philosophy or Indian philosophies that accept the authority of the Vedas, it appears that Jung's understanding of Eastern thought in general and its epistemological aspects in particular might have been better served if he had devoted more time to an in-depth study of at least one system of Eastern thought such as Advaita Vedanta.

An analysis of Jung's limited readings on Eastern thought reveals that they were mostly early translations of source texts in the Vedas. These source texts do not present in a coherent form the Vedic or Brahmanical systems of philosophy that were developed

later with the Vedic sources texts as their basis. Regardless, the source texts in the Vedas as well as the later texts based on them are characterized by an admixture of several disciplines and written in the format of terse aphorisms, in the style of the times that set down conclusions from personal experience and philosophical enquiry as terse general statements and a product of an attitude that saw no need for the separation of disciplines of knowledge as in the West. The Vedic philosophies are also presented with the twin objectives of communicating conclusions from philosophical enquiry and personal experience of higher states of consciousness and a means of knowledge (*pramana*) for attaining them. Long-term immersion in the material at different levels of depth in the multilevel literature of source Vedic texts and later texts based on them and the guidance of a teacher are considered necessary for a proper grasp of the truth claims of the Vedic philosophies such as Advaita Vedanta and their epistemological foundations.

In addition to Jung's Western philosophical bias towards a subject-object consciousness discussed in the last section, Jung's lack of long-term immersion in a system of Eastern thought with a teacher as a guide and his limited exposure to Eastern thought primarily through early source texts also appear to have contributed to Jung not understanding that Eastern thought had (a) a basis in critical philosophy, (b) a reasoned epistemology, (c) a basis in personal experience, (d) a dual nature as a critical philosophy and as a teaching methodology, and (e) a bias towards presenting different disciplines of knowledge together unlike in the West. The rest of this section presents in detail the evidence for the above conclusions drawn from examining in depth one system of Vedic philosophy, Advaita Vedanta.

On the historical development of Vedic systems of philosophy

The hermeneutic approach taken in this section is that, to properly understand a system of thought, it is also important to understand the context in which it evolved, the context in which it is found, and the purpose for which it was developed. Advaita Vedanta is a system of Indian thought based on the Vedas with Sankara (who is credited with the leadership of a renaissance in Hinduism in the 8th century before Christ) as its main proponent (Deutch, 1973, pp. 3-4). Advaita Vedanta is based primarily on the Upanishads, the end portions of the Vedas that date back to the period between ninth and fourth centuries before Christ (Raju, 1992, p. 186).

A primary objective for the development of Advaita Vedanta and five other Vedic philosophies that accept the authority of the Vedas (called the six *darsanas*) was to interpret and to provide a logical basis for the truth claims in the Vedas, especially those sections towards the end of the Vedas containing the truth claims about the ultimate self-knowledge that human beings can hope to acquire about themselves (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, pp. 17-22). "The ultimate end of every school is man's deliverance from all sufferings and attainment of abiding peace by true knowledge," writes Satprakashananda (1965/1974, p. 312). Historically, the six schools of thought that accept the authority of the Vedas (the *Nyaya*, the *Vaisesika*, the *Samkhya*, the *Yoga*, the *Purva Mimamsa*, and the *Uttara Mimamsa* or the *Vedanta*) developed a more logical basis for their truth claims in response to the logical challenges posed by the Buddhist, the Jainist, and the Carvaka schools of thought that developed in reaction to the Vedas whose authority they did not accept (pp. 17-20). With this development, "the critical side of philosophy became as important as the speculative" in Indian philosophical enquiry writes (Radhakrishnan,

1923/1994b, p. 17). "The question of the validity and means of knowledge forms an important chapter of each system. Each philosophical scheme has its own theory of knowledge, which is an integral part or a necessary consequence of its metaphysics" adds Radhakrishnan (1923/1994b, p. 25) on the presence of a system of epistemology in each of the six Vedic schools.

The Vedas are a compilation of ancient works in four volumes (*Rig, Yajur, Sama,* and *Atharva Vedas*) with some works such as its *Rig-vedic* hymns dating as far back as 20 centuries before Christ (Raju, 1992, p. 178). Notwithstanding claims in orthodox circles as divine revelation, the Vedas are an attempt to compile what remained of diverse ancient thought in written and oral traditions into as coherent and structured a body of knowledge as possible. The contents of each of the four Vedas can be broadly classified into four successive sections, the *Samhitas*, the *Brahmanas*, the *Aranyakas*, and the *Upanishads* (Sharma, 1987, p. 14). The *Samhitas* consist of religious hymns. The *Brahmanas* consist of prayers and rituals. Together, the *Samhitas* and the *Brahmanas* are referred to as the *karma khanda* sections of the Vedas. The third section, the *Aranyakas*, marks the transition of Vedic thought from the form of hymns, prayers, and rituals of the earlier sections into more explicit philosophic thought the development of which culminates in the fourth and the final section, the *Upanishads* (Sharma, 1987, pp. 14-16). Together, the *Aranyakas* and the *Upanishads* are referred to as the *jnana khanda* sections of the Vedas. The *Upanishads*, which deal more with the philosophy of the essential nature of a human being and a means of knowledge (a *pramana*) for a personal realization of it, are often referred to as the *Vedanta*. The terms *Vedanta* and *Advaita Vedanta* are often used interchangeably in the literature on Indian philosophy

Competing systems of thought such as Advaita Vedanta based on the Vedas that evolved over many centuries are attempts to systematize, clarify, adapt as well as to update ancient thought in the Vedas dating back to twenty centuries before Christ (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, pp. 24). Raju (1992, pp. 185-189) describes the development of Indian philosophy from the period before Christ to the period after in several stages characterized by increasing philosophical sophistication. The following stages of the development Vedic philosophy can be inferred from Raju's account with its implicit assumption that the stages of development of Indian philosophy parallel the stages of development of Indian religion because the seeds of later Indian philosophies can be found in earlier Indian religion; just as the seeds of more explicit philosophical thinking in the later portions of the Vedas can be found in the religious thought in their earlier portions. "In India, philosophy is not severed from religion" writes Satprakashananda (1965/1974, p. 312). According to this view, the first stage of Vedic philosophy can be traced back to their religious origins in the pre-Aryan Mohenjadaro civilization in the 3rd millennium before Christ and the Aryan civilization that interacted with it subsequently, stages that are more reflected in the first two sections of the Vedas, the *Samhitas* and the *Brahmanas*. The second, considered as a transition stage and characterized by greater philosophical insight, corresponds to the third section of the Vedas, the *Aranyakas*. The third stage saw the culmination of philosophical development in Vedic thought in the *Upanishads*, from about 900 to 400 years before Christ.

In the fourth stage in the development of Vedic philosophy from 400 years before Christ to 400 years after, the rise of Jainism and Buddhism and their rejection of the authority of the Vedas and the logical challenges they posed to Vedic thought provided

the impetus for further development of schools of Vedic philosophy in terms of increasing logical sophistication. They also led to the condensation, systematization, and updating of the voluminous contents of the Vedas and the literature based on them in the form of *sutras* or aphorisms (Raju 1992, pp. 188-189). The fifth stage of Vedic philosophical thought, from about 400 years after Christ, is characterized by the proliferation of commentaries on the terse and pithy S*utra* literature in Vedic as well as non-Vedic schools of Indian philosophy, a practice that endures to this day. In the sixth stage, from the 13th century to 16th century after Christ, all schools of Indian philosophy, inspired by the *Neo-Nyaya* school of logic, further refined their thought through exactness in concepts, definitions, and thinking while also producing independent treatises of the different systems. A seventh stage can be conceptualized as belonging to the subsequent period in which philosophies of the West and the East have interacted with each other to bring about further development in Indian philosophy in general and Vedic philosophy in particular.

The form of early Advaita Veda source books

The Vedas, the Vedic philosophies (the darsanas) as well as all the subsequent works based on them are often presented as terse statements with little explanation. "In the case of every *darsana*, we have first of all a philosophic fermentation, which at a particular stage is reduced to sutras or aphorisms" writes Radhakrishnan (1923/1994b, p. 24). The *Upanishads* as well as major derivative works such as the *Brahma sutras* were written in times when it was not unusual for yogis to put down the knowledge they gained from self-enquiry in the form of terse truth claims without documenting in detail

the experience and the thinking that led them to the knowledge. Jordens (1985a, p. 164) states that the yogis like Patanjali belonged to a tradition where "the transition from experience and reasoning to metaphysical statements" was "natural" and that their function was to guide a "very small number of possible adepts" to "the acme of mystical realization" (p. 164).

Therefore, a study of any Vedic philosophy that is limited to one or more of its primary works where the presentation is terse can lead to the impression that their contents are dogmatic assertions. There are often many derivative works with several levels of interpretation of an important source book that is presented in a terse form and a reader can be left with a limited understanding of the system on reading only the source. For example, the *Brahma sutras*, which is considered as an important source book for all the Vedic philosophies and attributed to Vyasa, is presented in the form of terse aphorisms (*srutis*). It is said to belong to a period when many works were written in such a format with the express intent of presenting and updating in condensed form the voluminous knowledge in the Vedas. A commentary on the *Brahma sutras* by Sankara titled The *Brahma sutra bhasya* (Vireswarananda, 1936/1993; Gambhirananda, 1965/2004) is an important source book in Advaita Vedanta and an attempt to bring greater understanding to the aphorisms in the *Brahma sutras.* And there are many commentaries in turn on the *Brahma sutra bhasya* by other writers in the Advaita Vedanta tradition that seek to bring greater understanding to the commentary by Sankara.

Given the above understanding of the evolution of the Vedic schools of philosophy, a case can be made that the understanding one would gain from reading only source books such as the *Brahma sutras* or the *Vedas* (on which the *Braham sutras* are

based) can be limited. This is because the *Upanishads* in the Vedas, the source texts for all Vedic philosophies, "cannot be called a formal and systematic philosophy in the usual sense of the term. . . . Outwardly the *Upanishads* contain contradictory statements, and so the texts were for a long time exhaustively discussed in order that the precise ideas of the rishis might be ascertained. Vyasa composed a treatise known as the *Vedanta-sutras* or *Brahma-sutras*, in which he reconciled the many apparent contradictions," writes Nikhilananda (1946/2005, p. 12). And these were often the kinds of books that were first translated into English because of their importance, the kind of books that appear most on Jung's reading list on Eastern thought. On the other hand, a case can also be made that reading some of the later commentaries that are rich in interpretation in isolation can also be confusing. For example, the *Brahma sutra bhasya* by Sankara can at times be confusing because of the complexity of the debate among different Vedic philosophies presented therein. All of the above only underscores the importance of being exposed to source books as well as derivative works and of the guidance of a teacher to increase the likelihood of a clear understanding of a system of Vedic philosophy such as Advaita Vedanta.

An analysis of Jung's sources of Eastern thought in the collected works

Even though Jung's understanding of Eastern thought is considered to be impressive, it has been suggested that Jung did not immerse himself in Eastern thought enough to grasp some aspects of it well. An analysis of his references to Eastern thought in his collected works, if they can be taken as primary sources of his views on the subject, appears to support the conclusion that Jung did not undertake an adequate study of books

that might have helped him to correct his misunderstanding of some aspects of Eastern thought. The analysis appears to support the conclusion that most of the primary sources that Jung studied are either translations of original works that are considered source books in the East or in the form that, without the aid of more detailed expositions of the source books, could have contributed to his inadequate and even incorrect understanding of some aspects of Eastern thought. To be fair to Jung, it is possible that the translations of more detailed expositions might not have been as easily available in his time as now.

In the fifth volume of Jung's collected works, *Symbols of Transformation* (Jung, 1952/1956), which is the English translation of the1952 revision of the 1912 original, of the 13 sources of Eastern thought in the bibliography, four are translations of the principal *Upanishads* (Deussen, 1938; Hume, 1921b; Max Muller, 1879 & 1882; Purohit Swami and Yeats, 1937), one a translation of the Bhagavad Gita (Arnold, 1930), one a translation of the hymns from the Rig Veda with a commentary (Griffith, 1889-92, 4 vol.), one eight volumes of translations and commentaries of the Indian literature in Sanskrit including the Vedas (Weber, 1850-63, 8 vols.), and one a translation of *The secret of the golden flower* with a commentary (Wilhelm, 1931/1962). Of the remaining five sources, two deal with Eastern art and antiquities (Cohn, 1925; Le Coq, 1922-1933, 7 Volumes), one a poetic account of the life of Buddha, *The light of Asia*, by Sir Edwin Arnold (1906), one a respected book on Vedanta by Rene Guenon (1945b), and Harrier Heinrich's *Seven years in Tibet* (1954), an account of life among the Buddhist monks.

Of the eighteen sources of Eastern thought in the bibliography of Jung's eleventh volume of the collected works, *Psychology and Religion: West and East* (Jung, 1958/1969), eleven are translations of works considered as original or source books in the

East. Of the eleven, six can be classified as Buddhist (Takakusu, 1894; Avalon, 1919; Budge, 1899, Evans-Wentz, 1954 and 1957; Rhys Davids and Woodward, 1922), three as Chinese (Legge, 1899; Wilhelm, 1931/1962 &1950/1967) and two as Indian in origin (Max Muller, 1879; Hume, 1921a). Of the remaining seven sources in the bibliography, three deal with Indian art and symbolism (Zimmer, 1926a, 1926b, and 1955), two describe Zen Buddhism (Suzuki, 1949, 1949-1953) and the life of a Zen Buddhist (Suzuki, 1934) , and two offer the teachings of the Indian sage Paramahamsa Ramakrishna (Ramakrishna, 1907,1930).

In summary, of the thirty one sources of Eastern thought in the bibliography of the two volumes of the collected works that deal most with Eastern thought as well as span Jung's earlier and later writings on the subject, eighteen of them can be considered as source books of the form that cannot be easily and properly understood without the aid of detailed expositions that have been written on them over the years. Of the eleven remaining sources, five deal with Eastern art, antiquities, and symbolism, one is on the life of a Zen Buddhist monk, one a poetic account of the life of the Buddha, one a personal account of the experience of living among the Buddhist monks for 7 years, two on the writings of an Indian sage Ramakrishna, and one an early account of Vedanta by a Westerner. There are no references in these two volumes of his collected works to writings that deal exclusively with Eastern philosophy, logic, or epistemology such as important writings on Indian philosophy in two volumes published in 1923 by Indian philosopher Radhakrishnan (1923/1994a &1923/1994b).

Although it cannot be said that Jung's understanding of Eastern thought was based primarily on the sources in the bibliographies of his collected works, it can be

argued that the sources listed therein, their number and more importantly their nature (in the form that need the reading of further expositions for a proper understanding), do not reflect the reading and immersion necessary for an adequate understanding of Eastern thought and its logical, epistemological, and philosophical bases. This argument gains in strength when Jung's refusal to meet with the holy men of India to discuss Eastern thought, his stated preference to wanting to find his own way through the heritage of his own culture, and his consequent pre-occupation with Western alchemy in the second half of his life even during his visit to India, are taken into account.

To be clear, there is no suggestion here that Jung's overall understanding of Eastern thought is inadequate. Jung's overall understanding of Eastern thought, despite its limitations, is impressive (Clarke, 1994, pp. 187-192). And Jung's sources of Eastern thought were not limited to the references in his collected works. His exposure to Eastern thought through Herman Keyserling, Richard Wilhelm, and J.B. Hauer, and through the Eranos seminars attended by a wide range of scholars including Heinrich Zimmer is not to be overlooked as insignificant. There is no suggestion here that the reading of the commentaries on the source books of a system such as Advaita Vedanta alone can lead to a clear understanding of the system. Some of these commentaries are difficult to read and confusing. They often present subtle arguments among various schools of Vedic philosophy that can at times obscure the essential point being made. The suggestion that is made here is that Jung's misunderstanding of certain aspects of Eastern thought can be attributed in part to his lack of exposure to a more balanced mixture of readings on the subject: original works, subsequent works that condensed and systematized the original works, and detailed commentaries that followed. And to be fair to Jung, he did not have

available to him in number as well as quality the translations of Eastern texts that are available today.

On the mixing of different disciplines of knowledge in India

In terms of overall content, the Vedas are an admixture of religious thought, myth, and symbolism, codes of conduct, ritual, prayer, hymn, cosmology, psychology, philosophy, metaphysics, and mysticism. And, as we saw earlier, a systematic and logical presentation of the seminal philosophical ideas found in the Vedas did not take place till much later. Most of Jung's readings of Indian thought appear to be confined to early translations of the *Upanishads* in the Vedas. Therefore, it is easy to understand how Jung might have generalized that Indian thought, a mixture of psychology, philosophy, and religion presented in a terse form, lacked the logical rigor of a post-Kantian critical philosophy on the one hand and empirical evidence on the other. Deutch (1973) speaks to the difficulty the West has with Indian thought in general, and with Vedanta in particular, vis-à-vis its traditional grounding and goes on to argue that "Vedanta's concern with spiritual realization, in short, does not make it less of a technical philosophy" (pp. 5-6).

Radhakrishnan (1923/1994a, p. 23 & p. 31) writes India does not share the Western attitude that related fields of knowledge such as psychology, philosophy, and religion need be kept apart. Such an attitude in India can be seen arising naturally from its essential philosophy embodied in systems such as Advaita Vedanta. From the point of view of a system of thought that has as its central claim the fundamental inseparability (nonduality) of all things, all aspects of reality, theology as well as science, have to be

related to each other and be consistent with each other even if took a more comprehensive theory of reality. Systems such as Advaita Vedanta can be seen as attempts to provide such a comprehensive theory of reality. The following discussion on the difference between India and the West in the need to maintain a strict separation among different spheres of knowledge and of its consequences offers further contextual understanding of Jung's difficulty with the mixture of different disciplines in Eastern thought.

Historically, science and religion have never been as politically opposed to each other in India as they have been in the West. Other branches of knowledge in India have not suffered as much from the dire need to adhere to religious dogma. The opposition of religion to other branches of knowledge such as philosophy and science in the West can be seen as a necessary step in the face of religious dogma that stifled the growth of an integrated and multidimensional understanding of man and his environment, an understanding that included religion. I am grateful to my advisor Glen Slater for pointing out that the differing notions of religion in the East and the West probably reflect as well as contribute to the harmonious versus the adversarial relationship between religion and other disciplines of knowledge in the two hemispheres. It has been pointed out that the West has turned to the East in different periods in its history to debunk religious dogma and to find a more comprehensive and inclusive understanding of the nature of self and reality and that aspects of Jung's work can be seen as an example of this (Clarke, 1994,1997).

While it can be argued that the polarization of religion from other aspects of man's understanding of self and reality in the West might have contributed to the

unparalleled growth in science and technology in the past 300 years, it can also be argued that the polarization of science from other branches of knowledge such as philosophy and religion and the dire need to make all disciplines of knowledge including psychology scientific has stifled the growth of an integrated and interdisciplinary knowledge of man's understanding of himself and his environment in modern times. It is as though scientific dogma has replaced religious dogma as the obstruction to an interdisciplinary and integrated understanding of the reality man and his environment in the West. Wilbur (2000, pp. 69-72; 2001, pp. 19-22; 2006, pp. 164-169, 188-189) refers to this tendency on the part of science as the flatland of scientific reductionism.

The greater growth of science and technology in the West and the benefit it has brought to the whole planet in the time that religion became increasingly separated from other disciplines in the West can be cited as evidence for the lack of a corresponding separation in the East having placed at least some constraint on the growth of science and technology there. The persistence of religious myth and superstition in the face of clearly established scientific rationale for certain phenomena such as volcanic eruptions in Indonesia (Marshall, 2008) can be thought as of a continuing effect of the lack of separation between religion and other disciplines and the consequent lack of the development of science and technology. However, that the East has been able to assimilate and even emulate Western science and technology in such a short period of time in the 20th century can be understood as due at least in part to the relative lack of polarization historically between religion on the one hand and science, philosophy, and other disciplines on the other. This, it can be argued, is in part due to the more integrated interdisciplinary model of the psyche in the collective conscious and unconscious in India

that Radhakrishnan (1923/1994a, p. 31) writes about. Religious dogma in the East, wherever it is dominant, appears to be more of a constraint on the evolution of social institutions than on the evolution or adoption of science and technology.

The epistemology of Advaita Vedanta

All aspects of ancient systems of thought such as Advaita Vedanta evolved over many centuries. Aspects of the system such as its epistemology are found distributed across many texts as well as concentrated in more specialized texts devoted to it. The treatise *Vedanta Paribhasa* by Dharmaraja Adhvarin (Madhavananda, 1942/2000) offers a systematic treatment of Advaita Vedanta epistemology. Many commentaries have been written on it since its publication in the 17^{th} century. *Methods of knowledge according to Advaita Vedanta: Perceptual, non-perceptual, and transcendental* by Swami Satprakashananda (1965/1974) is a more recent exposition. An accurate understanding of Advaita Vedanta, especially its epistemological basis, requires an in-depth study not only of the texts that lay out the broader findings of the system but also the texts such as those described above that offer more detailed treatments. Unfortunately, the translations that were available to the West early on belonged more to the former category than to the latter, which might have also contributed to the impression that Eastern epistemology lacked a basis in logic and critical philosophy.

Satprakashananda (1965/1974) and Madhavananda (1942/2000) provide an idea of the level of logical rigor and critical philosophical enquiry involved in the epistemology of Advaita Vedanta. According to Advaita Vedanta, there are three levels of reality, the *vyavarika*, the *pratibhasika*, and the *paramarthika* (Balasubramanian, 1990, pp. 22-24). The *vyavarika* refers to the empirical reality, the world out there. The

pratibhasika refers to the subjective or phenomenal reality of the individual. For example, when an individual mistakes a rope for a snake, the rope is said to belong to the *vyavarika* (empirical) level of reality and the snake is said to belong to the *pratibhasika* (phenomenal) level of reality. The Advaita Vedanta view of reality is neither subjective idealism nor objective realism (Satprakashananda, 1965/1974, p. 64). The *paramarthika* refers to the absolute level of reality where all distinctions and all subject-object differences of the other two levels of reality disappear. "It is the realm of Being, the absolute truth, which is trans-linguistic" and even philosophy "comes to an end" with this respect to the *paramarthika* or absolute level of reality, writes Balasubramanian (1990) who also observes a similarity between this Advaita Vedantic view and the Western phenomenologist Merleue-Ponty's view in his own words that "negative philosophy has access to the absolute" and "true philosophy scoffs at philosophy, since it is aphilosophical" (p. 22) which implies that no philosophy can come close to comprehending the absolute directly.

The six means of knowledge in Advaita Vedanta are perception (*pratyaksa*), inference (*anumana*), comparison (*upamana*), postulation (*arthapatti*), nonapprehension or nonperception (*anupalabdhi*), and verbal testimony (*sabda*) (Satprakashananda, 1965/1974, pp. 17-18). The first five means of knowledge are valid for generating knowledge at the empirical (*vyavarika*) and phenomenal (*pratibhasika*) levels of reality. While they can help clarify mediate knowledge of the absolute (*paramarthika)* level of reality, they cannot lead an individual to the direct knowledge of the absolute as the absolute is not an object to be apprehended in the subject-object frameworks of the empirical (*vyavarika*) and phenomenal (*pratibhasika*) levels of reality. "An exposition of

the various means of valid knowledge (*pramanas*) has for its aim, in the context of Advaita," writes T. M. P. Mahadevan (1965/1974), "the demonstration of their insufficiency and relative nature, paving the way for their transcendence in the unconditional self that is pure knowledge" (p. 13).

In Advaita Vedanta, the ultimate goal for the individual is to realize oneself as the immutable and non-dual absolute self (the *Brahman*) with the resolution of all limited conceptions to the contrary brought due to inherent tendencies in the psyche towards limiting identifications of oneself at all relative or dependent levels of reality. The basic thrust of the Advaita Vedanta epistemology is that this higher knowledge cannot be had as an object-knowledge through any epistemology at any relative or dependent level of reality involving a subject-object framework. It can only be had by subjecting the ego, the 'I' in every order of relative or dependent reality, and its apparent independent function of consciousness to scrutiny through self-reflection or valid mediate knowledge of the absolute such as the Vedas to dispel the various limiting identifications and conceptions one might have of oneself at different levels or orders of reality. Neither the mystery of identification of the nondual consciousness down to the level of individual consciousness nor the mystery of the resolution of individual consciousness up to the level of absolute consciousness of the *Brahman* can be fully explained or known (*anirvacaniya*) in any relative or dependent order of reality through any epistemology (Mahadevan, 1965/1974, p. 13). However, direct knowledge of oneself as the *Brahman,* either through self-reflection or valid mediate knowledge such as the Vedas, is possible because one's essential nature as the *Brahman* is always intuitively known by the individual.

Western critical philosophy attributed to Immanuel Kant (Scruton, 2001; Watkins, 2001) holds as a central tenet that it is important to appraise human reason critically to determine its limitations and what valid knowledge it can generate given its limitations before generating the knowledge, and concludes that metaphysical categories that underlie human experience cannot be directly known. The Advaita Vedanta epistemology also reveals a similar critical attitude in determining the limitations of the body, mind, and senses and what valid object-knowledge it can generate of inner and outer objects given their limitations at the phenomenal and empirical levels of reality; and concludes that the metaphysical category of the nondual self of the *Brahman* that underlies all experience cannot be directly known. However, Advaita Vedanta holds that direct knowledge of the metaphysical category of the nondual *Brahman* is possible through other means of knowledge such as deconstruction of human consciousness through self-reflection and/or valid mediate knowledge such as the Vedas; and that the Kant's understanding is valid for phenomenal and empirical levels of reality when consciousness is mistakenly believed to be an independent property of those relative levels of reality which is natural given inherent tendency towards it in the psyche.

The dual nature of Advaita Vedanta

Deutch (1973) finds in Advaita Vedanta "one of the greatest philosophical achievements to be found in the East or the West" (p. 3). But Advaita Vedanta is as much a philosophy as it is a *pramana* (means of knowledge) for spiritual achievement. This *pramana* (means of knowledge) offers an adept seeking enlightenment a practical guide and a teacher guiding disciples to enlightenment a teaching methodology. Like the Vedas

on which it is based, that Advaita Vedanta is as much a *pramana* (means of knowledge), a practical guide, and a teaching methodology for enlightenment as it is a philosophy does not appear to be as widely understood in the West. Advaita Vedanta, writes Deutch (1973), "is more than a philosophical system, as we understand these terms in the West today; it is also a practical guide to spiritual experience, and is intimately bound up with spiritual experience" (p. 4). Bhattacharyya (1990) writes that Indian philosophy "was never conceived as a merely theoretical exercise for the sake of conceptual clarity" and that "all systems of Indian philosophy had a practical aim to achieve" (p. 4). This lack of understanding of the dual nature of Vedic philosophy in the West could have also contributed to the misunderstanding of systems such as Advaita Vedanta in particular and Eastern thought in general. The next portion of this section is devoted to an exploration of the *pramana* (means of knowledge) aspect of Advaita Vedanta as a practical guide and a teaching methodology for enlightenment.

There is debate among Advaita Vedantins as to whether self-realization can happen through intrapsychic means alone, with some asserting strongly that it is not possible. This debate will be examined in the next chapter, when the Jungian model is examined for insight on a possible resolution to this debate. For the rest of this section, the discussion will proceed on the basis of the assumption that the knowledge of the self is sought through a mediate body of knowledge external to the individual such as the Vedas instead of through self-reflection alone.

The process of enlightenment in traditional Advaita Vedanta

In traditional Advaita Vedanta, the first recommendation for an individual who seeks enlightenment is that he finds a qualified teacher for guidance, a teacher with immediate (direct) as well as mediate (indirect) knowledge of the *Brahman* through the Vedas (*Mundaka upanishad*, I.2.13, Gambhirananda, 1957/1989b, p. 105). An individual who seeks enlightenment needs to be a qualified person (an adhikari) who is able to discriminate between the real and the apparently real (*viveka*), is able to be indifferent to sensuous pleasures that distract the mind from the attainment of self-knowledge (*vairagya*), who can meet positive and negative situations in life evenly with a disciplined mind (*sama)* and body and senses (*dama*), who has endurance to tolerate the opposites (*titiksa*), a steady mind (*samadhana*), and faith in the teacher and the teachings (*sraddha*), who is single-pointed in pursuit (*uparati*), and has a longing for freedom (*mumuksutva*) (*Brahmasutra bhasya*, I.1.1, Vireswarananda, 1936/1993, pp. 19-20). There is a parallel between this requirement in Advaita Vedanta and the one in Jungian psychology that an individual possess a mature ego before attempting to engage the deeper levels of the unconscious to individuate. Both systems are similar in the view that the deeper exploration of the psyche is better suited to the second half of the life of the individual. In Advaita Vedanta as well as Jungian psychology, there is also an understanding that the teacher or the analyst guides the individual through the necessary maturation or ego development.

The process involves three basic steps of: (a) exposure to the teachings through the teacher or through the Vedic texts (*shravanam*); (b) contemplation of the teachings by subjecting them to reason, logic, prior beliefs, and experience; and the removal of doubts

that arise in the above process through further contemplation and interactions with the teacher and the teachings (*mananam*); and (c) an ongoing practice of holding in one's awareness the truths that have been revealed (*nidhidhyasanam*) writes Adhvarindra in chapter 8 of *Vedanta Paribhasa* (Mahdavananda, 1942/2000, pp. 203-227). This three-step process can lead to enlightenment but there is, however, no guarantee that it would. The outcome is understood to depend in part on individual karma but ultimately on the will of the totality, the will or the grace of the self of Isvara.

The process of becoming enlightened is described as one of removing ignorance (avidya). There are two types of knowledge (*vidya*) in Advaita Vedanta, higher knowledge (*para vidya*) and lower knowledge (*apara vidya*) (*Mundaka upanishad*, I.1.4, Gambhirananda, 1957/1989b, p. 79). Lower knowledge that is in the way of higher knowledge is considered *avidya* (ignorance) opposed to *vidya* (knowledge) even though it might be valid for the level of reality it pertains to. Lower knowledge is legitimate knowledge for a lower level of reality and therefore cannot really be considered as ignorance for that level of reality. But to the extent to which it obstructs or hides higher knowledge, it is considered as ignorance or antiknowledge from the point of view of the absolute. For example, the scientific means of generating knowledge as well as the knowledge generated by science would be considered valid for the empirical order of reality but regarded as anti-knowledge or ignorance from the point of view of the absolute to the extent to which they block the individual from realizing his higher self. However, once higher knowledge (*para vidya*) is attained, all other forms of knowledge (*vidya*) and means of knowing (*pramanas*) are revealed to be lower knowledge (*apara vidya*) and ignorance (*avidya*) (Deutch, 1973, p. 82).

In that they offer the possibility of higher knowledge that cannot be had as object-knowledge, the Vedas are considered as a means of knowledge (*pramana*) for the higher knowledge of the *Brahman*. In some nonorthodox schools, the Vedas are held as a path laid down by yogis who became enlightened intrapsychically through self-reflection alone (Satprakashananda, 1965/1974, p. 194). This offers the possibility of an individual being able to attain the higher knowledge through his own efforts. Orthodox schools of Advaita Vedanta however regard the Vedas as revelations from God to man. They consider as a necessary prerequisite that an individual gains this knowledge of the higher self from a teacher or a teaching such as the Vedas before meditating on the mediate knowledge to arrive at the direct and intuitive higher perception of oneself as the *Brahman* (Satprakashandana, 1965/1974, pp. 195-196).

The enduring debate on whether an individual can arrive at the higher knowledge internally or needs an external source will be taken up for a fuller discussion in the next chapter. However, all schools of Advaita Vedanta are in agreement about the impossibility of communicating fully in duality the relationship (if any) between the nondual reality of the *Brahman* and the apparent and dependent reality of the diverse phenomenal world, an indescribable (*anirvacaniya*) relationship that is beyond all words, attributed to maya, an indescribable mystery (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994a, pp. 34-35). Therefore, there is an understanding of the incompleteness of all paths or descriptions or methodologies that lead from the phenomenal world to the *Brahman*. Because any relationship between the absolute and the relative is considered to be only apparent and not real from the absolute point of view, the description of a path as "leading" an individual from the relative to the absolute does not imply that there is necessarily "a

relationship" between the two, even from the relative point of view. Also, while a path can be regarded as one that works or one that does not work, depending on whether it has led anyone to enlightenment, it cannot be said that a path will necessarily work for all individuals. And if a path is seen as having led an individual to enlightenment, it cannot be said with certainty that it is the path that led that individual to enlightenment. As a practical matter, the confidence in a path appears to grow with the number of people it has led to enlightenment. All this uncertainty is because the descriptions of higher knowledge and the means to achieve it in the Vedas are mediate knowledge that can only point to the higher knowledge of the *Brahman*. Even though such mediate knowledge has been known to lead to enlightenment of self-awareness of oneself as the *Brahman*, the exact process that an individual undergoes from the relative to the absolute to become enlightened is ultimately indescribable in its entirety because the relationship between the *Brahman* and the phenomenal world is ultimately not only a mystery but an apparent and unreal one from the absolute point of view.

Advaita Vedanta as a teaching methodology employs language, logic, philosophy, ethics, myth, symbol, analogy, metaphor, and imagination--all the epistemologies and all the knowledge available on all other levels of reality--to communicate the truth claims in the Vedas as well as to dispel the doubts that arise in the mind of the individual faced with such truth claims, to help an individual get closer to a personal realization of the *Brahman*. On the use of analogies in the teaching methodology of Advaita Vedanta Deutch (1973) writes that "reason may be used in the form of 'analogical reasoning' (*samanyatdrstnumana*); that is, reasoning that is based upon analogies between the transcendental and the empirical orders of being" (pp. 93-94); and

that the analogies function "not so much as a convincing one" in any rational manner but "as a means of awakening one to new possibilities of experience" (p. 94). The analogies and metaphors used to intuit the knowledge are used loosely as they all break down eventually if taken too literally and pushed too far within the level of reality in which they are validly used in an effort to reveal the transcendental. In the rest of this section, examples of the use of logic, metaphor, and analogy employed in Advaita Vedanta are presented to offer glimpses into its teaching methodology. The examples I have chosen to present are ones that worked for me personally to further my understanding.

Examples from the teaching methodology of Advaita Vedanta

One of the most common metaphors used in the teaching methodology of Advaita Vedanta to "intuit" the relationship between the immutable self (the *Brahman*) and an individual (jiva) is the analogy of the clay pot (*Chandogya upanishad*, VI.1.4, Radhakrishnan, 1953/1994, pp. 446-447). The clay does not undergo change in being one clay pot or another. There is a change in form but there is no change in the clay. That the clay continues to exist unaltered as clay in the form of a pot has to be assumed for the metaphor to work. Reflecting on the changes in the physical and chemical properties of the clay, if any, as it is transformed into a particular pot will be stretching the metaphor beyond its limit and away from its intended purpose. In the same way the clay remains unaltered in the form of a pot, the self (the *Brahman*) continues to exist unaltered in the form of an individual (*jiva*). Just as the clay cannot be separated from the pot that is made from it, the *Brahman* cannot be separated from the individual. The clay has an existence of its own, whereas the pot depends entirely on the clay for its existence.

Logic is often used in Advaita Vedanta to challenge an individual's everyday experience and lead him in the direction of a reality beyond. A good example of it can be found in the logical argument (*vada*) that establishes the counter-intuitiveness of the dual position that there is separation or difference between the subject and an object in the phenomenal world. The argument unfolds as follows: If there is a separation between the subject and an object, it implies the existence of a second object that separates the two. If there were only the subject and the object, the thing that separates the subject and the object (there has to be one) has to be either the subject or the object which would imply that there is no separation between the subject and the object. If on the other hand there were a second object that separates the subject and the first object, it would imply the need for the existence of a third object to separate it from the subject and the second object. For there to be a separation between the subject and the second object that separates it from the first object, the separating object cannot be either the subject or the first or second object. If it were the subject, it would imply that there is no separation between the subject and the second object. If it were the first object, it would imply that there is no separation between the first and second objects. Therefore, the existence of the third object would be necessary for the existence of the second object which was demonstrated as necessary to separate the subject and the first object. Using the same argument, it can be shown that the existence of a fourth object would be necessary to have a separation between the subject and the first object.

It can be seen from the repeated application of the above logic that to show a separation or difference between the subject and an object requires the need for the existence of an infinite number of objects between the subject and the object to sustain

the basic assumption of the separation or difference between the subject and an object. Because the conclusion challenges our everyday experience as well as the intuitive understanding of unity in the psyche of a human being, it is used as part of the teaching methodology in Advaita Vedanta to help remove the ignorance of difference or separation between the subject and any of its objects, whether they are internal objects of the mind or external objects of the world, to establish the non-duality of our existence.

Another example from Advaita Vedanta of deconstructing everyday experience through logic and common sense to intuit the reality beyond involves the analysis of waking (*jagaritha-sthana*), dreaming (*svapna-sthana*), and dreamless sleep (*susupti*) states of human beings (*Mandukya upanishad*, verses 2-7, Radhakrishnan, 1953/1994, pp. 695-698). The analysis establishes that there is a witness state (*turiya*) common to all three states of everyday consciousness. While waking and dreaming, there is the presence of an ego consciousness. In the dreamless deep sleep state, there ought to be a witness because the argument that there is none runs counter to an intuitive felt sense of continuity of self experienced through all three states of consciousness.

Section summary and conclusions

Section 1 presented an insight from the Advaita Vedanta perspective that it was natural for all human beings including Jung to have an inherent difficulty imagining a consciousness beyond the empirical ego. In addition, it was pointed out that Jung's epistemology exhibited a philosophical bias shared by Western phenomenology and modern science towards a subject-object world. In that it does not believe that the thing beyond can be known directly, it shares a Kantian bias regarding human consciousness.

Unable to imagine a subject outside of a subject-object context, Jung believed that the self could not be known directly and that introspective methods and/or mediate knowledge such as the Vedas could not lead to it.

Analyses presented in this section indicate that Jung's criticism that Eastern epistemology lacked a basis in critical philosophy and empirical evidence that played a part in Jung's rejection of Eastern claims of higher states of consciousness appears to be in part due to his lack of in-depth study of Eastern thought and its epistemology and more importantly to the lack of personal immersion in the practice (*sadhana*) necessary for personal verification of possible higher knowledge beyond the level of the empirical ego. These reasons have been suggested by others before, but they acquire strength in the light of a deeper discussion of the different aspects of Advaita Vedanta; its teachings, its epistemology, and its teaching methodology. Advaita Vedanta, for example, invites an individual to subject its truth claims to logical rigor as well as personal experience. Its epistemology as well as its teaching methodology shows the logical rigor of critical philosophy which Jung appears to have overlooked. It is consistent with science with respect to epistemology vis-à-vis the empirical world. It is consistent with Jung's epistemology vis-à-vis the phenomenal world of inner and outer objects at the level of the empirical ego. It does not agree with Jung that there is no consciousness beyond the ego. However, unlike modern science, which appears to proceed with an underlying assumption that everything can ultimately be explained in terms of cause and effect in material terms, it is aware of the incompleteness of its explanation of how higher knowledge can be achieved and attributes it to the realm of the unexplainable. From the analyses presented in this chapter, it also appears that the lack of in-depth study of

Eastern thought and the lack of personal immersion in a practice such as Advaita Vedanta contributed to Jung not understanding the rationale for the overall context of Eastern thought (the mixing of different disciplines such as religion and philosophy from a very different perspective than in the West), and to his misunderstanding of the peculiar mode of presentation of ancient thought (simple statements of truth claims from personal experience and reasoning) as dogmatic assertions.

Analysis of Evidence of Higher States of Consciousness

One of the reasons Jung offered for rejecting Eastern claims of higher states of consciousness was the lack of empirical evidence for them. Jung has been criticized for overlooking the statements of yogis that their claims were verifiable through personal experience. Jung has also provided an alternative explanation for these phenomena characterizing them as trance or hypnotic states or as states due to "participation mystique." In Section 1, Jung's difficulties in this regard were analyzed and understood within the conceptual framework of Advaita Vedanta. In Section 2, Jung's views on this subject were analyzed from an epistemological perspective and Jung's study of Eastern thought was examined for its adequacy for a proper understanding of the latter. In this section, the results of an analysis of the empirical evidence for higher states of consciousness from the East as well as the West are presented. The general characteristics of the available empirical evidence for higher states of consciousness and the possible reasons for the great deal of variation observed in these states are presented. The evidence is examined for its adequacy vis-à-vis Jung's criteria for empirical evidence.

And insights are presented on the difficulties Jung might have had in accepting the available evidence that appear to meet his criteria.

Evidence for higher states of consciousness

There is considerable evidence for higher states of consciousness in the form of self-reports of individuals from the East as well as the West, from ancient to modern times, from a diversity of people, monks and mystics, and ordinary folks of all ages) in very different contexts (spiritual practice in different religions, meditation, trauma, near-death experiences, deep experiences such as falling in love or having a child, and random events). The classic book *Mysticism: The Development of Humankind's Spiritual Consciousness* by Evelyn Underhill (1995) recounts the experiences of higher states of consciousness of Western mystics such as St. Catherine of Siena, St. John of the Cross, Plotinus, Eckhart, and St. Mechthild of Magdeburg. *Daughters of the Goddess: The Women Saints of India* by Linda Johnsen (1994) retells the experiences of higher states of consciousness by several holy women of India some of whom are still alive. *The Second Birth: The Heart of Awakening within the Heart of the Community* compiled and edited by Bob Valine (2005) contains numerous and recent accounts of higher states of consciousness experienced by Westerners on a spiritual path. *Life at Death: A Scientific Experience of Near-Death Experience* by Kenneth Ring (1980) repeats descriptions of higher states of consciousness by ordinary folks during near-death experiences. *The Psychology of the Future: Lessons from Modern Consciousness Research* by Stanislov Grof (2000) tells several accounts of higher states of consciousness by individuals during traumatic experiences around birth. Wilbur (2000) offers a schema for organizing the

evidence on higher states of consciousness that he classifies along a continuum of consciousness possibilities.

There is often considerable individual variation in the description of any of the large number of altered states along a continuum of consciousness beyond the phenomenal ego consciousness. The great deal of individual variation in the descriptions of altered states perhaps points to the inherent difficulty of expressing such uncommon realities through language that was developed essentially for describing common realities. It is difficult to describe them and therefore it is difficult to share them with others. These states fall outside of the realm of consensual reality. It is also natural that the expression if not the experience of higher states of consciousness is filtered through and molded by the linguistic, religious, and scientific frameworks of experience and meaning that dominate the culture at the time. They are also often opposed to paradigms of reality that are politically dominant at the time in religion, science, and even psychology. Therefore, it is prudent to discount them, alter them to suit current paradigms, or not to share them with others. Because they are extraordinary states of reality, only a few achieve them, especially the states that involve the higher reaches of consciousness such as states of enlightenment (Wilbur, 2000). Yet, there appears to be adequate reporting of such higher states of consciousness over time in different cultures and adequate commonality in the description of those states for their classification along a continuum of higher states of consciousness and for a shared recognition of such states among individuals who have had them across cultures and time.

Characteristics of higher states of consciousness

There is considerable variation in the states that have been reported ranging from being a mere witness to oneself where it is clear that one's thoughts and actions are happening on their own without one's participation (Valine, 2005, p. 7), to being one with everything (Sharma, 1993, p. 100), to being nothing, to being one-with-God experiences of Western mystics (Underhill, 1995), to being-God experiences of Eastern mystics (Amritaswarupananda, 1994, p. 146). There is also a great deal of variation in the reported duration of these altered states in the reports, ranging from a brief period, a few minutes or hours, to a permanent alteration in consciousness. A characteristic common to these higher states of consciousness is the report of the absence of the usual sense of 'I' that is experienced by the individuals in their everyday lives. The boundaries of the usual 'I' appear to be enlarged to a greater or lesser extent and the resulting experience is recognized as dramatically different from ordinary states of consciousness (Sharma, 1993, p. 87). All these states, regardless of duration, in that they offer glimpses of states of consciousness that transcend the ordinary subject-object 'I' or the phenomenal ego consciousness, provide potential evidence for Eastern claims of states of consciousness that transcend the ego. The reported state of enlightenment (*moksa*) is just one state in a continuum of possible states of higher consciousness.

Underhill (1995), in her in-depth study of Western mysticism, classifies mystical experiences into three broad hierarchical stages: Nature mysticism, metaphysical mysticism, and divine mysticism. Nature mysticism corresponds to experiences that involve being one with nature. Metaphysical mysticism corresponds to experiences that involve formlessness, and divine mysticism involves experiences that involve being part

of God or one with God. Ken Wilbur (2000, pp. 5-27) has classified these self-reported states of consciousness from different cultures and different periods of time along a continuum of consciousness possibilities that ranges all the way from the ordinary subject-object ego consciousness to the nondual consciousness claimed as a possibility in Advaita Vedanta. Of the validity of these higher states of consciousness states, Wilbur (2000) writes:

> But it should be realized from the start that these levels and sublevels presented by the perennial sages are *not* the product of metaphysical speculation or abstract hairsplitting philosophy. In fact, they are almost in every way the codification of *direct experiential realities*, reaching from sensory experience to mental experience to spiritual experience. The "levels" in the Great Nest simply reflect the full spectrum of being and consciousness available for direct experiential disclosure, from subconscious to self-conscious to superconscious. Moreover, the discovery of these waves, over the years, has been communally generated and consensually validated. The fact that wherever they appear, they are often quite similar, sometimes almost identical, simply tells us that we live in a patterned Kosmos, and these richly textured patterns can be--and were--spotted by intelligent men and women in almost every culture. (p. 8)

Wilbur (2000), however, begs the question as to whether these states are an inherent structural givens in the psyche or potentials created in the collective psyche by mankind over time. Either way, he asserts that these states are potentially available as achievements in consciousness for every human being even though only a limited number of people appear to be capable of the states further along on the continuum of consciousness at this time in human history. Wilbur (2000) writes:

> It is not necessary to picture the basic structures or basic holons as being permanently fixed and unchanging essences (Platonic, Kantian, Hegelian, or Husserlian). They can, in part, be understood as habits of evolution, more like a Kosmic memory than a pregiven mold. But either way, a crucial point remains: the fact that the great yogis, saints, and sages have *already* experienced many of the transpersonal realms (as we will see) shows us unmistakably that we *already* have the potentials for these higher levels present in our own makeup. The human

> organism and its brain, in its present form, has the capacity for these higher states. Perhaps other states will emerge in the future; perhaps new potentials will unfold; possibly higher realizations will dawn. But the fact remains that *right now* we have at least these extraordinary transpersonal realms already available to us. And whether we say that these higher potentials have been eternally given to us by God, or that they were first created by the evolutionary pioneering saints and sages and then bequeathed to the rest of us as morphogenetic fields and evolutionary grooves, or that they are Platonic Forms forever embedded in the Kosmos, or that they showed up by blind chance mutation and vapidly mindless natural selection, doesn't change in the least the simple fact that those higher potentials are now available to all of us. (p. 11)

And,

> In premodern times, while it is true that much, or even most, of spirituality was magic, mythic, and prerational, nonetheless the most highly evolved yogis, saints, and sages had access to the transrational, transpersonal, and transcendental realms--they embraced, in their own way and in their own terms, the entire Great Nest of Being, subconscious to self-conscious to superconscious. . . .
> And even if the *average* individual did not awaken to the higher levels in the Nest, it was clearly understood that these higher potentials were available to any who wished to pursue a path of awakening, liberation, or enlightenment. Premodernity acknowledged these higher, transpersonal, spiritual realms, whereas modernity, for the most part, denies them altogether. (pp. 54-55)

Modern science and higher states of consciousness

Modern science maintains as a working hypothesis that consciousness, the ability to be aware of oneself and one's experience, is a function of the physical properties of the brain even though it is far from being able to establish it as a scientific fact (Damasio, 1999). However, reflecting its philosophical bias of scientific materialism, it discounts all possibilities other than matter as the origin of consciousness. Science appears often to over-generalize available research findings to discount other possibilities. For example, the finding that the electrical stimulation of certain portions of the temporal lobes can produce altered states involved in spiritual experience is at times used to declare that all spiritual experiences originate as physical processes in the brain (Persinger, 1987). Some recent scientific studies (Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007; Ehrsson,

2007) have found that some out-of-body experiences can be reliably produced in laboratory settings. A hypothesis that is offered for the underlying process in these studies is the temporary failure of the brain in its ability to integrate the incoming data from the perceptual senses on the one hand and the bodily sense on the other brought about by an overwhelming experience such as trauma. The authors have used these findings to suggest that all out-of-body experiences including near-death experiences might be a product of the brain in malfunction from being overwhelmed.

The Advaita Vedanta perspective on higher states of consciousness

From the Advaita Vedanta perspective, a multiplicity of states of higher consciousness outside of the most ordinary subject-object phenomenal ego consciousness and the appearance of the physical body as the origin of altered or higher states of consciousness when one's awareness shifts from one level of the psyche to the next can be seen as natural and inherent to a multilevel psyche with multiple levels of awareness; and as a product of the natural and hard-to-overcome (con)fusion of the reflection of the consciousness property of the *atman* with the ego (the *ahamkara*) leading to an apparently conscious ego and the subsequent and natural (con)fusion of this apparently conscious ego with the body, mind, and senses leading to the sense of the limited individual (*jiva*).

In Advaita Vedanta, the body of an individual (*jiva*) is theorized as having five layers with the first level being the gross physical body (the *sthula sareera*) (*Tattva bodha*, Tejomayananda, 2004, pp. 52-53). The other four levels are referred to as belonging to the realm of the subtle body (the *suksma* or *linga sareera*) (*Tattva bodha*,

Tejomayananda, 2004, pp. 54-60). This model, also called the method of the five sheaths (*pancha kosha prakriya*) is explained in detail in chapter 2 of *The Taittiriya upanishad* (Radhakrishnan, 1953/1994, pp. 541-552). Sankara also presents the model of the five sheaths in depth in verses 149 to 212 of *Vivekacudamani* (Madhavananda, 1926/1995, pp. 57-82). All five levels of the body of the individual *(jiva)* are considered to be matter as well as information or intelligence that constitute or shape the matter into that particular form. The difference between the levels of the body is one of difference in the kind of material (and the constituting information) involved. The bodies interpenetrate each other and inform each other. When one life ends, the gross body (the *sthula sareera*) alone is discarded and all four levels of the subtle body (the *suksma sareera*) carry over to the next life in case the individual does not reach enlightenment in his current life.

The five levels or layers of the body of the individual (*jiva*) are called the *annamaya kosha* (the gross physical body), the *pranamaya kosha* (the *prana* or energy body), the *manomaya kosha* (the mental body), the *vignyanamaya kosha* (the intellectual body), and the *anandamaya kosha* (the body of bliss) (*Tattva bodha*, Tejomayananda, 2004, pp. 52-60). According to Advaita Vedanta, all five levels of the body have to be de-identified with as the nonself for enlightenment (*moksa*) to occur (*Tattva bodha*, Tejomayananda, 2004, pp. 60-62). This model offers one possible explanation for the self-reports of a large number of varied altered or higher states of consciousness in human experience, in progressive spiritual practice or evolution, and from temporary or permanent overwhelm or malfunction of one or more layers of the body of the individual (*jiva*).

In the five-sheath (*kosha*) model of the individual (*jiva*) in Advaita Vedanta, consciousness (the ability to be self-aware) is not an independent property of any of the five levels (*Tattva bodha*, Tejomayananda, 2004, pp. 60-62; *Vivekacudamani*, verse 210, Madhavananda, 1926/1995, pp. 81-82). To the extent to which an entity on any level appears to have the independent property of consciousness, it is just that, an appearance, an ability that derives from the only source of consciousness there is, the nondual consciousness of the *Brahman*. However, the rest of the psyche (the ego, mind, memory, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings) is not just a function of the first level of the gross physical body alone, as held by modern science. The psyche is also posited to be a function of the subtle levels of individual (the *suksma sareera*) that is capable of extending into the world through or independent of the physical body. When it extends into the world through the physical body, it acquires the unique aspects of the physical body and brain, their structure and function, and reflects them in its experience and expression. When it extends into the world independent of the physical body, the mutual informing of the gross and subtle levels of the body of the individual ensures the bilateral information flow and influence between the two levels. The idea that the psyche is a precursor to the physical body, that it acquires further properties through the physical body, and that it is capable of extending into the world through or independent of the physical body implies the possibility of direct perception of the world outside without the mediation of the physical senses. It is of interest to note that the possibility of direct experience of external material objects without the mediation of sense-data is supported by direct realism, a Western theory of perception (Pitcher, 1971; Armstrong, 1961; Searle, 1983; Putnam, 1994; McDowell, 1987).

The apparent ability of the consciousness aspect of the *atman* to operate through many levels of the body of the individual and shift awareness from one level of the body to another provides an additional explanation for a multiplicity of altered states of consciousness in the psyche. The psyche when it withdraws from the physical level can produce out-of-body experiences as in near-death experiences. That would provide an alternative explanation for out-of-body experiences. But it does not mean that out-of-body experiences cannot also be produced due to malfunction or other reasons in the body at the physical level. In the Advaita Vedanta's five-layer model of the body, a limiting sense of the ego can be present on the subtle body level of the individual even when awareness leaves the first level of the gross body (the *sthula sareera* or *annamaya kosha*), as in death.

Of all the higher states of consciousness, the two states of consciousness associated with enlightenment (*moksa*) are of particular interest to Advaita Vedantins: *savikalpa samadhi* and *nirvikalpa samadhi*. *Savikalpa samadhi* is a state in which the awareness is identified with the level of *Isvara*, the totality of the creation. The awareness is that of the *Brahman* but there is also the awareness of an apparent universe by which the *Brahman* is unaffected (Nikhilananda, 1946/2005, p. 99). This state is also described as the experience of the *Saguna Brahman*, the *Brahman* with attributes. *Nirvikalpa samadhi* is a state in which the awareness is that of the *Brahman* without the simultaneous awareness of an apparent universe (Nikhilananda, 1946/2005, pp. 99-100). This state is also described as the experience of *Nirguna Brahman*, the *Brahman* without attributes.

There is disagreement between the Hindus and the Buddhists on the nature of the higher state of consciousness associated with enlightenment. While the Buddhists maintain that the ultimate nature of reality is emptiness that has as potential all possibilities for creation, they appear to attribute to the Hindus the belief that the ultimate nature of reality is an intelligence that encompasses everything, according to an interview with the Dalai Lama in the 2004 documentary *Short Cut to Nirvana* of the *Kumbh Mela* in India (Benazzo & Day, 2004). From this, it appears that the Buddhists' understanding of enlightenment in Hinduism is close to the description of *savikalpa samadhi* or awareness of oneself as *Isvara* or *Brahman* with the attribute of apparent creation in Advaita Vedanta. The awareness of oneself as a self-aware subject whose nature is emptiness with the potential for all possibilities for creation in Buddhist descriptions of enlightenment appears to be close to the description of *nirvikalpa samadhi* in Advaita Vedanta, the awareness of oneself as *Nirguna Brahman* or *Brahman* without the attribute of apparent creation. Therefore, the differences between *savikalpa samadhi* and *nirvikalpa samadhi*, the experiences of oneself as the *Brahman* with and without the attribute of an apparent creation respectively, appear to offer a potential explanation for the differences between the Hindus and Buddhists in their descriptions of higher states of consciousness associated with enlightenment.

Western mystics, especially Christian mystics, appear to believe that the ultimate awareness an individual could aspire to is the awareness of oneness with God. They are more likely to say "I am one with God" than "I am God" or "You are that" as Eastern mystics Underhill (1995). The experiences of Christian mystics, the experience of oneness with God, appear to bear on *savikalpa samadhi*, the awareness of oneself as

Isvara or God, the *Brahman* with attributes. As to the reason why Christian mystics would not go so far as to claim "I am God" as opposed to "I am with God," there is the possibility that they had to be mindful of the real possibility of heresy and its consequences. There is also the possibility that the strong belief supported by theology that one could not be God might have prevented some of them from attaining *savikalpa samadhi* and *nirvikalpa samadhi*. From the Advaita Vedanta perspective, such beliefs would constitute ignorance (*avidya*) that could effectively be in the way of deeper self-realization.

Jung's criteria for empirical evidence

To support his theories, Jung used as empirical evidence a diversity of sources: dreams, fantasies, myth, art, philosophy, literature, sculpture, architecture, symbols, and rituals. In order to support his theory of the collective unconscious, what he at times referred to as the objective psyche, he sought common patterns in these sources across many cultures. Unlike in modern psychology where self-reports are considered increasingly suspect as evidence regardless of the phenomena being studied, Jung took self-reports of clients as well as his own personal experiences including visions as evidence if not to confirm his theories but at least to formulate or revise them. His stance on re-incarnation is a case in point. Once skeptical on the subject, Jung started to be open to the possibility of reincarnation, "with somewhat different eyes," after having a series of personal dreams dealing with the reincarnation of an acquaintance of his, even though he could not come to a definite conclusion because he had not come across "any such dreams in other persons" (Jung, 1961/1989, p. 319). Jung however believed that he had

enough evidence from his and others' dreams that there was a conscious life after death (p. 305), a life in which the soul continued to evolve (p. 309).

Discussion of reasons of Jung's rejection of available evidence of higher states of consciousness

The cross-cultural and cross-traditional evidence for higher states of consciousness beyond the ordinary consciousness of the phenomenal ego is considerable. They appear to meet Jung's criteria for empirical evidence. Even though there is considerable variation in the description of these states across individuals, the descriptions of these states have enough commonality across cultures and time periods for them to be classified along a continuum of consciousness. Given the body of evidence, it is possible that Jung was not exposed to enough of it to change his mind on the subject, with the example of reincarnation cited above a case in point. That he did not have enough personal experience with such states to convince him of their possibility, as has been suggested by others, might be another reason. Let us consider each of these two possibilities in turn.

Notwithstanding his limited exposure to the data on reincarnation, it is hard to be convinced that Jung lacked adequate exposure to the available evidence on higher states of consciousness beyond the ego. His writings and references show a great deal of familiarity with the subject. He compares Meister Eckhart's descriptions of his experiences of states of higher consciousness with the states of higher consciousness of sartori in Zen Buddhism and experiences of religious transformation of Western Christian mystics Jung (1939/1969a), although Jung appears to be unaware of the extent to which Christian mystics experienced higher states of consciousness as documented extensively

in Underhill (1995). He discusses Shri Ramana's and Shri Ramakrishna's statements about the state of enlightenment at length (Jung, 1944/1969). Jung has been criticized for rejecting the claims of yogis that the higher states of consciousness beyond the personal ego were subjectively achievable realities. Jung actively sought to discount these claims of personal experience by offering the alternative explanation that they were trance or hypnotic states or states induced by the phenomenon of "participation mystique." From all of the above, we have to assume that Jung did not lack exposure to such evidence in the form of self-reports of others but appears to have discounted them regardless for a number of reasons.

That Jung did not have adequate glimpses into the possibilities of higher states of consciousness through his own experiences is also hard to take seriously. Jung was no stranger to nonordinary states of consciousness. There is a poignant passage in his autobiography in which he describes being personally aware of a unity with all things around him (Jung, 1961/1989, pp. 225-226).

> At Bollingen I am in the midst of my true life, I am most deeply myself. . . . At times I feel as if I am spread out over the landscape and inside things, and am myself living in every tree, in the splashing of the waves, in the clouds and the animals that come and go, in the procession of the seasons. (pp. 225-226)

Although this passage could be interpreted in many ways, it could also be interpreted as possible evidence that it was an awareness of a higher state of consciousness of the underlying unity of all things, which would be an achievement at the higher end of Wlibur's continuum of consciousness, a mystical experience of oneness with all things, an experience in the direction of the *Saguna Brahman* in Advaita Vedanta. It is possible that Jung's misunderstanding that the higher states of consciousness beyond the ego did not have a subject contributed to his overlooking of his own accomplishments and for his

disallowing such possibilities for the growth of the human psyche till the very end of his life. In that the states of higher consciousness, especially the states of *savikalpa* and *nirvikalpa samadhi,* are in the realm of rarity for most individuals, self-reports of such personal experiences do run the risk of not being acceptable as adequate scientific evidence. Deutch (1973) points to a similar problem in para-psychology of "establishing new empirical laws of nature on the basis of the 'extrasensory' perceptual experiences of a privileged few" (p. 71). However, Jung, who understood that only a limited number pursued even the path of individuation, was not averse to formulating theories on the basis of evidence from limited data as when he theorized in the ongoing conscious development of the soul after death and became open to the possibility of reincarnation. So his rejection of higher states of consciousness beyond the ego must be due to, apart from his misunderstanding that there was no subject or observer or 'I' in such states, to philosophical and epistemological biases that he brought to such evidence.

Western phenomenology challenged scientific reality by focusing on the subjective nature of all human observations. Subjectivity was inevitable because the observations were always "bracketed" or filtered in one way or another psychically and ultimately by the physicality of the organism. Therefore, such subjective and objective constraints needed to be taken seriously as a co-determinant of all experience. As these brackets or filters also constrained what could be observed or known directly, all realities beyond direct observation could only be inferred or known indirectly in terms of what can be observed. In Jung's principle of the reality of the psyche and in his assumption that the self could be known only indirectly in terms of images at the level of the phenomenal ego, the influence of Western phenomenology especially of Immanuel Kant

can be seen clearly. The basic philosophical and epistemological assumptions stemming from this influence appear to be the most important reason for Jung rejecting the possibility of higher states of consciousness beyond the phenomenal ego in the face of the evidence of experiences of higher states of consciousness, his as well as others, which appear to meet his own criteria for empirical evidence. "The Indian lacks the epistemological standpoint just as much our own religious language does. He is still pre-Kantian," wrote Jung (1944/1969), and "we remain conscious of the fact that we are discerning, with the limited means at our disposal, something essentially unknown and expressing it in terms of psychic structures which may not be adequate to the nature of what is to be known" (p. 580). On the Eastern claims that the psyche had inherent knowledge that could lead to higher states of consciousness beyond the phenomenal ego, Jung's response was that such a view "does not take seriously the experiential fact that the subjective categories of the mind do not posses knowledge themselves, but merely shape external stimuli so that perceptual knowledge results" (Coward, 1985, p. 68). Therefore, a mystic, "if he proceeds prudently and conscientiously, he will continue to discover that at least a part of his experience is a humanly limited interpretation" (Jung, 1944/1969, p. 581), and by implication, not claim any higher states of consciousness that is somehow unconditioned by the phenomenal ego.

In conclusion, it appears that Jung's rejection of the available evidence, which on closer inspection appears to meet his own criteria for empirical evidence, had more to do with the philosophical biases he brought to the evidence than to the adequacy of the evidence itself. As we saw in the previous section, philosophical biases from science and phenomenology appear to have made it difficult for Jung to allow for and imagine a

consciousness beyond the empirical ego in a subject-object context. These filters based on philosophical assumptions appear to have strongly influenced Jung to discount the available evidence. In addition, Jung's wrong conclusion that states of consciousness beyond the ego implied the absence of 'I' or a subject also appears to have contributed to not only his rejection of evidence of higher states of consciousness from others but also his overlooking of such states in his own experience.

As others have pointed out, it is possible that other factors were at work in Jung's rejection of claims of higher states of consciousness as well. The fact that the bulk of the evidence for higher states of consciousness was in contexts that could be characterized as mystical or religious might have also had to do with Jung's disinclination to take the evidence seriously for fear that he would not be taken seriously as a scientist. Jung concluded that the higher states of consciousness reported by Western Christian mystics were mostly experiences in religious transformation with few achieving satori, the state of higher consciousness reported in Zen Buddhism (Jung, 1939/1969a, pp. 547-548). The presentation of evidence from the East as well as the West, in that they focused more on the rarer nondual states towards the higher end of the continuum of consciousness, it might have been all the more difficult for anyone without adequate personal experience of such states or philosophical perspectives to take the available evidence seriously. Perhaps the evidence of more common states of higher consciousness beyond the empirical ego, of which there appear to be a large number of theoretical and empirical possibilities in Advaita Vedanta, as discussed earlier in this section, might have been met with less disbelief and discounting on Jung's part, as in his allowing for the possibility of a conscious soul that continued its development after death.

In fairness to Jung, it is important to point to the integrity with which he remained open to opposing paradigms throughout his life. Even though Jung might have made strong statements against the possibility of states of higher consciousness beyond the ego and ego resolution in certain places, statements that at times drew strong reactions and protests from others, including myself, familiarity with Jung's extensive writings reveals a man who is open to changing his mind when faced with new evidence as in the case of life after death and reincarnation and a man who is willing to leave the door open even on things that he believed were impossible. We find an example of the latter attitude in Jung's interpretation of his dream in which Jung is himself a dream in a yogi's meditation (Jung, 1961/1989, pp. 323-324). In his interpretation, he leaves open the door that the dream could be pointing in the direction of the Eastern concept of *maya* and towards the possibility of Jung's or his ego's dissolution upon the awakening of the yogi from his meditative dream into a different state of consciousness. This dream and Jung's interpretation are discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

Paradoxically, it is the modern scientific findings in quantum physics (that supported the phenomenological point of view and challenged it at the same time) that stimulated Jung's thinking towards a greater understanding of the psyche in a direction that appears to offer the possibility of further reconciliation between Jung's thinking and Eastern thought on the concepts of the self, boundaries of an individual psyche, and consciousness. In the next section, the changes in Jungian thought due to the findings in quantum physics from contributions by Jung as well as his followers are presented and their implications for East-West reconciliation are explored. In addition, the implications

of the especially more recent findings in quantum physics for Advaita Vedanta are explored.

Advaita Vedanta and Jungian Psychology from the Perspective of Quantum Physics

Jung, synchronicity, psychoid archetype, and unus mundus

In the second half of his career, Jung drew inspiration from the emerging paradigm of quantum physics to offer a framework of explanation for the phenomenon he termed synchronicity (Jung, 1952/1985, p. 98). Calling synchronicity an acausal connecting principle, he used it to explain events in time and space seemingly unconnected to each other in terms of cause-and-effect relationships of Newtonian physics. An example of a synchronistic event is a personal observation by Jung of a scarab beetle appearing in the environment of an analytical session while the analysand was describing a dream featuring a scarab beetle (Jung, 1952/1985, p. 22).

Central to Jung's theory of synchronicity is his reformulation of the concept of the psychoid archetype in the light of quantum physics findings that matter could be either wave or particle. While his earlier formulation of the psychoid archetype imagined it as an underlying but inseparable continuum of which spirit or psyche was at one end and the instinct or matter was at the other (Jung, 1946/1960, pp. 173-178 & pp. 200-216), his later formulation inspired by quantum physics re-imagined it as a common substratum in the collective unconscious that could express itself as either matter or psyche in the time-space continuum (Jung, 1952/1985, p. 97). In his reformulation of the psychoid archetype, Jung imagined it as outside of the time-space continuum, in the realm of a "transcendental psychophysical background" which he called the *unus mundus*, which is

"as much physical as psychic and therefore neither, but rather a third thing" with "all those conditions which determine the form of empirical phenomena" inherent in it (Jung, 1955-1956/1963, p. 538).

Advaita Vedanta, time, and space

In Advaita Vedanta, time and space are attributes of *Isvara,* the apparent creator and its creation, and not of the *Braham*, its nondual substratum. Like *Isvara,* they are a product of *maya*, a mystery, and therefore cannot be described as either real or unreal. Time and space are therefore only apparent attributes of the *Brahman* just as clay pots of different forms can only be seen as apparent attributes of the underlying common substratum of clay (*Vivekacudamani*, verse 251, Madhavananda, 1926/1995, p. 98). The *Brahman* is outside of time and space (*Vivekacudamani*, verse 254, Madhavananda, 1926/1995, p. 99). The relativity of time and space to the level of consciousness has long been recognized in Advaita Vedanta. *Isvara*, the *Brahman* aware of *maya* and therefore of the apparent nature of universe, is also outside of the realm of time and space. When consciousness of the *atman* or its equivalent the *Brahman* appears to be limited to the phenomenal ego, time and space cannot be negated as unreal. However, at the levels of the *Brahman* and *Isvara*, time and space cannot be affirmed as real.

Consciousness, Jung, and Advaita Vedanta

In Advaita Vedanta, the *Brahman* is described as having the properties of *sat* (existence), *cit* (consciousness or self-awareness), and *ananta* (limitlessness which implies nonduality as well as immutability) (*Atma bodha*, verse 36, Nikhilananda,

1946/2005, pp. 149-150). The *Brahman* is just a name for what is ultimately an indescribable underlying reality. The three attributes of existence, awareness, and unlimitedness do not completely describe the *Brahman*. The ultimate nature of the *Brahman* is indescribable (*anirvacaniya*) even though knowable directly as oneself. These three attributes of the *Brahman* can be helpful in realizing oneself as the *Brahman* because one intuitively knows the one's real nature and its identity with that of the *Brahman*. In interpretations or understanding of Eastern thought, the *Brahman* or the ultimate underlying reality is often mistakenly equated with *cit* (consciousness) as in Goswami (1993, p. 49), which is only one of its attributes.

The *Brahman* is the only source of consciousness as well as existence with all manifestations of consciousness and existence dependent on it (*Vivekacudamani*, verse 514, Madhavananda, 1926/1995, p. 191). The immutable nature of the *Brahman* (from its property of *ananta* or limitlessness by all criteria including time) makes all such manifestations of dependent existence and consciousness only apparent realities from the point of view of the *Brahman*. In Advaita Vedanta, there is no limit to the possibilities of expansion of consciousness in an individual (*jiva*). It is possible for an individual's awareness to resolve in the nondual awareness of the *Brahman* and for a direct knowing of oneself as the *Brahman* (*Atma bodha*, verse 49, Nikhilananda, 1946/2005, p. 158) "which is beyond the range of all speech" (*Vivekacudamani*, verse 255, Madhavananda, 1926/1995, pp. 99-100). The *Brahman* is the ultimate substratum of all psyche and matter and beyond all psyche and matter at the same time. The ultimate nature of which is indescribable but directly knowable as oneself in enlightenment.

To Jung, consciousness or the ability to be self-aware is a function of the ego and consciousness or self-awareness is always in the context of a subject-object framework. Neither the psychoid archetype nor the *unus mundus* possesses the property of consciousness or self-awareness, even though both have the potential to affect all manifestations of psyche and matter including the ego as their common underlying psychophysical reality. Their presence can be inferred from the observation of acausal but meaningfully connected (synchronistic events) in the time-space continuum and from insight (based on analogy) from quantum physics findings. "Of course there is little or no hope that that the unitary Being can ever be conceived, since our powers of thought and language permit only antinomian statements" and which "can at most be grasped in hints since in essence it is transcendental," writes Jung (1955-1956/1963, p. 538).

Relevant findings in quantum physics

Werner Heisenberg in 1925 and Erwin Schroedinger in 1926 are credited with the formulation of the basic principles of quantum physics to account for empirical evidence that contradicted classical physics that indicated that electrons which were believed to be particles also exhibited the properties of waves (McFarlane, 2000, p. 3). Niels Bohr's principle of complementarity helped to resolve this confusion with the theory that waves and particles are mutually exclusive but both are needed to for "a complete description of the quantum phenomena" (p. 3). The wave function associated with a quantum such as an electron is a probability distribution of its location in space. An observation of an electron at a particular location in space collapses the continuum of possibilities in the wave to a single value. The laws of quantum physics cannot account for when, where, how, and

what value would be realized "introducing an element of acausality and spontaneity into the theory at a fundamental level" (p. 4). This can lead to the observation of acausal correlations among observed quanta in the time-space continuum.

In formulating the theory of synchronicity, Jung extended the finding of predictable meaningless acausal correlations in the realm of matter in quantum physics to unpredictable acausal correlations across psyche and matter endowing them with the meaning of compensation from the unconscious for the purpose of individuation (Mansfield, 1995, pp. 82-83). Physicist Mansfield elaborates on the uniqueness of meaning in synchronistic events by comparing them to parapsychological phenomena which are "acausal since no energy or information exchange seems responsible for the correlations measured, but they lack the meaning of synchronicity" but they are like physical quantum phenomena in that they are "constant and reproducible" unlike synchronistic events (1995).

The uncertainty in the laws of quantum physics with respect to the observation of a quantum in terms of its location, timing, value, and form has led to the focus on the observer as a possible source of explanation. The observer affects the observed not in the sense that the actual properties of the object being measured but in the sense that "the measurement is the occasion for the determination of the actual properties of the object" and that "there is thus a spontaneity that enters nature in quantum measurement" (McFarlane, 2000, p. 10). Mansfield and Spiegelman (1991) point out that "it is the reflective consciousness, the association of knowing with the ego, which makes the empirical world possible and brings the transcendental into the empirical world of multiplicity" in comparison with physics where "the irreversible measurement process

transforms the potentialities into actualities" (p. 285). Mansfield (1995) further observes that "introducing a particular perspective, a finite center of consciousness, inevitably brings acausality into the transition between potentialities to actualities" (p. 202).

Even though he was of the opinion that "consciousness and unconscious have not clear demarcations, the one beginning where the other leaves off" (Jung as quoted in Pauli, 1994, p. 153), he maintained that the extent of the unconscious that could be made conscious was limited. Quantum physicist David Bohm's (1980) theory of the existence of an ocean of energy as the background of the universe as an implicate order in an explicit order-implicit order theory of reality appears to offer greater possibilities for the extent to which the unconscious can be made conscious than maintained by Jung (McFarlane, 2000, p. 15). According to Bohm (1990),

> the essential feature of this idea was that the whole universe is in some way enfolded in everything and that each thing is enfolded in the whole. From this it follows that in some way, and to some degree everything enfolds or implicates everything, but in such a manner that under typical conditions of ordinary experience, there is a great deal of relative independence of things. The basic proposal is then that this enfoldment relationship is not merely passive or superficial. Rather, it is active and essential to what each thing is. It follows that each thing is internally related to the whole, and therefore, to everything else. The external relationships are then displayed in the unfolded or explicate order in which each thing is seen, as has already indeed been indicated, as relatively separate and extended, and related only externally to other things. The explicate order, which dominates ordinary experience as well as classical (Newtonian) physics, thus appears to stand by itself. But actually, it cannot be understood properly apart from its ground in the primary reality of the implicate order. (p. 196)

The implicate order applies to what is unconscious in psyche and matter (Bohm, 1980, p. 196). And because the explicate order or what is conscious is ultimately not distinguishable from the whole, "consciousness is habitually fixated on the explicit surface manifestations rising up from deeper implicate levels of the psyche," explains

McFarlane (2000, p. 15). However, "it is nevertheless possible to become directly conscious of these implicate orders of reality – orders of reality that Jung assumed forever to be unconscious" (McFarlane, 2000, p. 15). In addition,

> such a consciousness will have the capacity for direct awareness of contents that previously would be considered transcendent, unconscious, and only indirectly knowable by inference from more explicit and concrete manifestations. The implication is that we cannot maintain a rigid or ultimate distinction between the transcendent and empirical, between the archetypes and their manifestations, or between the implicit order and the explicit order. (p. 15)

According to McFarlane (2000, pp.15-19), the implicate-order explicit-order theory of Bohm has a number of important implications. First, it implies an essential unity of implicate and explicate levels of both psyche and matter. Second, it implies an essential unity between matter and psyche at the implicate level as well as the explicate level of reality. And third,

> if consciousness becomes sufficiently subtle to see the implicate aspects of both psychic and physical phenomena, their unity in a common source can be directly experienced and not merely inferred indirectly from diverse concrete particulars. This implies the necessity for an expanded epistemology for physics, psychology, and knowledge in general that takes us well beyond the forms of knowing that are limited to only the most explicit orders of reality. (McFarlane, 2000, pp. 16-17)

Implications of recent quantum physics findings for Jungian psychology and Advaita Vedanta

For Jungian psychology, Bohm's theory that awareness has a tendency to habituate to more explicate orders of reality provides another basis for understanding Jung's as well as Kant's habituation to the subject-object context of the phenomenal ego and of their consequent shared difficulty in allowing for the possibility of knowing implicate orders of reality more directly, and not only indirectly through the images they

produced at the explicate level. This opens up the possibility of expanding the goals of personal growth beyond individuation, a topic that will be explored in the final chapter.

Bohm's theory offers scientific support for the greater possibilities of consciousness claimed by Advaita Vedanta. That the whole is enfolded in every part and inseparable from it offers the possibility of every part having the necessary means to know the whole directly or indirectly, a possibility that offers one way of understanding and resolving the debate in Advaita Vedanta on whether the psyche has the knowledge to realize itself as the *Brahman* on the inside or it has to depend on a mediate knowledge on the outside for that purpose. This topic will be taken up for detailed discussion in chapter 4. The notion that the whole is enfolded in every part is very much in line with the Advaita Vedanta notion that no part of the nondual *Brahman* is apart from any of its apparent manifestations. The fundamental difficulty in the way of self-realization is the inherent conundrum created by the fusion of the reflection of the consciousness aspect of the *atman* and the ego, a product of the body, mind, senses of the individual which leads to the creation of the apparently independently conscious phenomenal ego which then identifies with the body, mind, and senses to create the sense of a limited individual. The possibility of explication of the implicit order in the psyche without limit offers the possibility of making such identifications not only conscious but also the possibility of overcoming them on the way to the realization of oneself as the *Brahman*.

In Bohm's theory, there is essential unity or nonduality between implicate and explicate levels within psyche as well as matter. And in addition to the essential unity or nonduality between psyche and matter at the transcendental or implicate level of reality, there is also essential unity or nonduality between psyche and matter also at the empirical

or explicate level of reality. All this is very much in line with the essential teachings of Advaita Vedanta. The possibility of explication of the implicit order in the psyche as well in matter without any limit on the extent of consciousness or explication offers the possibility of going through the inside through the psyche or through the outside through matter to arrive at the same place, to be able to indirectly and even directly understand the underlying nondual reality beyond all psyche and matter. This is perhaps what Jung (1970) intuited when he wrote:

> Microphysics is feeling its way into the unknown side of matter, just as complex psychology is pushing forward into the unknown side of the psyche. Both lines of investigation have yielded findings which can be conceived only by means of antinomies, and both have developed concepts which display remarkable analogies. If this trend should become more pronounced in the future, the hypothesis of the unity of their subject-matters would gain in probability. (p. 8)

Advaita Vedanta points to the possibility of going through the outside through matter or through the inside through the psyche towards the enlightenment states of *savikalpa samadhi* and *nirvikalpa samadhi* through direct and indirect means in each realm (*Drk drsya viveka*, verse 23-29, Tejomayananda, 1994, pp. 75-90) which is consistent with the possibilities implied by Bohm's theory.

A scientific view that Advaita Vedanta resolves all paradoxes in quantum physics

Goswami (1993), a quantum physicist, has offered a theory that many paradoxes that have remained unresolved in modern quantum physics can be resolved by the assumption of self-aware consciousness as the underlying reality. The technical details of how this assumption resolves all the paradoxes in modern quantum physics is beyond the scope of this dissertation and can be found in his book *The Self-Aware Universe*. This work can be cited as evidence for science intuiting the ultimate reality in the face of

limitations of its epistemology or science finding psyche in the depth of matter. It is not an empirical fact that can be observed by the ego in a subject-object universe. It is a theoretical imagination on the part of the psyche that is in line with Advaita Vedanta. Advaita Vedanta goes further in stating that this truth about the underlying reality of one's nature can be personally grasped in the resolution of the very limited personhood that gives rise to the subject of a phenomenal ego in a subject-object world of empirical science.

Goswami (1993) describes Advaita Vedanta erroneously as a philosophy of monic idealism. That it is a monistic philosophy is not in doubt. However, it is not an idealistic philosophy. Idealism implies that the reality ultimately is psyche in the resolution of the debate on whether psyche or matter is the ultimate basis of reality. In this, he appears to share a common misunderstanding of the *Brahman* as defined by the property of consciousness (*cit*) alone. Self-aware consciousness (cit), like nondependent existence (*sat*) and *ananta* (lack of limitation), is an attribute that characterizes the *Brahman* but does not define its nature in its entirety. The *Brahman* is ultimately beyond all description even though it is personally knowable as oneself with all of defining attributes and more. However, this subtle misunderstanding does not appear to affect the conclusions of his book, because the *Brahman* is indistinguishable from consciousness (*cit*).

Because equating the *Brahman* with *cit* (pure consciousness or self-awareness) is quite common in understanding the *Brahman*, this section concludes with a passage from the *Mandukya Upanishad* that it is a mistake. The *Brahman* is ultimately beyond all description (*anivacaniya*).

> They consider the Fourth to be that which is not conscious of the internal world, nor conscious of the external world, nor conscious of both the worlds, nor a mass

of consciousness, nor conscious, nor unconscious, which is unseen, beyond empirical dealings, beyond the grasp (of the organs of action), uninferable, unthinkable, indescribable; whose valid proof consists of the single belief in the Self; in which all phenomena cease; and which is unchanging, auspicious, and non-dual. That is the Self, and that is to be known. (Gambhirananda, 1957/1989b, p. 200)

Chapter 4

The Complementary Role of Jungian Psychology in Advaita Vedanta

In the previous chapter, the Advaita Vedanta perspective was used in a complementary manner to help understand the conceptual difficulties that Jung had in the way of accepting higher states of consciousness beyond the empirical ego, which he identified with the consciousness function in the human psyche. In this chapter, the Jungian perspective is used in a complementary manner to help understand the differences in opinion among Advaita Vedanta schools on the possibility of enlightenment through intrapsychic means alone, which some believe is not possible. In addition, the complementary role that Jungian psychology and Advaita Vedanta can play in a more comprehensive model of the psyche is explored throughout this chapter.

The chapter is organized in five sections. In Section 1, Wilbur's four-quadrant integral model is used as a conceptual framework to assess the strengths, weaknesses, and potential complementarities in Jungian and Advaita Vedanta models. In Section 2, the superior aspects of Jung's understanding of the structure of the psyche, his understanding of relationships and communications among its many levels and his theory of archetypes, is discussed. In Section 3, the differences of opinion among Advaita Vedanta schools on the ability of an individual to obtain the necessary mediate knowledge for enlightenment through intrapsychic means alone is presented and explored. In Section 4, the Jungian theory of archetypes is brought in to understand and reconcile the differences of opinion among Advaita Vedanta schools and establish the possibility of obtaining the necessary mediate knowledge for enlightenment through intrapsychic means alone. In Section 5, some dream material is presented and explored as possible evidence of mediate

knowledge for enlightenment that is on par with the core teachings in Advaita Vedanta. And in Section 6, the complementary role that the Jungian model can play in helping those on the Advaita Vedanta path with acquiring the basic psychological and spiritual qualifications for enlightenment is discussed.

Wlibur's Four-Quadrant Integral Model

Ken Wilbur's four-quadrant integral model offers a comprehensive framework for exploring possibilities for bringing the Jungian and Advaita Vedanta models together to formulate a more complete model of the psyche that offers an individual greater potential for psychic development. In this section, following a brief presentation of Wilbur's four-quadrant integral model and an analysis of how each of the two models appears to fit into Wilbur's comprehensive framework, a preliminary assessment of the possible complementarities between the two models is undertaken.

In Wilbur's four-quadrant model, the upper left quadrant maps the subjective states of the personal psyche. These states range from simple states of cognition at one end to nondual states of consciousness at the other. Labeling the quadrant as interior, individual, and intentional, Wilbur (2000) describes it as including "the entire spectrum of consciousness as it appears in any individual, from bodily sensations to mental ideas to soul and spirit" (pp. 62-63). The entire range of states along this continuum is regarded as possible achievements for individual consciousness, from available empirical evidence across cultures and time periods (Wilbur, 2000, p. 8). It is assumed that the boundary between the conscious and the unconscious is a fluid one which can be shifted all the way to nondual states of consciousness. The language of this quadrant is in the form of 'I'.

The lower-left quadrant, (characterized as interior, collective, and cultural) maps a range of subjective states of the psyche that are shared by members of a group such as "values, meanings, world views, and ethics that are shared by any groups of individuals" classified under broad categories such as "magic, mythic, and rational," shared subjective states that help the members of a group "get along together" (Wilbur, 2000, p. 63). The language of this quadrant is in the form of "we" and "I-thou". The lower-left quadrant can be regarded as a subset of personal subjective states of the psyche that are shared by the group as to help to cohere it as a culture.

The upper-right quadrant "represents the *objective or exterior correlates* of those interior states of consciousness" mapped in the upper-left quadrant (Wilbur, 2000, p. 63). Characterized as exterior, individual, and behavioral, its language in the form of the third person or "it," this quadrant maps the structures and processes of the physical organism of the individual from individual atoms to the neo-cortex of the brain that physically anchor the subjective states of the individual mapped in the upper-left quadrant. "Researchers that study this quadrant focus on brain mechanisms, neurotransmitters, and organic computations that support consciousness" writes Wilbur (2000, p. 63). The lower-right quadrant (characterized as exterior, collective, and social) represents the exterior material world forms (oceans, planets, and galaxies) and institutional forms (families, tribes, nations, geopolitical formations; production systems from foraging to post-industrial or informational) that anchor and complement the cultural components mapped in the lower-left quadrant. "The language of this quadrant, like that of the objective individual" in the upper-right quadrant, writes Wilbur (2000), is "it-language" (p. 64).

Wilbur's view is that perennial philosophies such as Vedanta have done a better job of understanding and mapping the higher states of consciousness on the continuum of possibilities in the upper-left quadrant, states such as nondual states claimed as within reach of individual achievement by Advaita Vedanta (Wilbur, 2000, p. 8, pp. 16-17, p. 20). On the other hand, states of consciousness along the lower end of the continuum in the upper-left quadrant such as cognitive states are better understood and mapped by modern Western psychologists (Wilbur, 2000, pp. 22-27). When the Jungian model is examined along this continuum, it can be seen that its understanding and mapping of the psyche extend much more into the higher reaches of this continuum than many other psychological models that have been developed since, with the exception of models in transpersonal psychology, a discipline that has drawn much inspiration from Jung. Franklin Merrell-Wolff (1994), in his book *Experience and Philosophy: a Personal Record of Transformation and a Discussion of Transcendental Consciousness,* states that he "would rate Dr. Jung, by far, as the greatest Western psychologist" with regard to his mapping of the higher reaches of the psyche even though he was limited by the methodology of objective empirical research and his writings appeared to "lack the perspective of direct mystical realization. (p. 292)

Before an analysis of how the Jungian perspective might complement the Advaita Vedanta model, especially with respect to the debate in Advaita Vedanta over whether enlightenment is possible through intrapsychic means alone, one basic difference between Wilbur's four-quadrant model and the Jungian and Advaita Vedanta models is examined briefly. Essentially, in the nondual states in Advaita Vedanta, and in the later models of the psyche conceptualized by Jung where the psyche and matter were

hypothesized to emerge from a common substratum, all of the quadrants in Wilbur's model can be seen to collapse loosely into one state in the left-upper quadrant. It is not a critique of Wilbur's model by any means, for Wilbur's objective is to differentiate the substrata of the psyche as much as possible to make explicit all aspects that bear on it and to highlight the need not to emphasize one over another, for the purpose of a complete pursuit of knowledge of what it is to be fully human in "the big three" domains of human experience of arts, morals, and science (Wilbur, 2000, p. 73).

The Superior Aspects of Jung's Understanding of the Psyche

In chapter 3, it was pointed out that the difficulty Jung had in imagining consciousness beyond the level of the empirical ego hampered Jung from taking more seriously states such as nondual consciousness at the higher end of the continuum in the upper-left quadrant of Wilbur's integral model. And it was argued that this difficulty, which appears to be based primarily on the strong influence Kantian philosophy had on Jung's thinking, prevented Jung from understanding to a greater depth the nature and locus of consciousness in the human psyche. And this resulted in Jung assigning to the unconscious those states that were deemed conscious by not just the East but also by those Wilbur (2000, p. 8) calls perennial philosophers from the East as well as the West. On the other hand, Jung appears to have understood not only the overall structure of the psyche much better than other modern psychologists of the West but his understanding of some aspects of the psyche was superior to that of the perennial philosophers of the East as well as the West: the relationships between the lower and higher reaches of the psyche, between the conscious and the unconscious, between the ego and the self, between the

ego and the archetypes, and among the archetypes. Ajaya (1983, p. 145) describes as "a great and rare achievement" Jung's ability to "correlate dream consciousness and waking consciousness" (p. 145) and the deeper understanding of the psyche that it produced.

Jung's superior understanding of the psyche is evident not only in his understanding of the structure of the psyche but also of its processes, the communications among the different parts of the psyche including the communications between the ego and the self, as archetypally given. According to Ajaya (1983), Jung arrived at his contribution, "an astounding feat," by "reestablishing the Platonic ideas by moving them inward," using "Kant's conclusions as the very foundation for reestablishing in a new form the idealistic position that Kant's thesis seemed to negate," by taking "ideal forms that had been always regarded as external" and asserting "that they were part of the very structure of the psyche" (p. 33). And it is this superior understanding on Jung's part of the relationships and the communications among components and levels of the psyche as given archetypal dispositions that will be used in the next section to help reconcile the debate among different schools of Advaita Vedanta as to whether self-realization can be achieved through intrapsychic means alone.

This paragraph summarizes and clarifies the key aspects of Jung's thinking used in the following discussion to comment on the debate among Advaita Vedanta schools on the possibility of enlightenment through intrapsychic means alone: Jung understood the entire psyche including the ego as structured from archetypal dispositions in the collective unconscious. The inherent archetypal dispositions, universal ways of organizing one's experience of oneself and the world, were also understood to have inherent to them the capacities to offer compensatory and complementary perspectives

and knowledge to the rest of the psyche, as reflected in the understanding of the communications between the ego and the self, the ego and the archetypes, the conscious and the unconscious, and so on. And, inherent to the structural understanding of the psyche as based on archetypes is the understanding that all psychic processes, all communication processes, all epistemological means, on each level and between levels of the psyche, are also archetypally given even though each of them might evolve over time.

Compensation, karma, and Jung

Jung has drawn parallels between his theory of archetypes and the theory of karma in Hindu and Buddhist thought (Coward, 1985, pp. 95-107) which Advaita Vedanta also subscribes to. Briefly, *karma* in Eastern thought is understood as a product of an extremely complex cause and effect process stemming from the earlier actions of individuals in their current and prior lives (Waite, 2007, pp. 52-57). In any life, *karma* is understood to shape an individual's inner and outer conditions as well as all outcomes. In Advaita Vedanta, there is the understanding that the polarities of life occur in endless manner across multiple lives in an individual (*jiva*) who has not transcended them through enlightenment. This interplay of opposites in the psyche of the unenlightened individual can be considered as an overall compensatory mechanism motivating the individual to seek enlightenment and the freedom it offers from the suffering caused by the endless alternating of positive and negative experiences. There is also an understanding of *karma* as rewards and punishments. This understanding offers the possibility of *karma* playing a compensatory role in an individual psyche from the individual learning through his actions and their consequences. However, the theories of

karma in particular and Advaita Vedanta in general do not appear to have to the same degree the understanding of intrapsychic processes of compensation through which complementary perspectives and knowledge are shared among different levels of the psyche.

In the Jungian model, the collective unconscious is conceptualized as having multiple layers. While the deeper layers of the collective unconscious are understood as common to all of mankind, the more superficial and perhaps more immediate layers of the collective unconscious are considered to be more specific to a culture, tribe, race, ethnicity, ancestry, nation, and so on (Jacobi, 1973, p. 34). This layered understanding of the structure of the collective unconscious allows for the possibility that an individual from one culture might have a different inheritance than an individual from another culture, for example in terms of possibilities for spiritual achievement. Jung offered this as one reason for his recommendation against Westerners adopting Eastern spiritual methods. Therefore, it could be stated that individuals born in certain cultures are more likely to have greater compensatory access to certain spiritual endowments on the inside as well as the outside from the collective conscious. However, from the point of view of Advaita Vedanta, a soul has many lives which can span many cultures, and it can accumulate endowments from other cultures that can be carried over into next life. This allows for a greater possibility for compensatory knowledge for higher spiritual achievement in an individual psyche than imagined by Jung. It also could offer one explanation for why some individuals find more kinship for spiritual practices from certain cultures other than their own.

Dreams, Vedanta, and Jung

The superiority and therefore the complementary understanding that Jung brings to the structure of the psyche with respect to the possibility of communication between the conscious and the unconscious, between the archetypes and the ego, between the self and the ego in particular, can be seen specifically in the differences in the understanding of dreams in the two perspectives. In Jungian psychology, dreams are also understood to be a channel for compensatory perspectives from the unconscious to the conscious, which in some instances is from the self to the ego. Some theologians who are also Jungians have gone as far as to claim that some dreams if not all of them are God's messages to man (Sanford, 1989) even the word God is seldom used in a metaphysical sense. In Eastern thought, even though some in Advaita Vedanta and Jainism have described dreams as God or as from God (Layek, 1990, pp. 1, 142), there is no systematic explanation as to how this might come about. The analysis of dreams in Advaita Vedanta has been by and large for the purpose of establishing the invariant nature of the witness present in waking, dreaming, and dreamless or deep sleep states of consciousness, for the purpose of establishing the dream state as illusory, for the purpose of establishing both waking and dreaming states as equally illusory, or for the purpose of using the dream state as an analogy to describe the nature of the waking state in relation to the absolute, all towards the ultimate purpose of deconstructing and shifting an individual's awareness to the absolute (Layek, 1990, pp. 16-22). There is, however, one aspect in which some schools of Eastern thought appear to assign a compensatory role to dreams: prediction of the future (Layek, 1990, p. 95).

It is instructive to review quickly the different theories of dreams in Eastern thought as support for the basic hypothesis that Eastern thought in general lacks an understanding of the possibility of dreams being an intrapsychic conduit for compensatory perspective and knowledge from the unconscious to the conscious. In Eastern thought, dreams are held variously as impressions from past experiences (Layek, 1990, p. 50), as illusory (Layek, 1990, pp. 17, 19, 52, 141; Safaya, 1975, pp. 332-333), as *maya* (Layek, 1990, p. 48), as unreal (Layek, 1990, p. 48), as real or unreal as the waking state (Layek, 1990, pp. 56-57), as neither valid nor illusory (Layek, 1990, p. 81), as created by the *jiva* or individual (Layek, 1990, p. 42), as not created by the jiva but by the *Paramapurusua* or God (Layek, 1990, p. 50); as instructive (Layek, 1990, p. 50), as symbolic (Layek, 1990, p. 50), as predictive of future success or failure (Layek, 1990, p. 43), as impressions of the subconscious on the conscious where the subconscious is understood as formed from impressions of current and past life experiences (Layek, 1990, p. 87; Safaya, 1975, p. 334), as recollections of already perceived objects (Safaya, 1975, p. 332), as produced by sense organs (Safaya, 1975, p. 330), as not produced by sense organs (Safaya, 1975, p. 331), as stimulated by disorders of the body (Safaya, 1975, p. 331), and as products of *karma* which is at times prophetic, at times rewarding, and at times punishing (Safaya,1975, p. 334).

In addition, Eastern thought classifies dreams as organically based from the stimulation of the body from the inside or the outside, based on subconscious impressions, as prophetic, as karmic or *samsaric*, telepathic, a dream within dream, pathological or morbid (Safaya, 1975, p. 334); and as based on previous experience, observations from the waking state, constant thinking, hearing, moral and immoral acts,

and location (Layek, 1975, p. 86); as dreams that have one to one correspondence with external reality, as those arising from associations to other dreams contents, as those that have to do with thoughts in the waking state, as containing knowledge opposed to reality, and as those that cannot be expressed through language (Layek, 1975, pp. 87-88).

There are some indications in the brief review above of the Eastern views of dreams that there is some nascent understanding that dreams might play a role in communicating compensatory knowledge and complementary perspectives from the self to the ego. However, the understanding nowhere reaches the sophistication of the understanding Jungian thought brings to the subject. Again, this could be due to the focus on Eastern thought on understanding and communicating the nature of absolute consciousness underlying all states of consciousness in the psyche. It could also be due to less of a need in the Eastern psyche to make the polarities in the unconscious conscious than in the West, a phenomenon which Jung himself pointed to when he stated that the East had less of a shadow than the West (Glen Slater, in a private conversation, March 2006). However, the lack of adequate understanding of intrapsychic possibilities for communication between the levels of the psyche as revealed through the relative understanding of the dream material might be behind the controversy among various schools of Advaita Vedanta on the possibility of enlightenment through intrapsychic means alone.

The Differences of Opinion among Advaita Vedanta Schools on the Possibility of Obtaining the Necessary Mediate Knowledge for Enlightenment Solely through Intrapsychic Means

Self-realization or enlightenment that one is verily the *Brahman* is considered to be immediate (direct) knowledge. All knowledge that point in the direction of the ultimate reality of oneself as the *Brahman* that can potentially lead to enlightenment is considered to be mediate (indirect) knowledge (Satprakashananda, 1965/1974, p. 183). The Vedas are considered to be a source of valid mediate knowledge and in some ultra-orthodox Vedic schools considered to be the only source of mediate knowledge that can lead to enlightenment. The phrasing "knowledge that can potentially lead to enlightenment" is used here because there is no guarantee that the exposure to a source of such mediate knowledge can actually lead to enlightenment for an individual. It is because the process by which enlightenment takes place in an individual and the conditions that an individual has to meet structurally in his psyche for enlightenment to take place are considered to be ultimately unexplainable in their entirety, at least at the level of phenomenal reality. To understand the process of enlightenment in its entirety, we need to also understand in its entirety how the *avidya* (ignorance) that is in the way of self-realization as the *Brahman* came into being. And that is not possible, according to Sankara (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, p. 578).

Not all Vedic schools (schools that acknowledge the authority of the Vedas) believe in enlightenment or self-realization of oneself as the nondual *Brahman* that has self-existence, self-consciousness, and infinitude as its primary qualities (Satprakashananda, 1965/1974, p. 335). And not all schools that believe in the possibility

of enlightenment necessarily accept the Vedas as their authority (Hiriyanna, 1995, pp. 70-83). There are also several so-called mystical schools built around enlightened individuals in India that do not believe that the Vedas are either necessary or a valid means for enlightenment (Johnsen, 1994). Further, in the East, there are also non-Vedic schools such as Buddhist schools that believe in enlightenment even though their definitions of enlightenment vary (Hiriyanna, 1995, pp. 70-83). As pointed out in chapter 2, such variations in the descriptions of enlightenment among schools that subscribe to the nondual theory can be explained as understandable from the Advaita Vedanta perspective given the impossibility of describing the ultimate reality completely from the relative standpoint of the phenomenal world.

All schools that believe in the possibility of enlightenment, regardless of their definition of enlightenment, whether they are Vedic or otherwise, and whether they believe in the necessity of mediate knowledge from outside of the individual for enlightenment to take place, share a basic assumption that there is within the individual psyche capacities, structures, and mechanisms that can bring about the necessary shifts or resolutions in levels of consciousness for enlightenment to occur. In addition to whatever theoretical rationale they might offer, that many individuals have become enlightened or achieved higher states of consciousness (as documented in chapter three) is taken as evidence of such capacity within the individual (Sharma, 1993, pp. 85-100). The aspect of the debate among schools that believe in enlightenment that is of interest here is whether it is held that that some necessary mediate knowledge has to come from outside of the individual for it to occur. We focus on that debate among Advaita Vedanta schools below. Schools of Advaita Vedanta differ on whether an individual is capable of

generating the necessary mediate knowledge that can lead to enlightenment by intrapsychic means alone. Some schools of Advaita Vedanta maintain that it is not possible and that an external source of mediate knowledge such as the Vedas is necessary for the achievement of enlightenment (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, p. 435). Other schools of Advaita Vedanta maintain that it is possible for an individual to arrive at the necessary mediate knowledge that can lead to enlightenment through intrapsychic means alone (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, pp. 513-514).

Those who argue that it is not possible to arrive at the necessary mediate knowledge through intrapsychic means alone appear to fall into different categories along the lines of the reasoning they offer to support their position. The orthodox schools hold that the Vedas are revelations from God to man that offer the necessary mediate knowledge with the potential to lead an individual to enlightenment. Their claim that a purely intrapsychic route to the necessary mediate knowledge for enlightenment is impossible is at times based on a sophisticated epistemological argument that fixes as the vantage point the level of consciousness at the level of everyday empirical reality of subjects and objects. The epistemological possibilities for higher consciousness are then explored from this empirical point of view to arrive at the conclusion that it is impossible for an individual to become enlightened through intrapsychic means alone in that the *Brahman* cannot be apprehended as an object in a subject-object framework. Therefore, it is held that some necessary mediate knowledge (such as the Vedas) has to come from outside of the individual for enlightenment to take place. The classic Advaita Vedanta treatise on epistemology from the 17th century by Adhvarindra *Vedanta Paribhasa* (Satprakashananda 1965/1974; Madhavananda, 1942/2000) only validly establishes that

enlightenment cannot be had as an object of consciousness when the level of consciousness is fixed at the level of empirical reality and that the verbal testimony in the Vedas are a valid means for enlightenment. However, it is cited inappropriately by some orthodox schools such as my teacher Swami Dayananda's Arsha Vidya Gurukulum to rule out a purely intrapsychic route for enlightenment through self-reflection or by other means because it says that the *Brahman* cannot be comprehended as an object in a subject-object framework. Such a position begs the very important question of how the first man came to acquire the necessary mediate knowledge from the outside and the answer that it is revelation from God to man initially is unsatisfactory.

A comparison of this epistemological argument with Jung's epistemology is worth noting at this point. Jung, in attributing consciousness solely to the empirical ego, assumed that the empirical reality of subjects and objects as the only reality we would ever know. Mediate knowledge of the self was possible at this level, but the self itself would remain ever unknown, ever unconscious. From the Advaita Vedanta epistemological point of view discussed above, as used by some orthodox schools, such mediate knowledge of the self could not lead to enlightenment either as it would also be an object of consciousness. The necessary mediate knowledge had to come from the outside of the individual. However, there is one important difference between this Advaita Vedanta position and that of Jung's. That is, even this Advaita Vedanta position allows for the possibility of enlightenment or direct knowledge of the self from mediate knowledge such as the Vedas from the outside. Jung on the other hand does not appear to allow for this possibility on what appears to be mostly philosophical grounds. However, some might argue that Jung leaves the door open on this possibility occasionally as when

he interprets his dream of a yogi dreaming of Jung in meditation on whose awakening Jung would be no more as possible evidence for *maya*.

Of the Advaita Vedanta schools, however, there are some that uphold the possibility of enlightenment through intrapsychic means alone (Sharma, 1993, 85-100; Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, p. 518). The individual is considered as having the inherent capacity to arrive at self-realization directly through self-reflection alone and, if needed, the capacity through self-reflection alone to generate the mediate knowledge necessary for self-realization. The process of self-reflection focuses on the nature of the 'I' that is typically taken for granted as the basis of one's identity and, through differentiating, separating, and de-identifying the 'I' from all that it is identified with, eventually arrives at a nondual position where all that has been de-identified with is also owned as neither existent nor nonexistent in the larger 'I'. The basic difference between this position and Jung's position is worth noting at this juncture. In Jung's process of individuation, it is the empirical ego that is increasingly differentiated from all other contents of the psyche. In Advaita Vedanta, in the process towards enlightenment, even the empirical ego is differentiated and de-identified with from an absolute 'I' and then owned as neither existent nor nonexistent part of it.

Reconciliation of the Differences of Opinion among Advaita Vedanta Schools on the Possibility of Enlightenment through Solely Intrapsychic Means from the Jungian Perspective

In chapter 3, a case was made from the perspective of Advaita Vedanta that Jung's difficulty with Eastern claims of higher states of consciousness and the primary philosophical assumption at the core of his position based on Kantian philosophy were understandable given the inherent tendencies in the psyche that make self-realization

difficult. In this chapter, the focus is on answering the question as to whether Jung's understanding of the structure of the psyche offers (a) the possibility of enlightenment through purely intrapsychic means alone (directly through self-reflection or indirectly through mediate knowledge obtained through self-reflection or by other means) and (b) a way to reconcile the differences of opinion among Advaita Vedanta schools as to the possibility of enlightenment through intrapsychic means alone. The objective of the following analysis is to suggest that the Jungian understanding of the structure of the psyche as a matrix of archetypal possibilities does offer such possibilities. This requires that the Jungian model be modified to a significant degree to allow for centers of consciousness in the unconscious of the individual and for the possibility of higher states of consciousness beyond the empirical ego. The theoretical and empirical analyses presented in chapter 3 are assumed to provide one basis of justification for making such modifications to the Jungian model. The other basis of justification, an empirical one, will be developed later on in this chapter with the presentation and analysis of evidence of mediate knowledge in the form of dreams with the potential to lead an individual to enlightenment, evidence of mediate knowledge in dreams that is on par with the core knowledge found in the Vedas.

Intrapsychic possibilities for enlightenment through archetypal structures in the psyche

The modified framework of Jungian psychology offers a possibility for an understanding of how mediate as well as immediate knowledge of the nondual self can be arrived at by an individual intrapsychically. The archetypes in the collective psyche in the Jungian model, understood as universal structures of experience driving individual

experience, can be theorized as constituting or contributing to different levels of awareness in the psyche, the ego, the self, and so on, as in the five-sheath model of the individual psyche in Advaita Vedanta. Immediate knowledge of the nondual self can be understood as arising from shifts or resolutions in the levels of awareness in the psyche. The mechanisms for such shifts or resolutions involved in nondual experience and other higher states of consciousness can be conceptualized as built into the overall archetypal template of the psyche itself. Mediate knowledge of the nondual self arising intrapsychically in an individual can be understood as arising from the interactions between the archetypes and the ego, and in the interactions between the self, the archetypes of archetypes, and the ego, as compensations in the psyche from the universal psychic impulse towards wholeness, towards individuation as well as enlightenment. The immediate knowledge of the nondual self can be understood as resulting from the resolution the ego consciousness or expansion of it towards universal nondual consciousness. Thus, the mediate knowledge that can lead to the resolution of all relative levels of consciousness and to the absolute nondual consciousness can be understood as given or generated archetypically in the structure of the individual psyche and can be conceived as available in the intrapsychic communications between the ego and the self. Immediate as opposed to mediate knowledge of the self through self-reflection and by other means can also be understood as possible from archetypal endowments for such possibilities in the psyche.

In Jungian psychology, an axis of communication between the superordinate self and the ego called the ego-self axis has been theorized on the basis of empirical evidence of such communications through phenomena such as dreams. With the superordinate

status as regulator of all aspects of the psyche, the self is theorized to orchestrate all psychic processes, including all communications between the conscious and the unconscious, and between the ego and the archetypes. The evidence of such intrapsychic communications can be seen in dreams or visions (Edinger, 1972). At times, it could also be experienced as taking place between the individual and what appears to be an entity on the outside as in the case of Jung and Philemon or between an individual and a God in religious or mystical experience (Jung, 1961/1989, p. 183). This communication could also be understood to take place through synchronistic events as in the instance of Freud and Jung and the spontaneously splintering knife where the splintering knife was taken as compensation for Freud's conscious attitude (Jung, 1961/1989, p. 155).

The archetypal structures are considered to be unconscious in Jungian psychology. The modification suggested in this dissertation endows at least the self, the archetype of archetypes, with the property of consciousness. Assuming other archetypes as fields of consciousness and not as unconscious structures leads to some interesting possibilities. Autonomous possession of the ego by an archetype discussed in Jungian psychology (Edinger, 1972) can be viewed as a shift to the level of consciousness associated with the archetype. And inflation from archetypal possession in psychosis or mystical experience can be understood as the individual not having achieved enough discrimination in his self-understanding. According the Advaita Vedanta, in the realization of oneself as the *Brahman*, one understands oneself as neither a knower nor a doer, and the entire creation is one of appearance only. Inflation is therefore not possible in enlightenment. According to Sankara, enlightenment involves a level of awareness that goes beyond all images of God (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, p. 650).

As we saw earlier, such insights into the structure and function of the psyche, of the possibilities of communication between the conscious and unconscious, between the self and ego, between the inside and the outside, appears to be better developed in modern Western psychology, especially in Jungian psychology, than in the understanding of the psyche in ancient Eastern thought such as Advaita Vedanta. Next, this apparent greater understanding of the relationships between the lower and higher reaches of the psyche offered by Jungian psychology through its archetypal theory is used to resolve the debate among the different schools of Advaita Vedanta as to the locus of the requisite knowledge for enlightenment.

Reconciliation of differences of opinion among Advaita Vedanta schools

From the perspective of Jungian psychology, the understanding in traditional Advaita Vedanta schools that the mediate knowledge in the Vedas are from direct communications from God to man can be understood as from communications along the intrapsychic ego-self axis. They could have come from intrapsychic phenomena such as dreams involving images of God representing images of the self from phenomena such as visions where dream-like figures appear to be on the outside and communicating with the individual with or without synchronistic phenomena involving actual external objects at the same time. Here, the position of the traditional schools can be understood as based on an inadequate understanding of the structure of the psyche, especially of the intrapsychic communication possibilities along the ego-self axis.

The epistemological argument in Advaita Vedanta that holds as a vantage point the level of the empirical ego to establish its epistemological limits and to argue that the

mediate knowledge for self-realization has to come from the outside can be understood as from outside of the level of the empirical ego as opposed to from outside of the individual. The statement that the mediate knowledge for self-realization has to come from outside of the individual can be understood again as stemming from an inadequate understanding of the structure of the psyche, especially of the intrapsychic communication possibilities along the ego-self axis.

Advaita Vedanta schools, other Vedic as well as non-Vedic schools, and mystical schools that hold that the psyche has the inherent capacity to arrive at mediate as well as immediate knowledge for self-realization can be regarded from the Jungian point of view as in better grasp of its archetypal potential in the psyche for such purely intrapsychic possibilities even though their understanding of the mechanisms might be relatively unsophisticated when compared with Jungian psychology. Jungian psychology can offer those on the path of enlightenment in the West as well the East a valuable complementary perspective for understanding and using inner experience such as dreams as sources of mediate knowledge for not only the ultimate step of enlightenment but also in the steps along the way for meeting the qualifications for enlightenment, a subject that will be taken up later on in this chapter.

There is, within the Advaita Vedanta framework itself, a possibility for reconciling the differences of opinion on the locus of knowledge for enlightenment. In Advaita Vedanta, another topic in which there are differences of opinion is whether individuals have free will (Waite, 2007, pp. 67-84). If the position that there is no free will for the individual is assumed as valid, then all acts of apparent knowing and doing on the part of the individual have to be attributed to Isvara, the self that is the totality of not

just all things on the inside but also the totality of all things on the inside as well as the outside of the individual. In such a framework, the necessary compensation for enlightenment can be regarded as coming from the outside even if it came from the outside and vice versa making the inside-versus-outside-of-the-individual controversy unnecessary but understandable when the analysis is done at the level of the individual.

Evidence of Mediate Knowledge for Enlightenment in Dreams

In the previous section, using the framework of Jungian psychology and the concepts of archetypes and ego-self and other ego-archetype communications, with the necessary modifications to the Jungian model to allow for centers of consciousness in the psyche other than the ego, a theoretical rationale was developed to account for intrapsychic possibilities for acquiring mediate as well as immediate knowledge for enlightenment. In the literature on empirically based Jungian psychology, there is ample evidence of ego-self and other ego-archetype communications, especially in dream material in the context of individuation (Edinger, 1972). The objective of this section is to explore available empirical evidence in dream material in Jungian psychology and other sources (including personal material) of ego-self and other ego-archetype communications that could be characterized as containing mediate knowledge associated with enlightenment in Eastern thought such as the Vedas. There is no suggestion here that such intrapsychic communications cannot take place through means other than dreams. The focus on the analysis of dream contents for this purpose is driven by their availability on the one hand and the relative lack of understanding of dreams and their functions in Eastern thought as discussed earlier in this chapter. In this section, the hypothesis is

pursued that the dreams provide a universal conduit of knowledge from the self to the ego for the purpose of not only individuation in the Jungian model but also for the purpose of enlightenment in the Advaita Vedanta model. I begin with the presentation and analysis of a personal dream.

I was in the boarding school I attended from the age of 11 to 18. It was early in the morning. I was late for the early-morning drill of the National Cadet Corps (NCC), a voluntary paramilitary student organization sponsored by the armed forces, like the ROTC on American college campuses. I was polishing my shoes and the buckle on my belt with perfectionism that knew little pleasure. I was aware I was late and finally, I gave up the very idea of attending the drill. At that very moment, a very old woman with striking silver hair, whose race was difficult to categorize, appeared before me, took me by the hand, and led me to the balcony of the dormitory that was my home at the boarding school. She then pointed me in the direction of the view that was ahead of us: the galaxies. The balcony was like the side of a space ship and the view was one of unbounded space with numerous galaxies ahead.

This dream I had when I was going through my mid-life crisis, in my mid-thirties. I knew that I was done with a career teaching on tenure-track at a business school, a career towards which I had prepared myself academically for a long time. Not knowing clearly where I was headed next and for that matter who I was without that particular career, I asked myself the question "Who am I" before I went to sleep the night the above dream appeared, affecting me profoundly. To be clear, the meaning I took from the dream, the anima pointing me towards the possibility that I was the whole universe was not unknown to me. I had heard the theme before during a series of lectures on the

Bhagavad Gita by Swami Chinmayananda during my undergraduate studies in India and in other contexts since. But none of it had had the direct emotional and lingering effect of the meaning that the dream had. It can perhaps be argued that the dream was nothing more than a creative re-presentation of mediate knowledge in the unconscious initially gained from the outside. But that interpretation does not somehow quite fully capture or explain the dream, of the numinous anima presence, its archetypal quality, and its lasting and greater impact than all the mediate knowledge I had been exposed to before as to the possibility that 'I' might be the whole universe.

In his autobiography, Jung (1961/1989, pp. 323-324) reports two dreams that can be easily interpreted as instances of ego-self communication involving mediate knowledge for greater self-realization claimed as possible in Advaita Vedanta. The passage is reproduced below in its entirety to present what Jung did with the dreams by way of interpretation in his own words before a case is made that both dreams offer evidence of intrapsychic communication with the potential to lead to enlightenment, as evidence of mediate knowledge through dreams that parallels the core knowledge in the Vedas.

> In one dream, which I had in October 1958, I caught sight from my house of two lens-shaped metallically gleaming disks, which hurtled in a narrow arc over the house and down to the lake. They were two UFOs (Unidentified Flying Objects). Then another body came directly flying towards me. It was a perfectly circular lens, like the objective of a telescope. At a distance of four or five hundred yards it stood still for a moment, and then flew off. Immediately afterward, another came speeding through the air: a lens with a metallic extension which led to box-a magic lantern. At a distance of sixty or seventy yards it stood still in the air, pointing straight at me. I awoke with a feeling of astonishment. Still half in the dream, the thought passed through my head: "We always think that the UFOs are projections of ours. Now it turned out that we are their projections. I am projected by the magic lantern as C.G. Jung. But who manipulates that apparatus?"

I had dreamed once before of the problem of the self and the ego. In that earlier dream I was on a hiking trip. I was walking along a little road through a hilly landscape; the sun was shining and I had a wide view in all directions. Then I came to a small wayside chapel. The door was ajar, and I went in. To my surprise there was no image of the virgin on the altar, and no crucifix either, but only a wonderful flower arrangement. But then I saw that on the floor in front of the altar, facing me, sat a yogi- in a lotus posture, in deep meditation. When I looked at him more closely, I realized that he had my face. I started in profound fright, and awoke with the thought: "Aha, so he is the one who is meditating me. He has a dream, and I am it." I knew that when he awakened, I would no longer be.

I had this dream after my illness in 1944. It is a parable: My self retires into meditation and meditates my earthly form. To put it another way: it assumes human shape in order to enter three-dimensional existence, as if someone is putting on a diver's suit to dive into the sea. When it renounces existence in the hereafter, the self assumes a religious posture, as the chapel in the dream shows. In earthly form it can pass through the experiences of the three-dimensional world, and by greater awareness take a further step towards realization.

The figure of the yogi then would more or less represent my unconscious prenatal wholeness, and the Far East, as is often the case in dreams, a psychic state alien and opposed to our own. Like the magic lantern, the yogi's meditation "projects" my empirical reality. As a rule, we see this causal relationship in reverse: in the products of the unconscious we discover mandala symbols, that is, circular and quaternary figures which express wholeness, and whenever we wish to express wholeness, we employ just such figures. Our basis is ego-consciousness, our world the field of light centered on the focal point of the ego. From that point we look out upon an enigmatic world of obscurity, never knowing to what extent the shadowy forms we see are caused by our consciousness, or posses a reality of their own. The superficial observer is content with the first assumption. But closer study shows that as a rule the images of unconscious are not produced by consciousness, but have a reality and spontaneity of their own. Nevertheless, we regard them as mere marginal phenomena.

The aim of both these dreams is to effect a reversal of the relationship between ego-consciousness and the unconscious, and to represent the unconscious as the generator of the empirical personality. This reversal suggests that in the opinion of the "other side," our unconscious existence is the real one and our conscious world a kind of illusion, an apparent reality constructed for a specific purpose, like a dream which seems like a reality as long as we are in it. It is clear that this state of affairs very closely resembles very closely the Oriental conception of *Maya*. (Jung, 1961/1989, pp. 323-324)

In the analysis of the two dreams, Jung comes very close to an interpretation that the dreams communicate mediate knowledge of not only a conscious self other than the ego but also of the relationship between that self and the individual as between dreams and waking states, as theorized by Advaita Vedanta. In one dream, Jung understands himself as a projection of the magic lantern from a UFO. In the other dream, Jung understands himself as a projection of the meditating yogi upon whose awakening the individualism of Jung is no more. The individual ego is understood as resolved as the awakening of the yogi from the meditation takes place. In Advaita Vedanta, the dream state is often used as an analogy to communicate the relationship between the self and the individual: As the dream state disappears in the waking state, so does the sense of the individual when the ego consciousness resolves in the absolute consciousness of the *Brahman* upon enlightenment (Layek, 1990, pp. 16-52).

It can be argued that the representation of the self can be seen as a conscious (self-aware) entity in both dreams, a magic lantern from a UFO operated presumably by an unseen conscious alien being in one dream and a less ambiguous conscious meditating yogi in the other. However, Jung does not go that far in his interpretation. He interprets the yogi as a representation of his unconscious prenatal wholeness and an Eastern compensatory attitude from the unconscious to his Western conscious attitude bringing both dreams right back into his familiar framework of meaning with the locus of consciousness located solely in the ego even though the dreams communicate other possibilities in what appear to be no uncertain terms in accordance with the theoretical perspective of Advaita Vedanta. It is one of the enduring counterintuitive puzzles in Jungian thought that the archetypes of the collective unconscious such as the wise old

man and the wise old woman, not to mention the self that is the center and the superordinate regulator of the whole of the psyche, are theorized as unconscious entities (I am grateful to my dissertation advisor Glen Slater for getting me thinking along these lines in a conversation relating to the dissertation). This apparent glaring anomaly appears to be due to the imposition of Kantian philosophical and epistemological assumptions on an otherwise excellent model of the psyche.

The Value of Jungian Psychology in Acquiring Basic Psychological and Spiritual Qualifications for Enlightenment in Advaita Vedanta

In the previous sections, aspects of Jungian psychology and empirical evidence in dreams were used to reconcile the differences of opinion among Advaita Vedanta schools over solely intrapsychic means for enlightenment. In this section, other ways in which the Jungian model of individuation might be of complementary value to the Advaita Vedanta model are explored.

In Advaita Vedanta, the overall goal of psychic growth is enlightenment, the attainment of nondual consciousness. In Jungian psychology, it is individuation, an ongoing attainment of differentiation and wholeness throughout an individual's life. In Advaita Vedanta, the impulse towards the wholeness of nondual consciousness in enlightenment is considered to be a universal feature of the structure of the psyche. This impulse towards enlightenment is considered to be motivated by the need to overcome the eventual, inevitable, and persistent sense of limitation in self-definition and self-experience on all levels of consciousness other than nondual (Dayananda, 1989, pp. 1-42). In Jungian psychology, the impulse towards individuation is considered a universal structural feature of the psyche as well orchestrated by the self.

In Advaita Vedanta, even though a complete understanding of the process by which an individual becomes enlightened is held as impossible in duality, the acquisition of certain qualifications by an individual is understood to be helpful towards that end. Please see Dayananda (1997, pp. 34-78) and page 142 in chapter 2 of this dissertation for a listing of these qualifications. These qualifications are attitudes and capacities that an individual has developed that govern his inner experiences and outer behavioral impulses, his worldview, his treatment of the world outside, his understanding of his essential nature and of the world around him, and his valuation of what is most important to pursue in life beyond all these qualifications, the goal of enlightenment.

Basic qualifications for enlightenment in Advaita Vedanta

Specifically, the individual has the understanding and the capacity to tolerate the inevitable interplay of opposites, positive and negative, in his life experience; has control over his thoughts, feelings, and actions; is accepting of his and others' limitations; is accepting of himself and others; is not harmful or violent towards others; is compassionate; understands the world as *Isvara*, a manifestation of the *Brahman*, of which he is an integral part, and brings this understanding in his attitudes to and interactions with the world; understands that Isvara's will is superordinate to his and acts accordingly, accepting all outcomes as acts of grace; understands and desires the goal of enlightenment as above all other goals in life; and is single-pointed in his focus on the path of enlightenment.

The case for the use of the Jungian model in Advaita Vedanta for acquiring basic qualifications for enlightenment

In India, these qualifications are believed to accrue to the individual due to his maturing from experience of a lived life in the context of a society that embodies the essential knowledge of the Vedas, its goals as well as means, reflected in its culture, social institutions, religion, philosophy, art, and myth. And a qualified teacher, whom a relatively mature individual approaches for a deeper immersion in the material for the ultimate liberation, helps the individual to the extent necessary to further develop his basic qualifications for enlightenment. Whitfield (1992), a Westerner who immersed herself long-term in the study of Advaita Vedanta with a traditional teacher from India (who also happens to be my teacher) reports that she found Jungian analysis quite helpful in developing in her some of the basic qualifications for enlightenment. As an Easterner who has lived half his life in the West, in a 14-year Jungian analysis, I can also personally vouch for the value of Jungian analysis in helping me to develop some of the basic qualifications for enlightenment.

I have heard Swami Dayananda talk about his experience of running 3-year Advaita Vedanta residential training programs for Westerners in the U.S. He said that he was surprised by the extent of difficult psychological material that arose in his Western students, compared to his students in 3-year residential training programs in India, so much so that he had to start reading books on Western psychology to help his Western students work through the emotional difficulties that arose in the context of their spiritual practice. Swami Dayananda's observation of the cultural differences between his Western and Eastern students perhaps supports Jung's reservations and warnings about Westerners

adopting Eastern spiritual practices without regard to the cultural contexts in which these practices are found.

Countries like India are becoming increasingly Westernized, and their education systems increasingly grounded in Western science. And new generations of Indians are becoming increasingly educated in Western scientific paradigms. With increasing globalization, there has been a steady increase in the number of Indians living abroad. Although hard to measure, these trends have had some effect on the loosening of the cultural grounding that Indians have had in their lives in the past. In the West, there has been a steady increase in the interest in Eastern spiritual practices. All these trends point to a need for a psychological framework that is sufficiently scientific so as to appeal to those who are more scientifically trained and comprehensive enough so that it does not present such a reductive view of the psyche (as the Freudian model, for example) that it loses its appeal to those in the East as well as the West who have a much broader understanding of the psyche and who are pursuing larger goals of psychic development; a model that allows them to pursue larger goals for psychic development such as enlightenment and at the same time does a much better job of helping individuals on the path of enlightenment with developing the necessary qualifications for enlightenment. The Jungian model of individuation, based on empirical evidence that individuals can easily relate to their personal experience, with its greater understanding of relationships among levels of the psyche, appears to have the capacity to help modern individuals develop some of the psychological and even spiritual qualifications for enlightenment or other larger psychic goals they might be pursuing.

Eastern as well as Western systems of mysticism, religion, and spirituality, no matter the differences in their understanding of the psyche and of its possibilities, and of the ultimate goals, have in common an understanding that individuals on their path have to develop certain basic qualifications in terms of personal capacities and attitudes. Ironically, even though Jung warned Westerners against adopting Eastern spiritual practice, the Jungian model appears to be well-suited for adoption in other cultures for not just basic psychological preparation but also for basic spiritual attitudes such as ego-surrender that are often seen as necessary for larger spiritual pursuits as a basic spiritual qualification. In a way, the Jungian model, with its understanding of the need for all individuals to work with the collective cultural conscious as well as unconscious levels of their psyche, where culture itself is relativized as levels in the psyche, can be regarded as a truly transcultural model of the psyche. In that its structural understanding of the psyche shares to an extent the Eastern understanding of the psyche vis-à-vis the self while at the same time retaining the psychological thinking and the scientific attitude of the West, the Jungian model has additional attributes for being characterized as a truly trans-cultural model of the psyche. This perhaps explains the extent of Jung's impact on the field of trans-personal psychology, in the formulation of transpersonal psychology models, in the use of its concepts and techniques in the psychological preparation of individuals (through the use of shadow work for example), and in instilling the basic spiritual attitude of ego surrender in individuals through communications along the ego-self axis (Fox, 1990, p. 299; Grof, 1985, pp. 187-188). This perhaps also explains why the very first issue (April 1956) of the journal of the Indian Psychotherapeutic Society was dedicated to Jung.

The value of Jungian psychology in developing basic 'psychological' qualifications for enlightenment

Specifically, to those on the Advaita Vedanta path, the Jungian model can be of help in preparing them vis-à-vis the "psychological" qualifications required of them for enlightenment. For example, in Jungian psychology, individuation is understood to proceed from encounters between the conscious and the unconscious, where the hard-to-reconcile polarities are made conscious through compensatory mechanisms in the structure of the psyche, and then helped with their reconciliation by another structural feature of the psyche, the transcendent function. Through this process, it can be seen that individuals can develop a capacity to hold and tolerate the opposite tendencies in their psyche and the extreme experiences accompanying such polarities. This can help individuals in developing one of the most important qualifications for enlightenment: the ability to tolerate the opposites in their life experience.

And, in Jungian psychology, when individuals act compulsively mentally or physically, in terms of thoughts, feelings, actions, and they cannot help themselves, it is understood that such tendencies are often driven by unconscious complexes, systems of ways of perceiving and responding that are derived from personal experience but often one-sided and with an archetypal one-sidedness in its core. Examples of such complexes are the good mother versus the bad mother complexes associated with the good mother and bad mother archetypes. Working with difficult complexes involve making them more conscious, deepening into and building a capacity for the difficult experiences they involve, gaining a measure of control over the compulsive nature of perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that accompany them, and if necessary working with the complexes and their underlying archetypal templates that constitute their polarities in

the psyche. That is, an individual who suffers from a bad mother complex has to learn not only to make conscious and tolerate the difficult experiences of that complex without compulsively acting from them but might also have to work with the good mother complex and the good mother archetype as its basis. It can be seen that this process, in addition to helping individuals to develop a capacity for tolerating opposites in life experience, can also help them to have control over compulsive and habitual tendencies in their perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, which are some of the other important qualifications for enlightenment according to Advaita Vedanta. The other qualifications, the capacities to forgive oneself and others, to have compassion for oneself and others in the face of one's and other's limitations, and to accept oneself and others unconditionally, can be seen as having a stronger grounding in the psyche of those who have the capacity to tolerate the extremes in their life experience and have a cognitive as well as experiential understanding that all human beings share tendencies towards all polarities in their psychic makeup.

The value of Jungian psychology in developing basic 'spiritual' qualifications for enlightenment

The Jungian model can also be of help to those on the Advaita Vedanta path for developing the basic "spiritual" qualifications for enlightenment, the ability of the individual to understand the superordinate status of the will of God and to surrender to it, and taking all outcomes, positive and negative, as grace, from an understanding that the totality of the world that one is dealing with is *Isvara* (God) of which one is an integral part. In the Jungian model, one of the hallmarks of individuation is the ego's eventual understanding and surrender to the super-ordinate will of the self. We saw in chapter 2

that Jung found that he was unable to differentiate images of the self from images of God in culture after culture. Therefore, the Jungian model offers those on the Advaita Vedanta path an intrapsychic, subjective, and empirical path to an experiential understanding of the relationship between the ego and the self (God), of the latter's superordinate status, and of the eventual need to surrender to it, in order not only to become more differentiated but also more whole. Thus, the two models together offer not only a more comprehensive map of the psyche but also a greater range of means to realize it.

Chapter 5

Conclusions

The two primary objectives of this dissertation were (a) an exploration of the difficulty Jung had with states of consciousness other than the empirical ego, from the complementary perspective provided by Advaita Vedanta, an Indian philosophy; and (b) an exploration of the debate among Advaita Vedanta schools on whether enlightenment can be achieved through intrapsychic means alone, from the complementary perspective provided by Jungian psychology. These explorations were carried out in the context of long-term personal immersion in the theory and practice of the two systems of personal development, a research orientation recommended by Borelli (1985b) after an extensive review of the literature of C. G. Jung and Eastern religious traditions.

The chapter consists of five sections. Section 1 presents the major research questions and the summary of major findings, by chapter. Section 2 presents the specific incremental contributions of this dissertation to the area of research. Section 3 explores the potential contribution of the dissertation to the theory and practice of clinical psychology. Section 4 reflects on the limitations of this dissertation, and Section 5 points to possibilities for future research and study in the area of scholarship.

Summary of Major Findings

Research questions addressed in chapter 3:

Primary and overall objective:

Can a dialogue between the specific Eastern tradition of Advaita Vedanta and Jungian psychology shed further light on any misunderstanding that Jung might have had

of Eastern thought especially in relation to the nature of higher states of consciousness and the possibility for attaining them in the human psyche?

Secondary and specific objectives:

a. Theoretical perspective: Jung criticized Eastern claims of higher states of consciousness on philosophical grounds laid by Kant. Accordingly, he argued that the self cannot be known directly. He defined the ego as the only conscious function in the psyche. And he understood consciousness as always implying a subject-object context. From the perspective of Vedanta, it has been observed that Jungian thought is dualistic and that it is pertinent to one order or level of reality in Vedanta (Thornton, 1965). And according to Advaita Vedanta, a mysterious force called maya makes it extremely difficult for the human psyche to grasp its infinite nature (Radhakrishnan, 1923/1994b, p. 507). To what extent and in what specific ways can an in-depth study of Advaita Vedanta's multilevel model of the psyche with dual and nondual levels of consciousness help explain and reconcile Jung's difficulties with, rejection, and misunderstanding of Eastern thought, especially in relation to higher states of consciousness beyond the ego?

b. Epistemological perspective: One reason Jung offered for rejecting Eastern claims of higher states of consciousness is that Eastern epistemology lacked the logical rigor of Western post-Kantian critical philosophy. Indian philosopher Radhakrishnan (1929/1994a) disagrees: "It is untrue that philosophy in India never became self-conscious or critical. Even in its early stages rational reflection tended to correct religious belief" (p. 27). Does an in-depth analysis of Advaita Vedanta epistemology offer insight on this difference of opinion on whether Eastern philosophy and epistemology have a critical basis? What is the basis of Jung's conclusions in this regard?

c. Empirical perspective: One of Jung's criticisms of Eastern claims of higher states of consciousness was that they were not based on empirical evidence. What empirical evidence is there in the East as well as the West for the attainment of higher states of consciousness? What are their characteristics? To what extent do they meet Jung's criteria for empirical evidence?

d. Scientific perspective: Jung rejected Eastern claims of higher states of consciousness as scientifically untenable. However, in his formulation of the concept of synchronicity and reformulation of the psychoid archetype on the basis of emerging scientific findings in quantum physics, Jung speculated on a common third out of which the duality of psyche and matter arose and appeared to be moving in the direction of Advaita Vedanta's understanding of the nature of psyche as the fundamental substratum of the universe. Do findings in quantum physics since Jung bring the Jungian and Advaita Vedanta models closer?

Summary of major findings in chapter 3

The main reason for Jung's rejection of Eastern claims of higher states of consciousness beyond the empirical ego appears to be philosophical, based on the thinking of Kant. Jung was not unfamiliar with claims of personal experiences of higher states of consciousness. Having conceived the ego as the only center of consciousness in the psyche and consciousness as possible only in a subject-object context, Jung could not theoretically allow for states or centers of consciousness that did not involve a subject-object context, which appears to have had such a strong influence on him throughout his life that it appears to have led him to overlook the empirical evidence that came his way,

others' as well as his, evidence that pointed in the direction of the possibility of higher states of consciousness as claimed by the East.

An in-depth study of Advaita Vedanta and an analysis of Jung's readings on Eastern thought also reveal other possible reasons for his difficulty in accepting higher states of consciousness: inadequate understanding of Eastern claims, concepts, and epistemology from inadequate exposure to appropriate expository texts and inadequate long-term personal immersion in the practice of an Eastern path such as Advaita Vedanta to personally experience higher states of consciousness. Personal experience of higher states of consciousness is the only way to validate Eastern claims of higher states of consciousness beyond the ego as they cannot be apprehended as objects of consciousness at the empirical level of reality. Two of Jung's major misunderstandings of Eastern thought, the understanding that there is no 'I' or observer in higher states of consciousness that transcend all polarities (there is a witness) and that the East believes that the empirical reality is an illusion (neither real nor unreal, depending on the level of consciousness), are also revealed as inaccurate through the Advaita Vedanta perspective.

Advaita Vedanta offers an adequate complementary perspective for understanding Jung's conceptual difficulty with states of consciousness beyond the empirical ego as a natural human error. Advaita Vedanta postulates a multilevel structure of a nondual psyche with multiple dual or relative or dependent levels of consciousness and a nondual or absolute or independent level of consciousness. Consciousness on all relative levels is dependent on (or derives from) the absolute level of consciousness of a nondual self but appears to be independent and arising from relative levels because of strong inherent tendencies in the psyche. Given this, Jung's understanding of the empirical ego as the

only center of consciousness in the psyche and the methodology of modern science can both seen as valid in relation to the first-order of reality of the phenomenal world which has been referred to as the empirical order of reality throughout this dissertation. In addition, Jung's difficulty in accepting states of consciousness beyond the empirical ego and the Kantian philosophical outlook that strongly influenced it can both be understood as natural human error given the strong structural tendencies in the psyche (*maya, adhyasa,* etc.) for limiting identification of oneself and appearance of independence of consciousness on every relative level of the psyche.

The Advaita Vedanta theory on the formation of ego consciousness in the psyche offers a complementary perspective on the underpinnings of the empirical ego in the Jungian model. The basis of the ego (the *ahamkara*) in Advaita Vedanta is an unconscious sense of self (I-thought) that arises naturally from the operations of the body, mind, and senses. It derives its ability to be conscious ultimately from the *Brahman*, the only self that is infinite, conscious of itself without being an object unto itself, and whose existence does not depend on anything else. The appearance that the ego is the source of consciousness at the level of empirical reality is due to strong and hard-to-overcome inherent tendencies in the psyche towards mutual super-imposition (*adhyasa*) of the consciousness property of the *Brahman* and the body, mind, and senses on each other, caused by the projecting and concealing powers of *maya*, an apparent mystery, that can be described as neither existent nor nonexistent. Interestingly, modern neuroscience also understands the basis of the ego as an unconscious product of the body, mind, and senses where the mind is understood as a derivative of the physical brain. However, it differs

from Advaita Vedanta in that it believes that the ego is made conscious by yet-to-be determined processes of the brain itself.

One of the reasons Jung appears to offer for his rejection of Eastern claims of higher states of consciousness beyond the empirical ego is his criticism of Eastern epistemology as lacking a basis in post-Kantian critical philosophy. An in-depth analysis of Advaita Vedanta epistemology presented in Adhvarindra's 17th century *Vedanta Paribhasa* reveals an Eastern epistemology that appears to meet the logical rigor of a post-Kantian critical philosophy which is by and large is in agreement with Jung and Kant vis-à-vis their conclusions on what is knowable and what is not knowable at the empirical and phenomenal orders of reality. A number of possible reasons are provided for Jung's inadequate grasp of the nature of Eastern epistemologies: Jung's inadequate exposure to appropriate texts on Eastern epistemology as revealed through an analysis of his references to Eastern thought in his collected works; his lack of in-depth immersion in a system of Eastern thought; and the often-overlooked dual nature of Eastern thought as a philosophy as well as a *pramana* (means of knowledge) for spiritual achievement.

As for empirical evidence for higher states of consciousness beyond the empirical ego, there appears to be adequate evidence for them in the form of personal experiences involving them from the East as well as the West, evidence that appears to meet Jung's own criteria for empirical evidence. And although there appears to be enough commonality across the descriptions for making valid generalizations across cultures and individuals, there is at the same time considerable variation in the descriptions of higher states of consciousness beyond the empirical ego. This variation, however, can be understood from the Advaita Vedanta perspective as due to (a) the multiple levels of

consciousness in the psyche that awareness can extend to on the way to the nondual consciousness of enlightenment and (b) the difficulty in describing such states from the level of the empirical ego with language increasingly inadequate for describing the highest states of consciousness. And this variation can also be understood from the Jungian point of view as due to the filtering of such experiences through the cultural layers of the collective unconscious.

Using the findings from the emerging paradigm of quantum physics as a basis, Jung hypothesized that the psyche and matter might arise from a common substratum, to account for synchronistic phenomena. Writings in Jungian psychology based on modern findings in quantum physics since Jung continue to affirm and refine Jung's hypothesis. Bohm's (1980) theory of explicate and implicate orders implies that there is no limit to the extent to which the unconscious can be made conscious challenging Jung's view to the contrary. Bohm's understanding, however, that it is difficult but not impossible for human beings to make what is implicit explicit due to strong inherent tendencies in the psyche offers additional insight into the difficulty Jung, phenomenology, and modern science have had in imagining centers and states of consciousness outside of the subject-object context of the empirical order of reality. Of special interest to Advaita Vedanta is the finding by quantum physicist Goswami (1993) that all the paradoxes in modern quantum physics resolve with the hypothesis of nondual consciousness as the substratum of the universe, which offers modern scientific support for the Advaita Vedanta claim. However, Goswami (1993) makes a common error in characterizing the ultimate nature of reality as pure consciousness. But it does not seem to affect his conclusions.

Research questions addressed in chapter 4

Primary and overall objectives:

Can a dialogue between the specific Eastern tradition of Advaita Vedanta and Jungian psychology help resolve the differences of opinion among Advaita Vedanta schools on whether human beings have the inherent capacity to achieve enlightenment through solely intrapsychic means without an external source of knowledge such as the Vedas? Can such a dialogue also lead to the formulation of a more-comprehensive model of the psyche with greater means and ends for psychic growth?

Secondary and specific objectives:

a. What is the nature of the epistemological argument in some schools of Advaita Vedanta against the possibility of enlightenment through solely intrapsychic means?

b. Can Jungian psychology, especially with its well-developed understanding of the archetypal structure of the psyche and of the intrapsychic axis of communication between the ego and the self, help in understanding and if possible resolving the above differences of opinion among the Advaita Vedanta schools?

c. What understanding is there in the East of the possibility intrapsychic communication between the self and the ego of archetypal realities, especially through dreams which are considered to be an important conduit of such communications in Jungian psychology?

d. Is there any empirical evidence for intrapsychic ego-self communication that is on par with the core mediate knowledge around enlightenment in Advaita Vedanta?

e. In what ways do Jungian psychology and Advaita Vedanta complement each other? Is it possible to arrive at an overarching model of the psyche by integrating the two

models that offer greater possibilities, goals as well means, for human psychic achievement? Given the findings of the dissertation, what revisions or changes have to be made in the fundamental assumptions of the two systems to make them compatible?

Summary of major findings in chapter 4

The use of Wilbur's four-quadrant integral model to assess the strengths, weaknesses, and complementarities of Jungian psychology and Advaita Vedanta models reveals that perennial philosophies such as Vedanta have done a better job of understanding and mapping the higher reaches of the spectrum of consciousness in the human psyche and modern psychologies such as Jungian psychology have done a better job of understanding and mapping its lower reaches. Even though he might have fallen short in understanding the nature and locus of consciousness in the human psyche, Jung's understanding of the higher reaches of the psyche and his understanding of the relationship between its higher and lower reaches appear to be greater than those of any Western psychologist, with the exception of transpersonal psychologists many of whom drew much inspiration from Jung.

Jung understood all aspects of the psyche, structure as well as process, including all intrapsychic communications, as ultimately archetypally configured. Jung also understood that the relationships among all constituents of the psyche (between its higher and lower reaches, between the self and the ego) and the compensatory nature of intrapsychic communications among all of its constituents as archetypally driven and orchestrated by the self. And he conceptualized the psyche and its process in such a way as to make it relatively easy for individuals to learn about themselves through observing

their own intrapsychic communications such as dreams; not only about the superficial layers of their psyche such as the personal unconscious but also about its deeper transpersonal layers such as the self. In these respects, Jung offers a better understanding and mapping of the psyche than the East. For example, an analysis of the understanding of dreams in Indian thought reveals a real lack of understanding of their importance as intrapsychic means of communication from the unconscious to the conscious and in particular from the self to the ego as understood by Jungian psychology.

Even though all Advaita Vedanta schools agree that there are internal possibilities in the psyche of all human beings for the immediate knowledge of enlightenment to take place, there are differences of opinion among them as to whether individuals can get there without help from the outside, in the form of an external source of mediate knowledge such as the Vedas. The schools that hold the position that such knowledge was revealed by God to man do not have a satisfactory explanation for how this might have taken place in the first place. Some schools like the one I attend point to a 17th-century epistemological treatise in Advaita Vedanta by Adhvarindra (Madhavananda, 1942/2000) for an explanation. On close inspection, it turns out that this treatise only establishes that the *Brahman* cannot be apprehended as an object of consciousness in the empirical order of reality within the epistemological means at one's disposal at that level of reality; and that mediate knowledge such as verbal testimony found in the Vedas is a valid means for attaining enlightenment given the nature of the multilevel psyche. It does not however address whether such mediate knowledge can arise through intra-psychic processes among the multiple levels of the psyche.

Jung's superior understanding of relationships and communications among different levels of the psyche offers the possibility for understanding and reconciling the controversy among Advaita Vedanta schools on the possibility of obtaining the necessary mediate knowledge for enlightenment through intrapsychic means alone, knowledge that is on par with that found in the Vedas, through the compensatory mechanisms that are built into the archetypal template of the psyche. The claim by some schools that the critical mediate knowledge in the Vedas associated with the higher reaches of human nature cannot be gained by an individual through intrapsychic means only, and their explanation that such mediate knowledge in the Vedas was a revelation from God to man, can both be understood as derived from intrapsychic processes such as dreams or visions or other inner or "outer" images involving images of God in states of higher consciousness of the yogis and other individuals from autonomous compensatory archetypal movements in the psyche. Jung himself found that he could not differentiate the images of the self from the images of God in the evidence he found across cultures.

There are many reported instances of such spontaneous and autonomous experiences of higher states of consciousness including non-dual states leading to immediate as well as mediate knowledge of one's deeper nature. At times, they happen in the context of religious and spiritual practice, and at times they happen to ordinary people in other contexts which often form the starting point for a new orientation to their lives and a deeper exploration into themselves. Limited evidence of the communication of mediate knowledge for enlightenment along the ego-self axis, like the core knowledge associated with enlightenment in the Vedas, is presented through dreams that Jung himself had in his life and reported in his autobiography.

The Jungian and Advaita Vedanta models offer complementary perspectives with good potential for forming a more comprehensive model of the psyche that can serve as a basis for greater individual psychic achievement in the modern world, in the West as well as the East. The Jungian self is comparable to *Isvara*, the apparent self of the phenomenal world in Advaita Vedanta from the point of view of the absolute self of the *Brahman*. With the addition of another level of the self to the Jungian model, along the lines of the *Brahman*, the individual pursuit for psychic development can be extended beyond individuation to enlightenment where individuation can be regarded as a necessary step for acquiring the basic psychological and spiritual qualifications for enlightenment.

The possibility for enlightenment through immediate as well as mediate knowledge generated solely intrapsychically through compensatory mechanisms built into the archetypal template of the psyche as explicated through the Jungian framework and supported by findings in quantum physics is likely to appeal to the increasingly scientifically trained minds of the West as well as the East. In addition, the process of individuation in the Jungian model, its theory and practice, can offer modern man in any culture a rational, systematic, and subjectively verifiable way to acquire the necessary psychological and spiritual qualifications listed as factors that increase the likelihood of enlightenment in Advaita Vedanta. Jungian psychology and Advaita Vedanta are in agreement that the understanding of the psyche beyond a certain level involves experience that is beyond reason and explanation. And, at the same time, they both recognize the need for any knowledge of the psyche to be subject to reason and logic.

The basic sticking points to the integration of the two models towards the formation of an overarching model of the psyche are the assumptions in the Jungian

model of the ego as the only center of consciousness and of the impossibility of consciousness without an object. I hope that this dissertation has provided evidence from multiple angles, theoretical and empirical, from Advaita Vedanta, from quantum physics, and from the evolution in Jung, to help clarify, convince, and move the Jungian model towards a loosening of these basic assumptions driven by Kantian critical philosophy. It does not mean, however, that all aspects of both models can be interwoven seamlessly into a comprehensive whole. In fact, areas where they do not mesh well offer opportunities for further research. In this context, it is important to note that two models do not have to blend with each other perfectly for them to of complementary use to each other.

Incremental Contributions of the Dissertation to the Area of Research

As incremental contributions to the area of research, this dissertation does the following:

1. Identifies Jung's philosophical and consequent epistemological assumptions with their basis in Kantian critical philosophy and epistemology, and not the lack of exposure to relevant empirical evidence, as the main reason for Jung's difficulty in accepting states of consciousness beyond the empirical ego.
2. Also attributes Jung's lack in understanding and accepting of higher states of consciousness beyond the empirical ego to his inadequate exposure to necessary texts from a review of Jung's sources of Eastern thought in his collected works; and to his lack of long-term personal immersion in an

Eastern system of thought from an analysis of the process enlightenment in Advaita Vedanta.

3. Understands Jung's difficulty in accepting states of consciousness beyond the empirical ego from the Advaita Vedanta theoretical perspective as natural and reasonable human error due to strong tendencies such as *adhyasa* (superimposition) and *maya* inherent in the psyche of all human beings that make it extremely difficult to grasp the real nature and locus of consciousness (ability to be self-aware) in the psyche.

4. Examines the range of evidence for higher states of consciousness from the East and the West in the form of self-reports of personal experiences of individuals and concludes that there is adequate evidence for them and that they meet Jung's criteria for empirical evidence.

5. Offers a possible explanation for the huge variation in the descriptions of higher states of consciousness beyond the empirical ego in terms of number of levels of consciousness possible in the multilevel Advaita Vedanta model of the psyche and the difficulty in expressing in language experiences of higher states of consciousness.

6. Corroborates, elaborates, and deepens the understanding of others (Thornton, 1965; Whitfield, 1992) that the Jungian model can be regarded as valid for the empirical order of reality in the Advaita Vedanta model of the psyche with a deeper and more detailed analysis of the nature and locus of consciousness in the Advaita Vedanta model of the psyche.

7. Presents the evolution in Jung's thinking throughout his life, from new empirical evidence (on re-incarnation, for example), from the part of his personality (no. 2) that valued the irrational, and from emerging quantum physics findings (his reformulation of the psychoid archetype to account for synchronistic phenomena), and his dreams that pointed to centers of consciousness beyond the ego, an evolution that indicates movement towards reconciliation within himself of his earlier differences with the East on higher states of consciousness;
8. Presents evidence from modern quantum physics findings that support the Advaita Vedanta theory of the conscious nature of the substratum of the universe (Goswami, 1993) which in turn supports Bohm's (1980) theory of implicate and explicate orders of reality and its implication that there is no limit to the extent to which the unconscious can be made conscious.
9. Provides an analysis of the relative strengths, weaknesses, and complementarities of Advaita Vedanta and Jungian psychology models using the framework provided by Wilbur's comprehensive integral model. This analysis finds that Advaita Vedanta's superiority in mapping the higher reaches of the spectrum of consciousness and Jungian psychology's superiority in mapping its lower reaches are highly complementary.
10. Employs the superior understanding of the psyche provided by Jungian psychology, its theory of archetypes, its understanding of relationships among different levels of the psyche, and of the compensatory nature of intrapsychic communications among its constituents, to reconcile

differences of opinion among Advaita Vedanta schools on the possibility of obtaining the requisite mediate knowledge for enlightenment through intra-psychic means alone, in favor of the existence of such capacity in the psyche.

11. Examines the 17th century Advaita Vedanta epistemological treatise *Vedanta Paribhasa* by Adhvarindra (Madhavanana, 1942/2000) and finds that it does not support the contention of some Advaita Vedanta schools that this treatise supports their position that the requisite mediate knowledge for enlightenment cannot be obtained by intrapsychic means alone and also finds that it only establishes that the self cannot be apprehended as an object in the empirical order of reality which is consistent with Jung's and Kant's views and that the mediate knowledge in the form of verbal testimony in the Vedas is a valid means for achieving enlightenment.

12. Discusses the complementary role the Jungian model can play in helping those on the Advaita Vedanta path in obtaining the necessary psychological qualifications (the ability to tolerate opposites, for example) and spiritual qualifications (surrender of the ego to the self, for example) for enlightenment.

13. Presents a case for a more comprehensive model of the psyche that integrates two complementary models with greater possibilities for psychic development for the modern scientific human in all cultures and also presents adequate theoretical and empirical evidence for relaxing

Jungian psychology's assumption that consciousness is limited to the empirical ego to make the integration or joint use of Advaita Vedanta and Jungian psychology models possible.

14. Offers an example of research based on long-term and in-depth immersion in an Eastern and a Western model of the psyche as recommended by Borelli (1985b).

Implications for Clinical Psychology

Jung's contributions to the theory and practice of clinical psychology enlarged the understanding of the psyche beyond the personal unconscious of Freud, placed the self in the collective unconscious as the central organizing principle of the psyche, and introduced individuation as an important motivating force and goal for personal development. Inspired in part by Jung, transpersonal psychologists have mapped more comprehensive models of the psyche and more over-arching goals such as enlightenment for personal psychic development. However, due to a variety of factors, Jungian psychology and transpersonal psychologies to a greater degree continue to occupy only a fringe status in the larger mainstream of the theory and practice of clinical psychology.

Much of modern mainstream psychology continues to share the neuro-scientific hypothesis that consciousness is an elusive and yet-to-be-demonstrated derivative property of the physical brain. The range of pursuit of therapeutic change in clinical settings has become increasingly narrow, focused on pathology on the one hand and psychopharmacology on the other. Realistically, the contributions of this dissertation to the general theory and practice of clinical psychology has to be placed in the context of

the extent to which they can help gain acceptance for Jungian and transpersonal psychologies in the mainstream psychologies as the psyche at large moves mainstream psychologies and cultures they are embedded in the compensatory direction of larger meanings and pursuits in psychic life as the solution to life's persistent ills, through models that make sense to the modern scientific human being.

Some findings presented by the dissertation offer possibilities for convincing the now largely and increasingly scientifically minded modern man the importance of more expanded models of the psyche for personal development and of larger pursuits in one's psychic life for greater meaning and fulfillment as a human being: The parallels between modern neuro-science and Advaita Vedanta in the understanding of the structure of consciousness in the human psyche on the micro level, the parallels between modern quantum physics and Advaita Vedanta in the understanding of the nature of the substratum of the universe on a macro level, and the presentation of empirical evidence on higher states of consciousness and intrapsychic possibilities for achieving them to which individuals can easily relate to their personal experience. The wider adoption of these findings by mainstream psychologies would of course depend to a great extent on the compensatory shifts in the larger psyche in the direction of larger meanings from a felt collective need for them. Meanwhile, the immediate implications of the findings of this dissertation are to be found in their application to Jungian psychology on the one hand and transpersonal psychologies on the other.

The findings of this dissertation offer a theoretical and empirical rationale for enlarging the Jungian model to accommodate a different but complementary understanding of the nature and locus of consciousness in the human psyche, another

level of the self, another layer of possible psychic achievement, and another layer of meaning in intrapsychic communications between the conscious and the unconscious and in synchronistic phenomena. The dissertation also offers transpersonal psychology models a theoretical and empirical rationale that is grounded in a cross-validation of an Eastern spiritual philosophy and a modern Western depth psychology. It also offers transpersonal psychologies a theoretical and empirical rationale for employing an expanded Jungian model as suggested in this dissertation for not only psychological purposes in the context of spiritual work but also for spiritual purposes such as enlightenment.

Limitations of the Dissertation

The scope of the dissertation is wide-ranging, an analysis of an area of conceptual difficulty in each system from an in-depth perspective provided by the other, from multiple angles, theoretical and empirical, involving quantum physics, neuroscience, mysticism, metaphor, transpersonal psychology, philosophy, logic, and epistemology. For this reason, depth had to be sacrificed for breath in some areas with the research exploratory and the conclusions hypothetical as a consequence, which offer potential directions for future research and study. Two of the areas that suffered the most from less than adequate depth and offer good possibilities for future research are the analysis of empirical evidence of higher states of consciousness in chapter 3 and the analysis of empirical evidence for intrapsychic communication of mediate knowledge for enlightenment through intrapsychic means such as dreams, visions, and imagination in chapter 4.

Possible Directions for Future Research and Study

1. The analysis of the quantum physics finding (Goswami, 1993) that all of its theoretical contradictions resolve with the assumption that the underlying substratum of the universe is consciousness, along the lines of the Advaita Vedanta position, offers possibilities for an in-depth examination of its claims by researchers with a good grounding in quantum physics.
2. The discussion of the parallels between Advaita Vedanta and modern neuro-science on the subject of how consciousness is constructed at the lower end of the spectrum of consciousness in the upper-left quadrant in Wilbur's four-quadrant integral model offers possibilities for a deeper exploration.
3. Both Jungian and Advaita Vedanta models theorize vertical and horizontal structures in the psyche that are not necessarily equivalent. An in-depth study of the multilevel structure of the psyche in Advaita Vedanta to determine whether there are further parallels between it and the structure of the Jungian model especially its archetypal theory along vertical and horizontal lines offers another possibility for research that can help in integrating the two models further.
4. *Vedanta Paribhasa* by Dharmaraja Adhvarindra, the Advaita Vedanta epistemological treatise has a sophisticated presentation of the structure of the multilevel psyche that understands the mind and its processes such as perception as originating from the subtle body of the individual; and not

from the gross physical body that science attributes them to. In the former view, the physical body is used as an instrument by the subtle body on the gross physical level of empirical reality; and it is the superimposition of the properties of the subtle body on the gross body that makes the mind and its processes such as perception erroneously appear to be independent properties of the gross physical body. This multilevel structure of the psyche in Advaita Vedanta with a subtle body and a gross body with the former penetrating the latter moving through the latter to generate psychic processes such as perception and understanding offers the possibility of an explanation within the Advaita Vedanta framework itself of possibilities for solely intrapsychic communication of necessary mediate knowledge for enlightenment. This offers a potential direction of future research for reconciling the differences of opinion among the Advaita Vedanta schools on the subject within the Advaita Vedanta framework itself.

5. The collective unconscious in the Jungian model is understood as a layer of the psyche shared by all human beings which does not necessarily ascribe its transpersonal nature a metaphysical status. The Advaita Vedanta model understands that the deeper layer of the individual psyche that is transpersonal has metaphysical status. The comparative study of this aspect of the two models is likely to yield insights on how their integration can be furthered.

6. A comparison of the model that integrates Jungian and Advaita Vedanta models with other Western transpersonal psychology models can be an interesting and useful study.
7. A comparison of the model that integrates Jungian and Advaita Vedanta models with more recent integral models from the East such as Sri Aurobindo's integral model can be another interesting and useful study.
8. An exploration of the usefulness of Imaginal and Archetypal psychologies in the integrated Jungian and Advaita Vedanta model especially for facilitating ego-self intrapsychic communications of higher knowledge offers yet another direction for further research.
9. A reformulation of the Jungian theory of dreams from the theoretical perspective provided by Advaita Vedanta offers a fascinating possibility for future research.

In Conclusion

This dissertation was more than anything else a personal undertaking of immense emotional significance. It was a 10-year effort to settle the emotional turbulence from the clashing and colliding of Jungian psychology and Advaita Vedanta, two models of personal growth I found myself simultaneously immersed in. It is with great satisfaction and much gratitude that I end this dissertation with the awareness that I was fortunate enough to have the grace of the self on the inside and on the outside to conclude it with a higher degree of satisfaction than I ever imagined possible.

Towards the end of the writing of this dissertation, I saw Amritanandamayi or Ammachi, a female Indian guru who is also known as the hugging saint from India. I have seen Ammachi a number of times before, but it was different this time. Despite being unimpressed by her intellect, my consciousness moved in her presence in ways I have not experienced it before. I was no longer interested in an intellectual understanding of the entire path before I followed it. The dissertation had brought me to a logical conclusion that there was no path that was lit all the way by the intellect. That it was not possible I had learned not just from reading Sankara and Jung but from a deep sense after groping for it unconsciously and unsuccessfully for 10 years or perhaps all of my life. It is as though that all the intellectual exploration and understanding, more than dispelling the many doubts I had started out with, had brought me to a place where I could simply surrender to a guru with no regard for her intellect and experience her divine grace. And perhaps as a consequence, ordinary folks I know have started to show up in my dreams as symbols of the self, affirming the divinity in the ordinary. I feel full. I feel grateful. And I have nothing more to say, for now.

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Appendix A

List of readings of Advaita Vedanta source books with details of authors, translators, and commentators

Atma Bodha. Author: Sankara.

Chinmayananda, Swami. (1993). *Atma Bodha of Bhagavan Sri Sankaracarya* (with commentary by Swami Chinmayananda). Bombay: Central Chinmaya Mission Trust. (Original work published 1987)

Nikhilananda, Swami. (2005). *Self-Knowledge (Atma Bodha)* (an English translation of Sankaracharya's Atmabodha with notes, comments, and an introduction by Swami Nikhilananda). New York: Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Center. (Original work published 1946)

The Bhagavad Gita. Author: Unknown.

Bhaktivedanta, Swami Prabhupada. (1989). *Bhagavad-gita as it is: With the original Sanskrit text, roman transliteration, English equivalents, translation and elaborate purports.* Los Angeles: Bhaktivedanta Book Trust.

Brahma Sutra Bhasya. Author: Sankara.

Vireswarandana, Swami. (1993). *Brahma Sutras* (with text, word-for-word translataion, English rendering, comments according to the commentary of Sri Sankara, and index). Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama. (Original work published 1936)

Gambhirananda, Swami. (2004). *Brahma Sutra Bhasya of Shankaracharya* (translated by Swami Gambhirananda). Kolkatta: Advaita Ashrama. (Original work published (1965)

Drg Drsya Viveka. Author: Sankara.

Nikhilananda, Swami. (1995). *Drg Drsya Viveka: An inquiry into the nature of the 'seer' and the 'seen' (* text with English translation and notes by Swami Nikhilananda). Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama.

Suddhabodhananda Saraswati, Swami. (1996). *Vedantic ways to samadhi: Drg Drsya Vivekah: The ascertainment of the true 'I'* (text with English translation and commentary by Swami Suddhabodhananda Saraswati). Mumbai: Sri Viswesar Trust.

Tejomayananda, Swami. (1994). *Drig Drishya Vivek* (with commentary in Hindi by Swami Tejomayananda and translated into English by Swamini Vimalananda). Bombay: Central Chinmaya Mission Trust.

Tattva Bodha. Author: Sankara.

Tejomayananda (Trans. and commentary) (2004). *Tattva bodha of Sri Sankaracarya.* Mumbai: Central Chinmaya Mission Trust.

The Upanishads. Authors: Unknown.

Gambhirananda, Swami. (1989). *Eight Upanishads with the commentary by Sankaracarya*, (vol. 1), (translated by Gambhirananda). Kolkatta: Advaita Ashrama. (Original work published 1957)

Gambhirananda, Swami. (1989). *Eight Upanishads with the commentary by Sankaracarya*, (vol. 2), (translated by Gambhirananda). Kolkatta: Advaita Ashrama. (Original work published 1957)

Radhakrishnan, S. (1994). *The Principal Upanishads* (edited with introduction, text, translation, and notes by S. Radhakrishnan). New Delhi: HarperCollins India. (Original work published 1953)

Vedanta Paribhasa. Author: Dharmaraja Adhvarindra.

Satprakashananda, Swami. (1974). *Methods of knowledge according to Advaita Vedanta.* Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama. (Original work published 1965)

Madhavananda, Swami. (2000), (Trans.). *Vedanta Paribhasa of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra.* (Translated and annotated by Swami Madhavananda). Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama. (Original work published 1942)

Vivekacudamani. Author: Sankara.

Madhavananda, Swami. (1995). *Viveka-cudamani of Sri Sankaracarya* (translated by Swami Madhavananda). Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama. (Original work published 1926)

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